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1Introduction
Globalization produces greater economic interconnections between countries and an in-
crease in international goods and capital flows. As a result, it is more likely that shocks,
positive or negative, do not stay isolated where they occur but spill over the borders of
nations and affect other countries. The financial crisis in 2008 and the associated tide
of events in the last two years are clear indications of the extent to which globalization
has developed and how strongly the world is linked. Governments all over the world have
reacted heavily and intervened in order to prevent the worst. They have spent an enor-
mous amount of money to try to save banks and firms. This is just one salient example
which shows us that the role of governments, their behavior and the corresponding public
spending is heavily affected by and connected to the degree of globalization. The finan-
cial crisis is also an example of how globalization can lead to greater risks and that the
welfare state as a relatively safe harbor and rescuer compensates for some of the occurred
losses and, as a result, is forced to expand. This role of the state is not restricted to
financial crises but a much more general phenomenon. In a seminal paper Rodrik (1998)
explains that open countries have ‘bigger governments’ because governments provide in-
surance against the greater risks associated with globalization, in particular, also with
international competition in the goods market. The argument contrasts the situation in
the 1990’s when several governments made a big effort to cut their budget in order to
avoid a loss in competitiveness. As Rodrik (1997a) describes: “[...] the integration of
markets for goods, services, and capital is pressuring societies to alter their traditional
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practices, and in return broad segments of these societies are putting up a fight. These
pressures for change are tangible and affect all societies. [...] Ask business executives or
government officials why these changes are necessary, and you will hear the same mantra
repeatedly: ‘We need to remain (or become) competitive in a global economy’ ” (p. 1-2).
Whether globalization causes big or small governments cannot be answered unam-
biguously (this will become more evident in Section 1.2). But probably everyone agrees
that the public sector faces great challenges caused by market integration and that glob-
alization affects government behavior. It is beyond the scope of this book to shed light
on all the dimensions of the interrelation between globalization and public spending. The
main globalization channel that this study focuses on is trade liberalization of intrain-
dustry trade. Only one part of Chapter 4 is dedicated to capital market integration.
The contribution of this book is to describe some new theoretical channels through which
globalization affects public spending and to analyze them empirically. Thereby I dis-
tinguish between the real and the nominal government share. On the one hand, a new
channel is identified of how the real government share reacts to globalization. On the
other hand, beyond its impact on the real share, it is shown that market integration can
have important additional effects on the nominal government share.
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 describes some styl-
ized facts of the public sector. Section 1.2 presents the literature on the interdependence
between openness and government size. First, some theoretical channels of how capital
markets’ and goods markets’ integration may affect public goods provision are discussed.
Then, the existing empirical evidence about this relationship is reviewed. As trade liber-
alization will be the main globalization channel discussed in this book, Section 1.3 briefly
describes the background and key features of the ‘New Trade Theory’ literature. Finally,
Section 1.4 sketches the basic idea of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and points out their contribution
and how they are related to the existing literature.
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1.1 Public Sector: Stylized Facts
1.1.1 Growth of Government Spending
Public spending has risen enormously in many countries during the last century. The
steady growth of government shares has been already addressed by Wagner in the late
nineteenth century as he noticed increasing government spending on infrastructure, edu-
cation, and health care.1 Despite the change to the modern welfare state in the nineteenth
century, the growth of government shares was comparably moderate until the World War
I.2 Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) write that the unweighted average of public expenditure
as a share of GDP for 17 industrialized countries was approximately 11 percent of gross
domestic product in 1870. The first World War induced an increase in government spend-
ing from approximately 13 (in 1913) to 19 (in 1920) percent of gross domestic product.
The great Depression, starting in 1929, was interpreted as a failure of the market econ-
omy which resulted in more active governments and higher government expenditures. In
1937, the average share of government spending was about 23 percent. After the World
War II, it continued to grow as governments took over an even more active role in the
economy. “The development of the theory of public goods and of the concept of externality
suggested a growing allocative role for the state” (ibid. p. 10). The redistributive role
of the government became a more important one. Beside social spending, the focus were
also put on expenditures on education, health and infrastructure.3 This growth in gov-
ernment spending continued to increase until 1980 where it reached on average 43 percent
(ibid.). The rising costs of government and the failure to allocate resources efficiently and
to stabilize the economy in the recession of the 1970s, led to a growing skepticism about
government intervention (ibid.). Finally, in the early 1980s, the growth has slowed down
and for some countries public expenditure shares even declined. “[...] [W]hat started as
a policy to cope with growing budget deficits and cure rampant inflation during the 1980s
developed into a campaign to [...]roll back the State[...]”(UN, 2001, World Public Sector
Report, p. 34).
1Musgrave et al. (1975).
2For early numbers on government spending components for Germany, United Kingdom and Sweden
see Flora and Heidenheimer (1981) and Nowotny (1999).
3Nowotny (1999).
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Figure 1.1 shows the development of the unweighted mean of real (constant 2005 prices)
and nominal (current prices) government consumption as a share of GDP from 1950 to
2007 (derived from Penn World Tables 6.3).4 Government consumption does not include
public investments and income transfers. This explains the lower level of government
spending compared to the aforementioned figures. There is an obvious increase in nominal
terms for both OECD and non-OECD countries until 1980 after which it flattened and
finally in the 1990s started to decrease. It was in the 1990s when Great Britain and USA
have declared the end of ‘big government’.5 The evolution in real terms is quite similar
compared to the one in nominal terms, except in the early years of the OECD sample.
The real share declined for more than a decade, from the late 1950s to 1970, while in
nominal terms there has been a steady increase.
Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) emphasizes that the most rapid growth in government
expenditure has taken place between 1960 and 1980. Many research scholars in the 1960s
and 1970s were concerned with the steady growth of the public sector which did not
seem to change in the foreseeable future. This makes it not at all surprising that studies
about public sector growth exist en masse and with it theories and explanations. For a
long time only domestic causes have been identified as sources for public sector growth
(see e.g., Garrett and Rhine (2006) for an overview). Finally, the question arose how
and whether globalization can be made responsible for this boom to some degree. Ob-
serving that after the second World War economies have become increasingly integrated,
Rodrik, 1997b notices:“Economists have paid surprisingly little attention to the relation-
ship between [...] the growth of government, on the one hand, and the intensification of
international economic integration, on the other” (p.2).
How government spending might be related to market integration - theoretically and
empirically - is discussed in the literature review in Section 1.2.
4Government consumption from an earlier version of the Penn World Tables (PWT 6.2) will be an
important measure in the empirical part of this book.
5As US President William J. Clinton said in his address about the state of the Union, at January 23,
1996: “We know big government does not have all the answers. We know there’s not a program for every
problem. [...] The era of big government is over.”
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Figure 1.1: Development of government consumption in OECD and non-OECD from
1950-2007 (unweighted average)
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1.1.2 Home Bias and Labor Intensity
It is often assumed in many of the reviewed articles in Section 1.2 and also in this book
that the public sector produces non-tradable goods or/and consumes only domestic goods.
This seems to be a strong assumption. However, it is widely accepted among scholars that
the home bias in public consumption is quite large. Table 1.1 provides some numbers on
the share of imports of government consumption. Indeed, the average share of imports in
government consumption of the selected countries amounts to only 1 percent confirming
the impressively strong home bias in government consumption.
Also, it is often assumed that the public sector is more labor intensive than the private
sector as it is more intensive in services. According to Monacelli and Perotti (2008),
the average share of services in total spending on goods and services in the U.S. for the
period 1954 to 2006 amounts to 0.49 for private consumption and 0.80 for public spending
(including wages for public employees). The figures are reproduced in table 1.2.
Non-tradability of public goods is going to be a central assumption in the models
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Table 1.1: Home Bias in Government Consumption
Government Import Total Import
(% of Gov. Consumption) (% of GDP)
Brazil 1.07 10.75
Canada 0.03 45.20
Czech Republic 1.78 64.17
Denmark 0.00 38.84
Finland 1.64 39.16
Germany 0.80 32.03
Hungary 1.67 53.94
Indonesia 3.38 30.56
Ireland 3.66 93.82
Netherlands 0.11 63.05
Slovak Republic 0.22 73.09
Sweden 0.02 48.13
Switzerland 0.04 44.70
United Kingdom 0.10 28.62
Mean 1.04 47.58
Source: Epifani and Gancia (2009, Table A1), calculated from OECD Input-Output Tables
around the year 2000
Table 1.2: Average shares of spending on goods and services in the US, 1954:1-2006:2
Private Government
Spending on goods in GDP 0.32 0.035
Spending on services in GDP 0.32 0.14
Services in total spending on goods and services 0.49 0.80
Source: Monacelli and Perotti (2008, Table 1), calculated from NIPA accounts
discussed in this book. The labor intensity in public spending will only be an important
assumption in Chapter 4. Even there, the assumption is only crucial for a part of the
results. Although, the channel described in Chapter 2 does not require that the public
sector is more labor intensive, the framework allows for differences in labor intensity
between the two sectors.
1.1.3 Baumol’s Cost Disease
A big concern in the 1960s and 1970s has been steady growth of the public sector in
nominal terms relative to real output (see figure 1.1). According to Baumol (1967) one
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explanation might be as follows. If the price of public goods increases and demand
for public goods is price inelastic (i.e., does not decrease proportionately), government
spending increases.6 The price of the public good relative to the private goods prices
may increase because productivity in the private sector increases more than in the public
sector. If labor is mobile between the two sectors, wages in all sectors increase and the
costs in the public sector increase relatively more. The rising expenditure shares for public
goods is well known by the term Baumol’s cost disease.
This difference in productivity growth between the private and public sector is based
on the observation that the public sector is relative service intensive.78 Mueller (2003)
ascertains that there exist some studies which suggest that government productivity lags
private sector productivity and may be even zero or negative. Empirical evidence for
Baumol’s cost disease in the public sector is provided, e.g., in Spann (1977), Berry and
Lowery (1984), Ferris and West (1996), Mueller (2003). Ferris and West (1996) find that
slower productivity in the public sector accounts for two-thirds of the rise in the cost of
U.S. government services between 1959 and 1989. Mueller (2003) finds that for probably
all 25 investigated OECD countries the Baumol effect explains at least a part of the
increase in government expenditures from 1960 through 1995.
1.2 Openness and Government Size: Literature Re-
view
1.2.1 Theory
It is commonly assumed that the growing mobility of capital puts pressure on capital
taxation and as a consequence on government spending. As Wilson (1999) states: “A
central message of the tax competition literature [(e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986;
Wilson, 1986; Wildasin, 1988; Bucovetsky, 1991)] is that independent governments en-
6Note that the price of public goods is equal to the costs.
7Beyond doubt, some components in government spending are quite capital intensive such as military
service and may also experience large productivity increases.
8Note that the argument of lower productivity growth in the labor-intensive public sector compared
to the capital-intensive sector is also underlying the Balassa-Samuelson effect in international macroeco-
nomics.
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gage in wasteful competition for scarce capital through reduction in tax rates and public
expenditure levels.” If in one region a tax is levied on mobile capital, a part of this tax
base will move to a region where net returns are higher. Hence, imposing a tax rate in one
region has a positive externality for the other region. A general result of this literature is
that optimal taxation of mobile capital results in inefficiently low tax rates and a smaller
public sector.9 In order to overcome the problem of underprovision of public goods due
to low tax rates, governments should cooperate which results in efficiency gains.
While this mechanism has been mainly discussed in the context of capital mobility, it
is clearly also at work when goods markets integrate (see Haufler, 2001). High tax rates
on commodities in region A make the commodities more expensive in A. It follows that
some customers will consume in country B. This positive externality will again lead to
inefficiently low tax rates in a non-coordinated Nash equilibrium (Haufler, pp. 31-32). As
a consequence, a negative relationship between trade liberalization and government size
is to be expected.
In view of the channels discussed so far, globalization and increasing competition in the
international goods market constrain government activity. International integration calls
for smaller governments as tax distortions should be reduced to maintain competitiveness
(Andersen, 2002). The literature sometimes denotes this type of negative relationship the
‘efficiency hypothesis’. Garrett (2001) explains: “The fundamental tenet of the efficiency
hypothesis is that government spending [...] reduces the competitiveness of national pro-
ducers in international goods and service markets. [...] Income transfer programs and
social services distort labor markets and bias intertemporal investment decisions. More-
over, government spending must be funded, often by borrowing in the short-term, and ul-
timately by higher taxes.” For instance, Alesina and Perotti (1997) show that an increase
in transfers raises unit costs of tradable goods (i.e., generates a loss in competitiveness),
lowers demand for exports and decreases domestic employment.
Interestingly, although it seems intuitively plausible that government activity comes
under pressure if markets are highly integrated, theories predicting exactly the opposite
effect are not rare. For instance, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) show that economic in-
9If one looks at countries with different size (e.g., Bucovetsky, 1991; Wilson, 1991) it follows that
small countries face a more elastic tax base (an increase in the tax rate leads to a larger capital outflow
in per capita terms). It follows that small countries set a lower tax rate.
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tegration can lead to a race to the top rather than a race to the bottom. Based on a
standard tax competition model, the authors take into account that industrial concen-
tration in the core (industrialized countries) creates an ‘agglomeration rent’. If there are
significant agglomeration effects, firms know that they can earn more in the core than
in the periphery (less industrialized countries). Hence, core governments can tax their
industries more than a periphery government without losing capital. On top of that,
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) find that tax harmonization may harm both industrialized
and less industrialized nations.10
Another explanation for a positive relationship between trade openness and govern-
ment size is pointed out by Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1998). The underlying story
in both arguments is that international market integration comes at the costs of greater
risks. The government is assumed to provide insurance against these risks and transfers
to compensate for the losses. The literature has named this explanation as the ‘compen-
sation hypothesis’. Rodrik illustrates his argument with a simple model. He assumes
that the terms of trade (price of the export relative to the import good) is stochastic
which pictures the idea of trade related risks.11 Imports are intermediate goods and are
assumed to increase productivity of domestic private production. This assumption makes
domestic production depend on the terms of trade risk. The public good is produced with
domestic labor so that the public sector is not exposed to the terms of trade risk. The
government, when determining the optimal size of the public sector, follows the “standard
portfolio arguments [which] suggest that an increase in the riskiness of exports calls for
a reallocation of the economy’s resources toward the safe activity (government) [...]” (
Rodrik, 1998, p. 1014).
The standard tax competition result, that governments in open economies face addi-
tional costs in terms of outflow of mobile factors if they are taxed heavily is one side of the
coin. However, market integration may also bring opportunities and benefits which make
it possible to levy a part of the domestic tax burden on foreign countries. This is the case
if the externality on the foreign country is negative. One such channel which is well known
10Note that these results of Baldwin and Krugman (2004) are only valid if there is only one core country
(i.e. no competition within the core).
11Already Bates et al. (1991) indicate that governments may respond to risks generated by fluctuations
in international market prices.
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in the literature is the terms of trade effect. Epifani and Gancia (2009) have elaborated
the terms of trade effect in an Armington (1969) framework with one homogeneous good
produced under perfect competition in each private industry and product differentiation
by countries. Under the assumption that governments spend their income on domesti-
cally produced goods, whereas households spend a fraction of income on imports as well,
higher government spending increases demand for domestic labor. As long as domestic
and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes the increase in demand for domestic labor has
a positive effect on wages and prices which leads to a terms of trade improvement. The
elasticity of substitution between the different country specific goods determine the degree
of the terms of trade externality. A low substitutability implies a strong terms of trade
externality and a relatively high level of optimal public good provision. Moreover, an in-
crease in the fraction of tradable industries leads to higher government spending because
the terms of trade externality can play in more industries. Therefore, trade liberaliza-
tion leads to larger public sectors when changes in public spending influence the terms of
trade. Taking into account the terms of trade effect, non-cooperative fiscal policies may
be too expansionary. Hence, unilateral decisions on optimal public good provision results
in overprovision compared to what would be welfare optimal from an aggregate point of
view. Coordination between the two governments leads to higher aggregate welfare. This
channel is analyzed by van der Ploeg (1987), Turnovsky (1988), Chari and Kehoe (1990),
Devereux (1991), Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Anderson et al. (1996) and Epifani
and Gancia (2009).12
To sum up, different channels play together in the interaction of the public sector
with international markets. Globalization can lead to small or large governments. The
magnitude of the different effects and thus the overall effect of globalization on government
size can only be determined empirically. A general result from the theoretical literature
is that globalization increases the chances that individual policy decisions affect other
regions and countries positively or negatively resulting in under- or overprovision of public
goods. In either way, one important conclusion is that globalization requires international
coordination.13
12Anderson (2006) points out that the inefficiencies by non-cooperative policies increase with a reduc-
tion of trade costs and hence, the gains from coordination will increase with market integration.
13Many of the problems affecting the world today cannot be solved on national level and requires
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1.2.2 Empirical Evidence
As different theories exists, the one pointing to a negative and others to a positive rela-
tionship between globalization and government size, an important question is: What do
the data say? Political scientists, for example, Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein (1985)
were among the first who have noticed a positive relationship between international trade
and the size of government. Cameron (1978) finds in a cross-section of 18 OECD countries
that the increase in government revenues as a percent of GDP averaged over 1960 to 1975
is positively associated with trade openness (the sum of exports and imports relative to
GDP) in 1960.14 Cameron argues that small open countries have a higher degree of indus-
trial concentration which facilitates the formation of labor confederations, fosters higher
unionization and increases the scope of collective bargaining. This results in a higher
demand for government transfers which attenuate the external risks. The argument that
the government takes on the role of providing insurance against external risk, has later
been taken up by Rodrik (1997a,b, 1998). Rodrik (1998) comments that Cameron’s source
of external risk is not plausible for most developing countries. Moreover, he finds that
not only government transfers but also government consumption is positively correlated
with trade openness. Therefore, he argues that a different source of external risk must
be at work. Rodrik considers two measures of external risk, volatility of terms of trade
and - to compare it with Cameron’s argument - product concentration of exports. He
finds strong indication that the main channel works through the terms of trade risk.15
Rodrik (1998) finds empirical support for the following hypotheses: “First, increases in
external risk must lead to greater volatility in domestic income and consumption. Second,
a larger share in GDP of government purchases of goods and services must reduce income
volatility. Third, the risk-mitigating role of government spending should be displayed most
prominently in social security and welfare spending [...]” (p. 998).16 Rodrik’s analysis
is mostly cross-section of approximately 100 countries for several years. If government
international norm-setting and regulations (UN, 2001, World Public Sector Report).
14In the following trade openness denotes exports plus imports divided through GDP.
15The interaction term of openness with either measure of external risk has a positive effect on public
consumption. However, there is a high correlation between the two interaction terms, and a regression
with both interactions as regressors shows that terms of trade risk does all the work of explaining the
positive correlation.
16Empirical evidence that a larger government size is associated with lower output volatility is provided,
e.g., by Fata´s and Mihov (2001).
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spending is averaged over the period 1990-1992 (1985-1989), trade openness is averaged
over the period 1980-1989 (1975-1984). His panel estimation for the period 1960 to 1992
does also support his hypotheses.
Rodrik’s work has initiated a number of empirical studies trying to confirm or con-
fute the positive relationship between trade openness and government spending. In a
cross-section of 113 countries for 1985-1995 averages, Garrett (2001) confirms the positive
significant effect of trade openness on government consumption. Alesina and Wacziarg
(1998) argue - based on cross-section data of 1985-1989 averages and 122 countries - that
the positive relationship between openness and government size documented by Rodrik
(1998) may be driven by the negative relation of country size with both trade openness
and the share of public consumption in GDP.17 Alesina and Wacziarg argue that large
countries can better rely on themselves and can afford to be closed. Additionally, because
of economies of scale and non-rivalry in public good provision, small countries may have
a larger government share in GDP. This finding has been revisited by Ram (2009). In
a large panel data set of 154 countries from 1960 to 2000 he finds no such relationship
when controlling for country fixed effects. Population which is used as a proxy for country
size is positively correlated with both government size and openness. Most importantly,
trade openness has - despite controlling for country size - a positive effect on government
consumption share.
Different studies have challenged the question of causality. Does really openness affect
government spending or does government spending influence the degree of openness of a
country?18 Rodrik (1998) executes some robustness checks by employing several instru-
ments for trade openness. Some studies approach the endogeneity issue with a test for
Granger causality. For instance, using time series data for 23 OECD countries over the
period 1948 to 1998, Molana et al. (2004) find only for a few countries in the sample a
causal positive relationship from trade openness to government consumption as a share of
17Additionally, they argue that the association between government spending and openness disappears
if the ratios are not taken in logs. This is also found in Garen and Trask (2005).
18As an example, government policies determine the degree of tariff rates and non-tariff barriers which
reduces trade flows. One may also argue that government expansion may crowd out private production
and exports, reducing the volume of trade. Or, countries with a large public sector would prefer to be
more open.
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GDP.19 In a more recent study, Benarroch and Pandey (2008) provide a Granger causality
test based on a large panel data set (96 countries over the time period 1970-2000) which
does not support Rodrik’s finding. They rather find a causal negative relationship from
government size to trade openness.
The ‘openness government size’ nexus has been differently approached by Garen and
Trask (2005). Most of the literature discussed above focuses on expenditure based mea-
sures of government. Garen and Trask demonstrate that the scope of governments is much
larger in less open economies when non-budgetary measures are considered. In a cross
section of 92 countries for the year 1990, they find that measures such as government
ownership of enterprises, price controls and asset expropriation are negatively affected by
trade openness (export plus import relative to GDP) and positively correlated with trade
barriers.
The aforementioned literature mainly analyzes the effect of trade openness on the
size of the public sector. A broader investigation of some channels discussed in Section
1.2.1 is provided for example in Garrett and Mitchell (2001). They concentrate their
empirical analysis on OECD countries for the time period 1961 to 1993. To validate
the two competing hypotheses ‘efficiency’ versus ‘compensation’,20 they do not restrict
their analysis on total trade flows but also analyze globalization measures such as FDI
and financial market integration. The authors “found some evidence of globalization-
constraints on government spending” (ibid. p. 174). Trade openness has a negative effect
on both government consumption and income transfers. However, “the evidence on capital
taxation was more supportive of the compensation perspective” (ibid.). Foreign direct
investment is associated with higher capital tax rates and other measures for financial
market liberalization have no impact on capital taxation.
Also Baldwin and Krugman (2004) illustrate that the average corporate tax rate (i.e.,
corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP) did not decrease at all between 1965 and
2000 in some European countries. Quinn (1997) finds some evidence that the degree
19Another time series analysis has been conducted by Islam (2004) who finds a positive link between
trade openness and government expenditure as a share of GDP for the countries Canada, England,
Norway and Sweden but a negative relation for USA.
20The efficiency hypothesis summarizes channels which leads to lower government spending. Under the
compensation hypothesis, we expect a positive relationship between openness and government spending
as governments compensate for external risks. See the discussion in Section 1.2.1.
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of capital account liberalization is positively associated with government expenditures
(net of defense and education) for a cross-section analysis (averages from 1974 to 1989)
of 38 countries and also positively correlated with most corporate taxation indicators.
However, Garrett (2001) could not confirm this finding in a 113 country cross-section
for 1985-1995 averages. Capital account regulation does not significantly affect central
government spending and government consumption.
In a panel analysis from 1967 to 1996 for 14 OECD countries, Bretschger and Hettich
(2002) find evidence that trade openness and capital market liberalization have a positive
effect on social expenditure (as a share of GDP). This finding supports the compensation
hypothesis. Moreover, consistent with the standard tax competition argument, corporate
taxes are negatively associated with globalization. The authors argue that their different
findings in support of the tax competition argument lie in the more appropriate measure
for corporate taxation.
Most empirical literature has focused on the loss of competitiveness argument versus
Rodrik’s risk compensation hypothesis. Whether government size is positively associated
with trade openness due to the terms of trade externality has only been investigated in
Epifani and Gancia (2009).21 They provide a direct test of the terms of trade externality
versus Rodrik’s compensation hypothesis. For the cross-section analysis, they have data
of 143 countries and the years 1995-2000. The panel analysis covers the years 1950 to
2000. Since the terms of trade externality works only if the domestic and foreign goods
are imperfect substitutes, Epifani and Gancia (2009) use the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution to capture this effect. The authors provide empirical evidence for their
argument in both cross-section and panel data analysis while Rodrik’s finding is not
confirmed. The authors find that trade openness has a stronger positive effect on the
government consumption share when the elasticity of substitution is low.
One thing stands out while reviewing the existent literature and the discussion about
how trade openness affects public spending. New Trade Theory models exist now for
three decades and with it the comprehension that gains from trade due to import of
new varieties play an important role in consumption and production. Nonetheless, the
21Empirical evidence that government spending generates an appreciation of the terms of trade (price
of exports relative to imports) and an increase in the price of non-traded versus traded goods is provided,
for instance, by Monacelli and Perotti (2008) and Mu¨ller (2004).
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theoretical and empirical discussion ‘how trade openness affects government size’ has not
been extended to this new insights. The main contribution of this book is to fix this hole
and to add to the existing literature new insights into the discussion ’how trade openness
affects government size’ which arise by taking New Trade Theory into account.22 Some
important features of the New Trade Theory literature are described in the following
section.
1.3 New Trade Theory
Around three decades ago Krugman (1979, 1980) provided a simple theoretical framework
where consumers gain from trade through the import of new varieties. More importantly,
Krugman’s framework could explain a predominant feature of the observed pattern of
trade which is the high degree of intra-industry trade between industrialized countries.
Central elements of this seminal work is that there is monopolistic competition with en-
dogenous firm entry and that the consumption basket combines all available varieties
according to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. The finite elasticity of substitution between the
varieties implies that there is a ‘love of variety’ (LOV), i.e., utility increases proportionally
more if the range of varieties increases than if consumption of a given variety increases.
Because of LOV, there are gains from trade through the import of new varieties. Ethier
(1982) adopted this approach to a model in which final output is produced with inter-
mediate goods. The intermediate goods are produced under monopolistic competition.
The homogeneous output good is produced with a combination of all available interme-
diate goods according to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator. Because of the finite elasticity of
substitution between the intermediate inputs, there are gains from trade in production
(external economies of scale) through the import of new varieties. Whether the focus is
on intermediate or output goods trade, gains from variety should appear on both levels.
There is evidence that gains from trade due to imports of new varieties are empirically
relevant. Broda and Weinstein (2006, 2004) find that imports of new varieties have
brought welfare gains to the United States and several other countries via a reduction in
22The tax competition literature has been extended to the New Trade Theory framework, see e.g.,
Janeba (1998), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Davies and Eckel (2010).
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the consumer price index. Broda et al. (2006) provide evidence for productivity gains due
to new imported varieties in several countries.
What makes Krugman’s framework so tractable is that all firms have identical tech-
nologies but still no one produces the same variety because of economies of scale. A
consequence of this simplification is the disadvantage that none or all goods are traded.
However, firms are different and the data shows that only a few firms export within indus-
tries. These exporting firms are bigger and more productive. Taking firm heterogeneity
into account (firms differ in their level of productivity), Melitz (2003) provides a model
which produces a lot of the observed patterns in the data. Because of trade costs, only the
most productive firms can export. In this setting, trade liberalization produces firm exit
and entry in the domestic market such that the least productive firms exit the domestic
market. As a result average or aggregate productivity of the producing firms increase.
The underlying intuition behind this process can be summarized as follows. Trade lib-
eralization increases profits in the export market which induces more firm entry. The
increased labor demand raises the real wage and forces the least productive firms to exit.
We will see that by enriching the existing discussion on the link between openness and
government size with some central elements of New Trade Theory, a lot of interesting and
new insights can be obtained.
1.4 Outline
The remainder of this book has the following structure. The second chapter focuses on the
theoretical analysis of the impact of globalization on government size when intraindustry
trade and gains from variety are important elements of international integration. The set
up for determining government size is related to the literature on optimal public good
provision which considers strategic interactions between two governments.23 Differences
in country size and in technology allow to answer the question how asymmetry between
countries matters. The contribution of this chapter is to account for monopolistic compe-
tition with endogenous firm entry and love of variety. In this setting, costs of public good
provision are the crowding out of domestic firms and varieties. When goods markets are
23This model draws on Hanslin (2008).
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integrated, it is straightforward that the crowding out of domestic firms will also harm
consumers in the foreign country as their range of different imported goods decrease. Uni-
lateral decisions on optimal public good provision results in overprovision of the public
good as the negative externality on foreign is not taken into account by the domestic
government. Trade liberalization is related to larger government size. Moreover, country
size matters. As the small country can more rely on the varieties from the large one, the
small country will choose a higher government share than the large country. To prevent
this beggar-thy-neighbor behavior and to maximize aggregate welfare, policy coordination
is required.
Chapter 3 focuses on the empirical analysis. For this purpose, a simple version of
the model described in the second chapter is formulated from which some hypotheses are
derived which are analyzed empirically.24 We will see - in line with Chapter 2 - that
gains from variety play an important role in determining the size of the public sector also
empirically. The main contribution to the literature is to provide empirical evidence for
the main story in Chapter 2 - the love of variety effect on government spending. In order
to test this channel, the measure for openness to trade is the extensive margin of imports.
This measure allows to match the gains from trade to the gains from variety.
Chapter 4 focuses on the question of how globalization affects the nominal size of gov-
ernment spending apart from the effects on public expenditures measured in real terms.
The model in Chapter 4 differs from most literature discussed in Section 1.2.1 as it is
not optimal public good provision which this chapter looks at.25 Rather, the question
is: how does capital market integration and trade liberalization affect the ratio between
the nominal and real government size? Looking at the ratio between the two measures
of government size is the same as considering the price of governments (unit costs) rel-
ative to the private sector price. Hence, the chapter is closely related to the literature
which explains differences in prices between tradable and non-tradable sectors. It is well
known from this literature that countries which are more capital-rich and countries with
higher productivity growth in the tradable sector show higher prices in non-tradable than
tradable sectors (see Bhagwati, 1984; Gemmell, 1987; Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964).
24Note that this chapter follows Hanslin (2010).
25This chapter is based on joint work with Josef Falkinger (Falkinger and Hanslin, 2010).
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The chapter contributes to this literature as it explains relative changes in prices between
the government and the private sector with capital market integration and trade liberal-
ization. Capital market integration may affect the relative prices when the public sector
produces more labor intensive. Trade liberalization can affect productivity positively in
the private sector (as discussed in the previous section) which in turn explains changes
in the relative prices. It follows that trade liberalization (through its effect over produc-
tivity) can be responsible for a Baumol’s cost disease (Baumol, 1967). The hypotheses
are also going to be investigated empirically for a large panel data set and separately for
OECD countries.
It is important to emphasize that each chapter should be considered as an independent
unit concerning the notation. Each of the following chapters ends with a conclusion. The
summary in Chapter 5 recapitulates the main insights of this book and provides a brief
outlook.
2The Effect of Trade Liberalization on
Optimal Government Size
Beyond doubt, one of the great findings in trade theory was the insight that access to
international varieties is an important source for gains from trade (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977 and Krugman, 1979, 1980). Intraindustry trade and endogenous firm entry have
dominated the trade literature in the last few decades, both theoretically and empirically.
Surprisingly, despite the dominance of gains from variety in the new trade theory, this
aspect has not been taken up in the recent discussion about globalization and public
spending following a seminal paper by Rodrik (1998). As pointed out in the introduction,
many studies about fiscal policy in open economies concentrate on the effects of a public
expansion on the terms of trade (e.g., van der Ploeg, 1987, Turnovsky, 1988, Devereux,
1991, Anderson et al., 1996, Anderson, 2006 and Epifani and Gancia, 2009).1 These
studies point out that the costs of taxation can be exported onto foreign countries since
unilateral fiscal expansion leads to an improvement in the terms of trade. Therefore,
governments react to market integration by increasing public spending.2 This chapter
ties in with the debate on the effects of trade openness on the size of the public sector by
1See also Persson and Tabellini (1995) for a survey.
2Rodrik’s (1998) explanation for a positive correlation between openness to trade and government
spending is different. He argues that openness may expose a country to greater risk, due to terms of
trade volatility. In this case, there may be a need to extend government spending after trade liberalization
in order to provide a social insurance against the external risk. Empirical evidence by Cameron (1978),
Rodrik (1998), Garrett (2001) and Epifani and Gancia (2009) supports the positive relationship between
openness to trade and public expenditure.
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having a closer look at the implications from new trade theory for this debate.3 Taking
into account the important developments in the new trade theory - gains from variety and
endogenous firm entry - this chapter provides us with a new explanation for the positive
relationship between openness to trade and public expenditure.
The literature regarding the effect of public spending on firm entry in an international
context mainly focuses on public spending for infrastructure (e.g., Holtz-Eakin and Lovely,
1996 and Egger and Falkinger, 2006). These papers point out that an increase in public
spending makes a country more attractive and stimulates firm entry. In contrast, in
this chapter it is assumed that public spending is used for the production of a public
consumption good. Thus, government activity affects only the available resources for the
private sector, which has quite different implications for the number of firms.
Accounting for endogenous firm entry, this chapter identifies the negative effect of the
public sector on the number of firms as an important cost of public good provision.4 An
increase in public production lowers domestic employment in the private sector and the
number of domestic firms producing a variety. However, in integrated markets, domestic
consumers have also access to foreign varieties. Therefore, in open economies, government
expansion reduces the number of varieties available to consumers relatively less than in
closed ones. Thus, the national costs of public good provision are lower, the more a
country is integrated into the world market. This provides important new insights why
trade liberalization may lead to bigger governments.
The effect of trade liberalization on the optimal government size is analyzed within
a general equilibrium framework with two possibly asymmetric countries. The countries
may differ in total factor productivity, capital and labor endowment and fixed cost technol-
ogy. In both countries there is a private and a public sector, both producing consumption
goods with capital and labor. The private sector is characterized by a continuum of in-
dustries of measure one, supplying tradable and non-tradable goods under monopolistic
competition. The country-specific public good is assumed to be non-tradable. The mea-
sure for openness to trade is obtained by assuming that an exogenous fraction of private
3This chapter is based on Hanslin (2008).
4Generally, a crowding out of the private sector due to an expansion of the public sector can occur at
either the extensive or the intensive margin. The terms of trade effect described above may be illustrated
by the latter, which is a reduction of the amount produced by domestic firms.
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industries is tradable.5 Trade liberalization is modeled as the opening up of industries.
The advantage of this measure is to discuss the effects of a marginal increase of openness
on public expenditure - rather than to make only a comparison between autarky and
open economy. The way of modeling trade liberalization deviates from the standard with
variable trade costs. The reason is that in order to describe the love of variety effect
it is important to focus on gains from trade due to new varieties and not due to lower
international market prices.6
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section the theoretical model is intro-
duced. Section 2.2 derives the equilibrium values of the variables for a given government
share. Following the tax competition literature, in Section 2.3 benevolent governments
in both countries choose their optimal government share. The Nash equilibrium of the
public sector is analyzed with respect to the asymmetry between the two countries and
the parameters of the economy. Section 2.4 further extends the discussion by analyzing
the importance of the love of variety effect versus the market power effect. Furthermore,
changes in the relative capital intensity between the public and private sector are ad-
dressed. Section 2.5 concludes. All proves and derivations are presented in Appendix A
and some further interesting details are discussed in Appendix B.
2.1 The Model
There are two countries, home (H) and foreign (F ). In both countries there is a private
and a public sector. The private sector is characterized by a continuum of industries of
measure 1 indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. In each industry and country various firms produce
differentiated goods with capital and labor under monopolistic competition. Each firm is
monopolist for one variety, after having incurred some fixed cost. There is free entry, that
is, the equilibrium number of firms in an industry is endogenously determined. Free trade
is assumed between the two countries in an exogenous fraction τ ∈ [0, 1] of the industries
and no trade for the remaining fraction 1− τ . Without loss of generality industries with
index j ≤ τ are the trading industries and industries with index j > τ are the non-trading
5This way of modeling openness is taken from Epifani and Gancia (2009).
6Anderson (2006) provides an analysis of the effect of lowering trade costs on the terms of trade and
optimal public good provision.
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ones. Thus, τ is the measure for openness, assuming that both countries are equally open.
In each country, there is one non-tradable public good which is produced with capital and
labor. The countries have an endowment K¯i of capital and L¯i of labor. Both production
factors are perfectly mobile between sectors within each country. The subscript i refers
to the two countries H and F .
2.1.1 Endowments, Preferences and Demand
The representative household owns total endowment of capital (K¯i) and labor (L¯i). Hence,
the household’s income is given by wiL¯i + riK¯i, where wi denotes the wage rate and ri
the factor price of capital in country i. Net income is given by Ii := wiL¯i + riK¯i − Ti,
where Ti denotes the tax imposed by the government.
The representative household derives utility from consumption of the different varieties
in each industry and the country specific public good denoted by Gi.
7 The valuation for
private goods versus the public good in the household’s preferences is captured in the
parameter η ∈ (0, 1).
Ui = η
1∫
0
log Yijdj + (1− η) logGi for i = H,F (2.1)
where subutility Yij is a CES aggregator over the varieties from industry j which are
available in country i
Yij =
(∫
k∈Nij
(
yikj
)ν
dk
) 1
ν
, i = H,F (2.2)
with ν ∈ (0, 1).8 yikj denotes consumption of variety k from industry j by the represen-
tative household in country i.9 The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties
7Appendix 2.7.3 discusses optimal public good provision if the public sector provides a variety of goods
and households have a love of variety also for the public goods.
8Although it has become quite common in the literature to disentangle the degree of love of variety
on the one hand and the elasticity of substitution and market power respectively on the other hand (e.g.,
Dixit and Stiglitz, 1975, Ethier, 1982, Benassy, 1996), for the tractability of the analysis the standard
Dixit-Stiglitz assumption is used - with ν determining the degree of love of variety and market power
simultaneously. For isolating the role of the love of variety, Section 2.4.1 provides an analysis using the
Benassy (1996) assumption.
9The location of production does not matter for the household’s optimal consumption choice since
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from industry j is given by σ = 1
1−ν > 1. Nij is the index set of all varieties from indus-
try j which are available for consumption in country i. Within any industry j > τ , the
household consumes only the varieties produced in the own country, within an industry
j ≤ τ , the household consumes all varieties produced in country H and F . Therefore, for
j ≤ τ , NHj = NFj.
Since the elasticity of substitution between the subutilities Yij is equal to 1, the house-
hold allocates its expenditures equally among the industries. Moreover, since the measure
of all industries is equal to 1, the amount allocated to an industry equals net income Ii.
Thus, the budget constraint for purchasing varieties from an industry is given by the
equation:
Ii =
∫
k∈Nij
pkjy
i
kjdk (2.3)
where pkj is the price of variety k in industry j. In a traded industry the household spends
the budget Ii on all industry specific varieties produced in country H and F , whereas in
non-traded industries the household spends Ii only on domestic varieties.
Household’s subutility (2.2) is maximized with respect to yikj, subject to the budget
constraint per industry (2.3). The resulting demand curve for each variety is given by
yikj =
(
pkj
Pij
) −1
1−ν
Yij , ∀ k ∈ Nij , ∀ j ∈ [0, 1] (2.4)
where Pij :=
(∫
k∈Nij (pkj)
1−σ dk
) 1
1−σ
is the consumer price index for industry j. It may
be interpreted as the unit cost function of subutility Yij. Note that PijYij = Ii.
10 Because
of free trade, home and foreign have the same consumer price index in tradable industries:
PHj = PFj for j ≤ τ .
2.1.2 Production and Supply
2.1.2.1 Public Good
The country-specific public good is produced with capital and labor. Like firms the public
sector takes factor prices as given, which is a common assumption in the literature. For
there are no trade costs.
10Use (2.4) in (2.3) for a check.
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simplicity, it is assumed that the public good is produced with a Leontief production
function:
Gi = min
{
βigKiK¯i, gLiL¯i
}
(2.5)
where βi > 0 describes the productivity of capital relative to labor in public good pro-
duction and gKi ∈ (0, 1), gLi ∈ (0, 1) the fraction of the economy’s capital and labor
endowments respectively, which are employed by the public sector. Cost minimizing
production of the public good implies βigKiK¯i = gLiL¯i. One advantage of the Leontief
function in the public sector is the mathematical tractability of the model. Furthermore,
it is sufficiently flexible to vary the degree of the labor intensity in the public relative
to the private sector. Since I want to focus on the deprivation of resources through the
public sector and the associated crowding out of the extensive margin of production (num-
ber of firms), it is assumed - throughout the main part of this chapter - that βi =
L¯i
K¯i
.
This implies that capital intensity in public good production is equal to the proportion of
capital endowment to labor endowment in the country. Hence, under cost minimization
gLi = gKi = gi so that public production is given by Gi = βigiK¯i = giL¯i and government
expenditures amount to gi(wiL¯i + riK¯i). This assumption has the important virtue to
isolate the crowding out of the extensive margin of private production from crowding
out of the intensive margin (output per firm). This is necessary if we want to eliminate
the terms of trade effect which would arise when the factor proportion supplied to the
private sector is distorted by public production. Deviations from this assumption and the
additional effects are discussed in Section 2.4.2.
The public good is financed by a lump-sum tax Ti. A balanced budget requires
Ti = gi(wiL¯i + riK¯i).
2.1.2.2 Private Goods
The production technology is identical for all firms and similar to Lawrence and Spiller
(1983). Each firm in an industry produces one variety with labor according to
xkj = AiLkj (2.6)
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where xkj denotes output of firm k in industry j located in country H or F , Lkj is the
input of labor of an individual firm and Ai denotes labor productivity in country i. Before
starting with production a fixed amount of capital K∗i has to be invested. Hence the fixed
costs are given by the factor price of capital times overhead capital riK
∗
i .
11
Since trade is costless and firms face the same elasticity of demand in the domestic
and foreign market, profit maximization implies a price equal to a constant markup over
marginal cost
pkj = pi =
wi
Aiν
, (2.7)
which is independent of firm and industry.
Free firm entry implies zero profits in equilibrium. This determines the quantity
produced by each firm xkj which is identical for all firms within a country, independent
of industry,
xkj = xi =
AiriK
∗
i ν
wi(1− ν) (2.8)
and labor demand of each firm
Li
(
ri
wi
)
=
ν
1− ν
ri
wi
K∗i . (2.9)
2.1.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium Conditions
2.1.3.1 Labor and Capital Market
Both capital and labor are used for production of private and public goods. Since the
government employs giK¯i and giL¯i for public good production, (1− gi)K¯i and (1− gi)L¯i
remains available for production of private goods. Further, each firm needs an amount of
K∗i to run the plant. The full employment conditions for capital and labor are
(1− gi)K¯i =
∫ 1
0
nijdjK
∗
i (2.10)
(1− gi)L¯i =
∫ 1
0
nijdjLi (2.11)
11One might assume a more general production function such as xkj = Ai(Kkj−K∗i )1−γ(Lkj)γ , Kkj ≥
K∗i which brings essentially the same results (see Hanslin, 2008). Therefore, I stick to the simpler version
presented in the text.
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where nij is the equilibrium diversity of private firms in industry j and country i which
has to be determined endogenously.
2.1.3.2 Goods Market
Since goods prices depend only on the location of production (see (2.7)), we can drop the
variety index and have the location index instead of the variety index. Therefore, from
now on, consumption of a variety from industry j is denoted by yi
′
ij, i, i
′ = H,F , where
i refers to the location of production and i′ to location of consumption of the variety.12
In a closed industry, consumption of a variety is equal to its production xi. In an open
industry, consumption of a variety is split between the two representative households:
xi =
{
yiij if j > τ
yiij + y
i′
ij if j ≤ τ
, i, i′ = H,F and i 6= i′ . (2.12)
For closed industries j > τ , (2.12) together with yiij =
(
pi
Pij
) −1
1−ν
Yij and Yij =
Ii
Pij
implies
that Pij = n
1
1−σ
ij pi is identical across j. Thus, also nij = ni for all j > τ . For open
industries j ≤ τ we have PHj = PFj = Pj. Thus yi′ij =
(
pi
Pj
) −1
1−ν
Yi′j and Yi′j =
Ii′
Pj
which
gives us for the demand of a traded variant: yiij + y
i′
ij = p
−1
1−ν
i P
ν
1−ν
j (Ii + Ii′). Combining
this with (2.12) we see that Pj is identical across all traded industries. So we can write
demand (2.4) in the form yi
′
i =
(
pi
Pj
) −ν
1−ν Ii′
Pj
where only the distinction j ≤ τ and j > τ
matters for Pj. Keeping this facts in mind, we can drop index j if the context makes clear
whether closed industries or open industries are discussed.
From now on I denote consumption of a variety in closed industries with xH and xF ,
respectively, and demand for varieties in open industries by yik, k = H,F and i = H,F ,
where k refers to the location of production and i to the location of consumption of the
12Note that we have yi
′
ij =
(
pi
Pi′j
) −1
1−ν
Yi′j .
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variety. Consumption of a traded variety (j ≤ τ) can be written as:13
(yHH , y
H
F ) =
(
IHxH
IF + IH
,
IHxF
IF + IH
)
(yFH , y
F
F ) =
(
IFxH
IF + IH
,
IFxF
IF + IH
) (2.13)
Using the facts described above and the goods market clearing condition (2.12) for
open industries gives us the following condition in equilibrium
xH
xF
=
yHH + y
F
H
yHF + y
F
F
=
(pH)
−1
1−ν P
ν
1−ν
j [IH + IF ]
(pF )
−1
1−ν P
ν
1−ν
j [IH + IF ]
=
(
pH
pF
) −1
1−ν
. (2.14)
2.1.3.3 Trade Account
Trade occurs because households love varieties. In open industries, a household spreads
its consumption over all produced varieties in both countries. In equilibrium, the value
of exports must equal the value of imports. In other words, the range of varieties times
price times consumption of the varieties produced in country i and consumed in country
i′, integrated over all traded industries, must equal the diversity of varieties times price
times consumption of the varieties produced in country i′ and consumed in country i,
integrated over all traded industries:
∫ τ
0
piy
i′
i nijdj =
∫ τ
0
pi′y
i
i′ni′jdj . (2.15)
2.2 Market Equilibrium and its Properties
The households spend an equal amount on each industry and prices and quantities pro-
duced are constant for all industries, Ii = nijpixi, j > τ . Therefore, in each non-traded
industry an equal number of firms, nij =
Ii′
pixi
, enters the market in equilibrium. In the
tradable industries only the average diversity of firms per industry is determined. We
may rewrite the trade account condition by using the budget constraint for purchases
from a tradable industry, Ii = nijpiy
i
i + ni′jpi′y
i
i′ , taking the integral from 0 to τ on both
13See Appendix 2.6.1 for a derivation.
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sides, and combining the result with (2.15). This yields τIi =
∫ τ
0
nijpi
(
yii + y
i′
i
)
dj. Since
yii + y
i′
i = xi, this reduces to
∫ τ
0
nijdj =
τIi
pixi
. Thus, the average number of firms in the
tradable industries is equal to the number of firms in a closed industry. Since the total
mass of industries is one, we get from (2.10)
1
τ
∫ τ
0
nijdj = ni,j>τ = ni =
(1− gi)K¯i
K∗i
, (2.16)
where ni,j>τ denotes the range of firms in each non-tradable industry and ni the range of
firms per country.14 The location of the firms in single tradable industries is undetermined.
Interindustry trade allows that firms in one tradable industry are mainly located in H
while in others are located more in F , as long as the location pattern is consistent with
(2.16).
The higher capital endowment or the lower overhead capital required to run the plant,
the higher is the measure of firms in equilibrium. The endowment left to the private sector
is decisive for the measure of firms in the market. If the size of the public sector expands,
fewer firms are active in the private sector. The negative effect of government spending on
the number of firms originates from the fact that the public sector produces a consumption
good. This may not be the case if the public sector produces infrastructure.15
The full employment conditions for labor (2.11) and capital (2.10) together with (2.9)
determine the relative factor prices
ri
wi
=
1− ν
ν
L¯i
K¯i
. (2.17)
Equation (2.17) implies that ν = wiL¯i
wiL¯i+riK¯i
. The share of labor income in total income
is identical in the two economies. The lower the market power of firms (i.e., the higher
ν), the higher is the wage share. Each firm producing a positive amount in equilibrium
supplies (substituting (2.17) for w/r in (2.8))
xi = AiK
∗
i
L¯i
K¯i
, i = H,F (2.18)
14Note that ni describes also the number of firms in a closed industry.
15In Egger and Falkinger (2006) provision of public infrastructure lowers the fixed costs of entry which
increases the number of firms.
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and demands Li = K
∗
i
L¯i
K¯i
of labor. The supply of each variety depends positively on the
amount of overhead capital and productivity, and declines if capital supply is abundant
relative to labor endowment. Note that only the factor proportion matters - not the
absolute level of endowments. The assumption that the public sector does not distort
the factor proportion implies that the size of the public sector does not affect equilibrium
output per firm - in contrast to the diversity of firms.
For the nume´raire I choose the price of home varieties. Setting pH = 1, factor prices
in home are determined by wH = νAH and according to (2.17) rH = (1 − ν)AH L¯HK¯H
respectively.
Condition (2.14) determines the price of foreign varieties in terms of the fundamentals
of the economy:
pF =
(
AH
AF
L¯HK¯F
K¯HL¯F
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν
. (2.19)
Note, since the price of domestic varieties is normalized, pF is equal to the relative price of
foreign to domestic varieties. The more productive and the less capital-rich is F relative
to H, the lower is the relative price of foreign goods. Moreover, prices in foreign are low,
ceteris paribus, if overhead capital is high in F . High overhead capital reduces the range
of firms in F and increases output xF per firm, which can only be sold if the price of
the foreign varieties decreases as well. A low price requires that marginal cost is low.
Through this channel high fixed capital requirements depress factor returns.
Equation (2.7) together with (2.17) determines the factor price of capital and wage
rate in country F : rF = (1− ν)AF L¯FK¯F pF and wF = νAFpF . Substituting pF , we have
rF = (1− ν)AνFA1−νH
(
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν (
L¯H
K¯H
)1−ν (
L¯F
K¯F
)ν
wF = νA
ν
FA
1−ν
H
(
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν (
L¯H
K¯H
)1−ν (
K¯F
L¯F
)1−ν
Comparing this with H, we see that both factor returns are low if overhead capital in F is
high relative to overhead capital in H. The net incomes are given by (1− gi)[wiL¯i + riK¯i]
which reduces to
Ii(gi) = (1− gi)AiL¯ipi .
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To summarize, an increase in public spending (higher gi) has only a variety effect -
the equilibrium diversity of firms decreases. Supply of commodities and its prices, as well
as the factor prices do not depend on the public good provision. This feature depends
on the very special assumption of βi =
L¯i
K¯i
which implies that the capital intensity for
public good production is equal to the capital intensity of country endowments. The
factor prices depend on the relative factor availability for private production and as long
as government does not affect this relative availability, government won’t have an effect
on market prices. Section 2.4.2 discusses the additional effects if βi 6= L¯iK¯i .
Since an increase in government spending crowds out private firms the next proposition
follows directly.
Proposition 2.1. An increase in the domestic government share (for given foreign gov-
ernment share gF ) reduces the volume of trade.
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.4.
Empirically there is a strong home bias in government consumption.16 Hence, other
things equal, an increase in government spending reduces the volume of trade. In the
model the home bias is incorporated since the public good is produced with domestic
labor and capital and is consumed only domestically.
2.3 Optimal Public Good Provision
2.3.1 Governments Optimization Problem
I assume a benevolent government whose aim is to provide a quantity of the public good
that maximizes the utility of the representative household. Government’s choice param-
eter is gi, the fraction of capital and labor used for public good production. Having
determined the equilibrium values in the last section we can describe the indirect subu-
16See for example Epifani and Gancia (2009).
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tilities for traded and non-traded industries as follows:17
Yi,j>τ (gi) = (ni(gi))
1
ν xi
Yi,j≤τ (gi, gi′) =
(
Ii(gi)+Ii′ (gi′ )
Ii(gi)
) 1
ν
−1
(ni(gi))
1
ν xi
(2.20)
where i, i′ = H,F , i 6= i′. Note that
(
Ii(gi)+Ii′ (gi′ )
Ii(gi)
) 1
ν
−1
> 1. Since the household loves
varieties, subutility in open industries is higher than in closed ones. Ceteris paribus, this
difference is higher the poorer or smaller the country. It follows that richer or larger
countries do gain less from trade than poorer or smaller countries.
Government in country i chooses gi such as to maximize the utility of the representative
household in country i taken as given gi′ (government spending in the other country),
where i, i′ = H,F and i 6= i′:
max
gi
ητ log Yi,j≤τ (gi, gi′) + η(1− τ) log Yi,j>τ (gi) + (1− η) logGi(gi) . (2.21)
Governments’ maximization of the household’s utility yields the following first order con-
dition (see Appendix 2.6.1 for the derivation):
ϑi := ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
1− gi −
1
1− gi + (1− gi′)Ωi′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−η
ν
1
1− gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− η) 1
gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0 (2.22)
where I defined
Ωi′ :=
(
Ai′
Ai
)ν (
K∗i
K∗i′
)1−ν (
K¯i′
K¯i
)1−ν (
L¯i′
L¯i
)ν
for i, i′ = H,F and i 6= i′. Before we are going to characterize the first order condition it
is shown that the solution to (2.22) corresponds to a global maximum:
Lemma 2.1. The second order condition for a global maximum is fulfilled, that is ∂ϑi
∂gi
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.2.
Relative country size is summarized in Ωi = (Ωi′)
−1 which is equal to 1 if the countries
are symmetric. Note that only relative differences in the fundamentals affect government
expenditures. The third term in equation (2.22) represents the positive marginal utility
17See Appendix 2.6.1 for the derivation of the subutility in open industries.
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of a higher supply of the public good. The second term represents the marginal utility
loss due to the crowding out of private firms in tradable and non-tradable industries. As
we discussed before, the average diversity of products in equilibrium is lower with higher
public production. The first bracket is positive and dampens the loss described by the
second term. This dampening effect comes from the fact that domestic public production
affects only the range of domestic firms - not the diversity of available foreign varieties.
Since households have a love of variety, subutility in open industries is higher than in
closed ones. Due to the crowding out of domestic firms, the diversity of domestic relative
to foreign varieties decreases which increases the relative weight of open industries. This
dampening effect is larger the higher the integration of the goods market which is measured
by τ . Without integration of the goods market, eq. (2.22) is solved for g = 1−η
1−η+ η
ν
< 1−η.
By inspecting equation (2.22), it can be seen, that the degree of openness plays no longer
a role if ν → 1, i.e., in a situation under perfect competition and no love of variety.
Moreover, the effect of the asymmetry between countries on optimal government share
vanishes. Prices equalize (see equation 2.19) since goods are homogeneous. Then, optimal
government share is given by g = 1− η, identical for both countries.
According to eq. (2.22) the foreign country affects optimal government size through
its choice of gi′ . The following Proposition describes the interaction between the two
governments:
Proposition 2.2. Domestic optimal government share depends negatively on foreign op-
timal government share if τ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.4.
Proposition 2.2 implies that government expenditures are strategic substitutes. If
government spending in the foreign country is increased, foreign firms exit the market
and fewer varieties are produced in country F . As a result, not only utility in the foreign
country but also in home is reduced. The dampening effect of openness on the opportunity
costs of public good provision in H (first term in eq. (2.22)) are also smaller. Therefore,
the domestic government has an incentive to reduce government spending. If the foreign
government share is equal to 1, there are no foreign varieties available for consumption.
Therefore, gi(gi′ = 1) =
1−η
1−η+ η
ν
, which is equal to the optimal government share in a closed
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economy.
The two reaction functions gH(gF , τ, ν, η,ΩF ) and gF (gH , τ, ν, η,ΩH) are illustrated in
figure 2.1.18
( )F Hg g
( )H Fg g
Hg
Fg
1
1
(1 )
(1 )
ν η
ν η η
−
− +
(1 )
(1 )
ν η
ν η η
−
− +
Figure 2.1: Governmental reaction functions
For a first comparative-static investigation of the optimal government share in a single
country it is interesting to look at the symmetric case. Under the assumption of identical
countries, we are able to calculate explicitly the equilibrium value of the Nash game of
the public sector.
2.3.2 Symmetric Countries
Relative country size is captured in the parameter Ωi which is equal to 1 for identical
countries. In this case gH = gF ≡ g is a mutually best response of both governments.
This optimal g is given by
g =
1− η
1 + η 1−ν
ν
(1− τ
2
)
(2.23)
This gives us the following Proposition:
Proposition 2.3. In the equilibrium with identical countries, the optimal government
share depends positively on τ and ν.
18The proof of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is presented in the Appendix 2.6.3.
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Proof. Inspection of (2.23).
The effect of openness on the optimal government share interacts with love of variety
(see also eq. (2.29) later).19 Only if households love varieties (ν < 1), subutility in open
industries is higher than in a closed industry. Thus, the more open a country, the higher is
a household’s utility. Since the consumer can benefit more strongly from foreign varieties
in more open economies, the importance of domestic varieties diminishes. This provides
an incentive for governments to set a higher g. Optimal government expenditure in a
closed economy (τ = 0) is equal to g = 1−η
1−η+ η
ν
and in a totally open economy (τ = 1)
equal to g = 1−η
1+η 1−ν
2ν
.
A higher ν (that is a lower love of variety) implies a higher optimal government spend-
ing. Since the negative effect on utility - due to a crowding out of varieties - is low when
love of variety is low, the public sector sets a higher government share.
2.3.3 Asymmetric Countries
Having obtained an insight for the effect of the different parameters on government spend-
ing in a symmetric equilibrium, I now turn to the asymmetric case. Note, that only the
relative difference between the two countries enters the first order condition. I first con-
sider some limiting cases. If Ωi′ → 0, i.e., country i′ becomes infinitesimally small. Thus,
we are able to analyze the interaction between a very large and small country which is
often discussed in the literature. For Ωi′ → 0 the solution for gi (given by (2.22)) re-
duces to 1−η
1+η 1−ν
ν
, which coincides with the optimal government size in a closed economy.
Since (Ωi)
−1 = Ωi′ , Ωi′ → 0 implies Ωi → ∞. Therefore, the solution for gi′ is given
by 1−η
1+η 1−ν
ν
(1−τ) . Hence not surprisingly, while for the large country the degree of open-
ness does not affect government spending, the infinitesimally small country benefits from
more openness. Further, in this limiting cases, domestic optimal government share is
independent of the foreign government share.
Proposition 2.4 summarizes the effects of the asymmetry between the two countries
on the Nash equilibrium of the public sector.
19The discussion in Section 2.4.1 will make clear, that in the case of symmetric countries there are no
gains from trade due to price differentials between the two countries. Since the public sector affects only
the diversity of varieties, the measure for the love of variety drives this result.
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Proposition 2.4. The bigger and more productive is country i relative to the country i′
(lower Ωi′), the lower is optimal government share in country i and the higher in country
i′.
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.4.
If in country i overhead capital requirement is relatively low or if capital endowment
is relatively high, more varieties are produced in country i. Relatively high productivity
and labor endowment imply that a larger amount of each variety is produced. Hence,
gains from opening to trade are larger for the relatively small country (i′) because it
benefits from a relatively broader range of foreign goods or relatively more of a certain
variety. The magnitude of the gains from opening are decisive for the costs of public good
provision. The dampening effect (the first term in equation (2.22)) on the costs of public
good provision increases in the gains from trade.20 Therefore, the costs of public good
provision in terms of utility are relatively small in the small or less productive country.
It is obvious from equation (2.22) that - for a given foreign government share - a higher
τ results in a higher optimal domestic government share. That is, the reaction functions
rotate outwards if τ increases. However, since the curves are negatively sloped, it is not a
priori clear whether openness does increase government spending in both countries. The
symmetric case already showed that openness has a positive effect on optimal government
spending in equilibrium. The limiting asymmetry cases show that the infinitely rich or
large country does not benefit from openness and therefore, government spending does
not depend on openness. While the optimal government share of the infinitely poor or
small country depends positively on τ . We have21
dgi
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ωi′→∞
>
dgi
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ωi′=1
>
dgi
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ωi′→0
= 0 ,
which let conjecture that the effect of openness on optimal government share is decreasing
in the relative size of of the country. I provide some simulation outcomes (see figure 2.2)
which support the conjecture that d
2gi
dτdΩi′
> 0 and dgi
dτ
> 0 ∀ Ωi′ 6= 0.22
20Note that the costs of public good provision in a closed economy is independent of country size.
21Remind: that gi|Ωi′→∞ =
1−η
1+η 1−νν (1−τ)
, gi|Ωi′=1 =
1−η
1+η 1−νν (1− τ2 )
and gi|Ωi′→0 =
1−η
1+η 1−νν
.
22The program code for the simulation in Mathematica 6.0 is available from the author upon request.
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Figure 2.2: Effect of τ on optimal gi subject to Ωi′ (ν = 0.7, τ = 0.3, η = 0.6). The plot
looks qualitatively the same for various values of ν, τ, η ∈ (0, 1).
An easier and more tractable alternative to the case of asymmetric countries is the ex-
tension of the scenario with two symmetric countries to one with N symmetric countries.
This approach captures important aspects of the asymmetric country case, because each
individual economy differs from the rest of the world, which is larger than the country
under consideration if N > 2. The Krugman-framework is easily extended to N countries
and the symmetric N -country Nash equilibrium of the governments is derived straight-
forwardly (see Appendix 2.6.5 for the derivation). Optimal government share in the Nash
equilibrium is given by the following expression
g =
1− η
1 + η 1−ν
ν
(
1− τ (N−1)
N
) .
For N = 1 we obtain the solution for the limiting case of a very large country and for
N →∞ the one for the infinitesimal small country. It can easily be shown that the effect
of openness is increasing in N :
∂2g
∂τ∂N
=
(1− η)η 1−ν
ν
1
N2
(1 + η 1−ν
ν
+ N−1
N
η 1−ν
ν
τ)(
1 + η 1−ν
ν
(1− τ N−1
N
)
)3 > 0 .
Put differently, the effect of τ on g is decreasing in country size.
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2.3.4 Welfare
It is well known from the literature that non-cooperative fiscal policies may be too ex-
pansionary if there are positive terms of trade effects.23 Of course, a similar result follows
here. If τ > 0, an increase in H’s public expenditure decreases the range of available
varieties not only in the home country. This negative effect on utility in country F is not
taken into account by H’s government when choosing the optimal level of public good
production. From a country’s point of view, optimal public good provision increases with
openness since the more a country is integrated into the world market (higher τ), the
more costs of public good provision are exported. It follows that uncoordinated fiscal
policies lead to an inefficiently high level of public good production.
For illustration consider the case of two symmetric countries.24 Total welfare is given
by 2U . If we consider a social planner who wants to maximize aggregate welfare, public
good provision in both countries should equal gP = 1−η
1−η+ η
ν
(gP denotes government share
set by a social planner) which is equal to the level in autarky. However, if both countries
choose separately their public good provision, they set g according to (2.23). It is easy to
see that gP < 1−η
1+η 1−ν
ν
(1− τ
2
)
= g. It follows that there is overprovision of the public good
without cooperation and that coordination between the two governments would increase
aggregate welfare.
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Love of Variety versus Market Power
The aim of this section is to separate the role of market power from love of variety. In
the standard Dixit-Stiglitz case we are not able to distinguish between the two effects.
I follow Benassy (1996) who provides a generalization of the standard Dixit-Stiglitz as-
sumption.25 The nice and special feature of this extension is to disentangle the parameter
23See for example van der Ploeg (1987), Turnovsky (1988), Chari and Kehoe (1990), Devereux (1991),
Anderson (2006), Egger and Falkinger (2006) and Epifani and Gancia (2009) for the discussion of over-
provision of public goods due to terms of trade effects.
24The problem of overprovision in a non-cooperative equilibrium exists, of course, also if countries are
asymmetric. The interested reader is referred to the Appendix 2.6.6.
25The working paper version of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) already discusses this general case.
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for monopolistic power or elasticity of substitution from the one for love of variety. Under
the Benassy extension the subutility is given by
Yij = (Nij)
ρ+1− 1
ν
(∫
k∈Nij
(
yikj
)ν
dk
) 1
ν
, i = H,F , (2.24)
where Nij = |Nij| denotes the measure of varieties from industry j consumed in country
i. The love of variety is captured in the parameter ρ ≥ 0. If ρ is equal to zero there is no
love of variety and if ρ = 1−ν
ν
we are back to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz case.26
The demand curve for a variety changes as follows
yikj = (Nij)
ρ ν
1−ν−1
(
pkj
Pij
) −1
1−ν
Yij ∀ k ∈ Nij , ∀ j ∈ [0, 1] (2.25)
where Pij := (Nij)
−ρ+ 1
σ−1
(∫
k∈Nij (pki)
1−σ dk
) 1
1−σ
is the price index per industry and may
be interpreted as the unit cost function of the subutility Yij (2.24).
Compared to the results presented so far, the subutilities for traded and non tradable
industries change as follows:
Yi,j>τ (gi) = (ni)
ρ+1 xi
Yi,j≤τ (gi, gi′) =
(
ni+ni′
ni
)ρ (
(Ii+Ii′ )ni
Ii(ni+ni′ )
) 1
ν
−1
Yi,j>τ (gi)
(2.26)
for i, i′ = H,F , i 6= i′, and note that ni and Ii are both functions of gi. Subutility in
closed industries depends positively on the love of variety while the parameter for market
power has no effect.
When there is no love of variety, ρ = 0, it is not clear anymore whether subutility in
open industries is higher than in closed ones.27 Whether
(Ii+Ii′ )ni
Ii(ni+ni′ )
is greater or smaller
than 1, depends on the relative prices of foreign and domestic varieties. Substituting
26See Montagna (2001) for a discussion of the welfare effects from trade under the two cases, Dixit-
Stiglitz versus no love of variety. To distinguish between external economies of scale in output production
and elasticity of substitution has become very common in recent theoretical contributions of international
trade, e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), Felbermayr et al. (2008) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
27Note that the utility functions between non-tradable and tradable industries are different functions.
While preferences in the former are defined over all ni domestic goods, preferences in the latter are
defined over all nH +nF domestic and foreign varieties. Given the available goods, ni in closed industries
and nH + nF in open industries, the consumer chooses optimally consumption of each variety. In open
industries, marginal utility of not consuming a certain foreign variety yi
k˜j
is infinity as marginal utility
2.4. EXTENSIONS 39
Ii = nipixi, i = H,F , and using (2.14) yields
(Ii + Ii′)ni
Ii(ni + ni′)
=
ni + ni′
(
pi
pi′
) ν
1−ν
ni + ni′
(2.27)
which is greater than 1 if pi > pi′ and smaller than 1 if pi < pi′ . In words, if the average
price in open industries is lower than in closed ones, subutility in open industries is higher
than in closed industries. Recalling that the relative price of foreign to domestic varieties
is equal to pF =
(
AH
AF
L¯HK¯F
K¯H L¯F
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν
, the term (2.27) for a household in H is greater than
1 if, anything equal, H is more capital rich, less productive in AH or overhead capital
requirement is lower.
Governments maximization of the household’s utility (equation (2.21) subject to (2.26))
yields following first order condition:
φi := ητρ
(
1
1− gi −
1
1− gi + (1− gi′)κi′
)
+ ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
1− gi + (1− gi′)κi′ −
1
1− gi + (1− gi′)Ωi′
)
− η(ρ+ 1) 1
1− gi + (1− η)
1
gi
= 0
(2.28)
with
Ωi′ =
(
Ai′
Ai
)ν (
K∗i
K∗i′
)1−ν (
K¯i′
K¯i
)1−ν (
L¯i′
L¯i
)ν
κi′ :=
K¯i′K
∗
i
K¯iK∗i′
for i, i′ = H,F and i 6= i′. As before, the last term in equation (2.28) captures the
positive marginal utility of a higher supply of the public good. The third term captures
with respect to yi
k˜j
is given by ∂Yij
∂yi
k˜j
= N1−
1
ν
ij
(∫
k∈Nij
(
yikj
)ν
dk
) 1
ν−1
(
1
yi
k˜j
)1−ν
. It follows that even
the household in the country with low prices whose subutility in open industries is lower than in closed
industries will trade. The central point is that the household can not decide about the number of different
goods she consumes. Given the range of different goods, she only chooses (optimally) how much of each
variety she wants to consume. That there is trade even if for one country utility in open industries
is lower than without trade is a peculiar outcome. Therefore, in a world without love of variety and
differentiated goods, one should have different preferences where the consumer decides simultaneously
about the number of different varieties and the quantity of a certain variety.
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the marginal utility loss due to the crowding out of private firms in each tradable and non-
tradable industry, which is larger the higher the love of variety. The first term in (2.22)
(derived under the assumption of ρ = 1−ν
ν
) combined the first two terms in (2.28). The
first term in (2.28) is positive and captures the love of variety effect in open industries.28
The second term is the income gain/loss in terms of utility, which I call the income effect.
It is positive if the inequality κi′ < Ωi′ holds which is equal to the inequality pi′ < pi .
29
If the fundamentals of the economy are such that the price of foreign varieties is smaller
than the price of domestic varieties, the income effect is positive since a relative low price
of foreign varieties implies that the average price in open industries is lower than the
average price in closed industries. If foreign varieties are more expensive than domestic
ones the income effect will be negative. The price differential between the two countries
has an effect as long as the firms have market power or the elasticity of substitution is
finite, i.e. ν < 1. It is obvious that if the income effect is positive for country H, it is
negative for country F and vice versa.
Consider for a moment the case without love of variety, i.e., ρ = 0. The first term
in (2.28) disappears. Openness affects government expenditure only through the income
effect. Openness to trade does not necessarily affect government spending positively. If
foreign prices are lower than domestic ones, there are gains from trade for the domes-
tic country and the domestic optimal government share does increase in openness. In
contrast, optimal government share of the foreign country decreases in openness.
Equation (2.28) illustrates that if the love of variety is sufficiently large (which is
definitely the case under the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption there are gains from trade for both
countries and government spending is larger in open economies than in closed ones.
If the countries are symmetric, then κi = 1 and Ωi = 1 and the second term in the
first order condition (eq. (2.28)) disappears. Thus, in a world of identical countries the
degree of market power or elasticity of substitution has no effect on optimal public good
28Note, that the first bracket in equation (2.28) can be rewritten to 11−gi − 11−gi+(1−gi′ )κi′ =
1
1−gi
ni′
ni+ni′
.
It is apparently increasing in the relative number of foreign varieties.
29This can be seen after some rearranging:
κi′ < Ωi′ ⇔ K¯i′K
∗
i
K¯iK∗i′
<
(
Ai′
Ai
)ν (
K∗i
K∗
i′
)ν (
K¯i′
K¯i
)1−ν (
L¯i′
L¯i
)ν
⇔ 1 <
(
pi
pi′
) ν
1−ν
.
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provision. The optimal g is given by
g =
1− η
1 + ηρ(1− τ
2
)
(2.29)
The effect of openness on the optimal government share plays together with ρ, the pa-
rameter for love of variety. If individuals have no love of variety, openness won’t have
an effect on government spending. The higher ρ, i.e., the higher the love of variety, the
lower is optimal government spending. This result makes clear that the positive relation
between ν and public spending derived in Section 2.3 for the Dixit-Stiglitz framework is
driven by the love of variety and not by the elasticity of substitution.
To conclude
Proposition 2.5. With two identical countries, optimal government spending depends
negatively on the parameter for love of variety. Further, optimal government spending
depends not on the elasticity of substitution. Openness has a positive effect on optimal
government size if consumers have a love of variety.
2.4.2 Labor or Capital Intensive Public Sector
The equilibrium was derived under the assumption that government activity does not
distort the relative factor endowment available for private production. That is, I assumed
that βi =
L¯i
K¯i
. This assumption is important in order to focus on interactions between
openness and the government sector without having a distortion by the government sector
on prices and supply. The only effect of a government expansion was the crowding out of
private firms. The aim of this section is to analyze the additional effects of government
activity if public good production is more labor intensive or more capital intensive than
the private sector. Consider equation (2.5). A large βi implies that productivity of capital
is large which in turn implies that employment of capital in public good production is low
relative to the employment of labor.
Remind that cost minimizing production implies that
gKi = gLi
L¯i
βiK¯i
.
42 2. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND OPTIMAL GOVERNMENT SIZE
The share of capital endowment employed in the public sector is proportionally increasing
in the share of labor endowment in the public sector. When βi <
L¯i
K¯i
, then gLi < gKi which
means that the public sector is more capital intensive than the private sector. If βi >
L¯i
K¯i
the reverse holds.
Cost minimal production of a public good is thus given by
Gi = βigKiK¯i = gLiL¯i.
The factor proportion supplied to the private sector is equal to (1−gKi)K¯i
(1−gLi)L¯i with gKi =
gLi
L¯i
βiK¯i
. As before, there is one public choice parameter since there is a one-to-one mapping
between gKi and gLi. Therefore, in the following gKi is replaced by gLi
L¯i
βiK¯i
. This implies
for the relative factor prices
wi
ri
=
ν
1− ν
K¯i
L¯i
B−1i ,
where I defined Bi :=
1−gLi
1− gLiL¯i
βiK¯i
. Note that ∂Bi
∂gLi
≷ 0 if βi ≶ L¯iK¯i . Since the supply of a variety
and labor demand of a firm depend on the relative factor prices, both are now affected
by government activity:
xi = AiK
∗
i
L¯i
K¯i
Bi (2.30)
and
Li = K
∗
i
L¯i
K¯i
Bi .
The range of firms is given by equation (2.16) with gi replaced by gKi = gLi
L¯i
βiK¯i
:
ni = (1− gLi L¯i
βiK¯i
)
K¯i
K∗i
. (2.31)
The crowding out of the extensive margin of production due to an expansion of the public
sector is given by: ∂ni
∂gLi
= − L¯i
K∗i
1
βi
. We see that the smaller is βi, the stronger is the
crowding out of firms. As long as the public sector employs capital for production, a
crowding out of private firms takes place.
The price of foreign varieties depends on the public share in home and foreign:
pF =
(
AH
AF
(
BHL¯HK¯F
BF K¯HL¯F
)
K∗H
K∗F
)1−ν
. (2.32)
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Under the assumption of βi =
L¯i
K¯i
, government activity does only influence the range
of firms producing a variety in equilibrium. However, if we allow for βi 6= L¯iK¯i , there is no
equilibrium variable which stays unaffected by the government share. For analyzing the
effect of government activity we have to distinguish two cases: βi >
L¯i
K¯i
and βi <
L¯i
K¯i
.
Case 1: βi >
L¯i
K¯i
If βi >
L¯i
K¯i
, the public sector produces more labor intensive than the private sector, that
is gKi < gLi. There is relatively less labor available for the private sector. This implies a
higher relative wage rate compared to the case where βi =
L¯i
K¯i
. Consider now an increase
in government activity. An expansion of the public sector increases gLi by more than gKi
and hence the factor proportion of capital relative to labor supplied to the private sector
(given by B−1i
K¯i
L¯i
) increases. As a result the relative factor price wi
ri
increases. Demand for
labor and the supply of each variety are decreasing in the factor proportion B−1i
K¯i
L¯i
and
hence decrease with an expansion of the public sector if βi >
L¯i
K¯i
. Because of a decrease in
the factor price of capital, the fixed cost decrease. This allows each firm to produce at a
lower scale. It follows that for given public spending in the foreign country, an expansion
of the government sector increases the relative price of domestic varieties. Hence, an
increase in government spending improves the terms of trade if the public sector produces
more labor intensive.
Hence, this model does not only allow for the love of variety effect due to crowding
out of firms, it also captures the widely discussed positive terms of trade effect with the
more realistic assumption that the public sector produces more labor intensive.30
Case 2: 0 < βi <
L¯i
K¯i
For completeness, although less realistic case, if βi <
L¯i
K¯i
, the public sector produces more
capital intensive than the private sector, that is gLi < gKi. An expansion of the public
sector increases gLi by less than gKi and hence the factor proportion of capital relative to
labor supplied to the private sector (given by B−1i
K¯i
L¯i
) decreases if the government share
30Assuming an alternative public good production such as G = gL¯, where the public good is produced
exclusively with labor, only the terms of trade effect remains (see Appendix 2.7.1).
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increases. All the effects discussed above change their sign except, of course, the negative
effect on the number of firms is still present.
To sum up, the labor intensity in the public sector relative to the private sector is
decisive for the crowding out of the extensive margin of production (number of firms)
and intensive margin of production (output per firm). If the public sector produces labor
intensive, there is less crowding out of private firms. As a result, the love of variety effect
is smaller. However, there is a positive terms of trade effect due to the crowding out of
the intensive margin of production.31 In contrast, a capital intensive public sector implies
a larger crowding out of firms but a deterioration of the terms of trade.
2.5 Conclusion
Based on a general equilibrium model, this chapter has identified a new channel how
trade openness may lead to larger governments. The model consists of two heteroge-
neous countries which both comprise a public and private sector. There are tradable and
non-tradable private industries, endogenous product differentiation within the private in-
dustries and consumers have a love of variety. In this framework, the effect of openness to
trade on optimal public good provision is analyzed. Moreover, the effects of heterogeneity
between countries on optimal public good provision are discussed.
The idea that government expansion may be achieved on expense of the welfare of other
countries due to the terms of trade effect (TOTE) is familiar. However, this chapter shows
that under the assumption of endogenous firm entry and Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, the
cost of public good provision may be exported due to the love of variety effect (LOVE).
Since a governmental expansion crowds out only domestic varieties, the costs of public
good provision in terms of welfare are lower, the more industries are open. Therefore,
government spending depends positively on openness if consumers have a love of variety.
Furthermore, since the gains from trade are larger for a small or less productive country,
the smaller country chooses a higher government share. In contrast, in a closed economy,
optimal government share is invariant with respect to the size of the respective economy.
31In Section 2.7.2 the first order condition is split in the different parts, costs due to crowding out of
extensive and intensive margin of production and gains from trade due to love of variety and terms of
trade effect.
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The possibility of governments to export the costs of public good provision leads to an
equilibrium where both governments act too expansionary. An agreement between the
two governments reducing government activity in both countries would lead to a higher
aggregate welfare.
The main focus of this chapter is put on the crowding out of private firms (extensive
margin) and hence on the LOVE. However, the presented theoretical framework is able
to account also for crowding out of the intensive margin and hence the TOTE. Hence,
the two possibilities of exporting costs of public good provision and their implications for
optimal government size in open economies can be discussed in one unified framework.
Two production factors and the differences in factor intensity of public versus private
production are decisive for the effect of government activity on private sector’s production
and the relative factor prices. The degree of crowding out of the extensive and intensive
margin of production is decisive for the size of the LOVE and TOTE.
The chapter provides a foundation for a number of empirical research questions. A
first empirical investigation whether the LOVE on public spending exists in the data is
provided in Chapter 3. Whether the LOVE or TOTE is of higher empirical importance
and whether the strength of the two effects depends on relative factor intensity in private
and public sector is left for further empirical research.
A natural and interesting theoretical extension would be to take capital flows between
countries into account. This may allow to combine the race to the bottom argument,
based on the fear of capital outflow, with overprovision arising from the possibility to
export costs of public good provision.
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2.6 Appendix A: Proofs and Derivations
2.6.1 Derivations
Derivation of eq. (2.13)
Using demand yi
′
i =
(
pi
Pj
) −ν
1−ν Ii′
Pj
, i, i′ = H,F we see that consumption of in H relative to
consumption in F of a variety produced in H is equal to the relative income:
yHH
yFH
=
IH
IF
.
Using this, the equation for market clearing in a tradable industry, xH = y
H
H + y
F
H ,
and the relation
yHH
yHF
=
(
pF
pH
) 1
1−ν
we get the demand for tradable varieties
(yHH , y
H
F ) =
(
IHxH
IF + IH
,
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν IHxH
IF + IH
)
(yFH , y
F
F ) =
(
IFxH
IF + IH
,
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν IFxH
IF + IH
)
Further by using the condition xH
xF
=
(
pH
pF
) −1
1−ν
(eq. (2.14)) expression (2.13) is obtained.
Note that the derivation of equation (2.14) does not require (2.13).
Derivation of the Subutility in Open Industries
For i, i′ = H,F and i 6= i′:
Yi,j≤τ =
(
nij
(
yii
)ν
+ ni′j
(
yii′
)ν) 1ν
= yii
(
nij + ni′j
(
yii′
yii
)ν) 1ν
(2.33)
Further, using Ii = pinixi = nijpiy
i
i +ni′jpi′y
i
i′ and the fact that
yi
i′
yii
=
(
pi
pi′
) 1
1−ν
implies
nixi
yii
= nij + ni′j
(
yii′
yii
)ν
.
Combining with (2.33) and substituting yii, i = H,F from (2.13), we get the subutility in
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open industries in expression (2.20).
Derivation of the First Order Condition (eq. (2.22))
We first rewrite the objective function of the government in the form (i = H,F ):
max
gi
ητ
1− ν
ν
(log(Ii(gi) + Ii′(gi′))− log Ii(gi)) + η log (ni(gi))
1
ν xi + (1− η) logGi(gi)
The first order condition of this problem is given by:
0 = ητ
1− ν
ν
(
∂ log(Ii + Ii′)
∂gi
− ∂ log Ii
∂gi
)
+
η
ν
∂ log ni
∂gi
+ (1− η)∂ logGi
∂gi
(2.34)
This yields equation (2.22).
2.6.2 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. We will show that the solution to the first order condition (2.22) corresponds to a
global maximum, that is ∂ϑi
∂gi
< 0.
∂ϑi
∂gi
= ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
(1− gi)2 −
1
(1− gi + (1− gi′)Ωi′)2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡A(gi)
−η
ν
1
(1− gi)2 − (1− η)
1
(gi)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(2.35)
As Ωi′ ≥ 0 and gi′ ∈ (0, 1) we have A(gi) ≥ 0. Note that ∂A(gi)∂Ωi′ > 0, hence A(gi) is
minimal if Ωi′ = 0 and maximal if Ωi′ →∞.
Now Ωi′ →∞ ⇒ A(gi)→ ητ 1−νν 1(1−gi)2 . Hence, for Ωi′ →∞,
∂ϑi
∂gi
→ η
ν
1
(1− gi)2 [τ(1− ν)− 1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−1− η
(gi)2
< 0 .
2.6.3 Proof of Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Proof of Existence. Note first that gi, gi′ ∈ [0, 1]. Since the reaction functions are con-
tinuous and strictly negatively sloped (Proposition 2.2), there exists an equilibrium if
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gi(gi′ = 1) > 0. In the following we are going to proof this.
The solution at gi′ = 1 is gi(gi′ = 1) =
ν(1−η)
ν(1−η)+η < 1. In Proposition 2.2 it is shown
that dgi
dgi′
< 0 which implies that gi >
ν(1−η)
ν(1−η)+η for gi′ ∈ [0, 1) and gi < 1 for gi′ > 0.
This argument holds for both i, i′ = H,F and i 6= i′ and hence the two functions must
intersect at least once as illustrated in figure 2.1.
Moreover, note that because of gi(gi′ = 1) > 0, both countries provide a positive
amount of the public good in an equilibrium.
Proof of Uniqueness. It remains to show that ∂gi
∂gi′
is strictly monotonic (in- or decreasing).
For notational simplicity we will define κ ≡ ητ 1−ν
ν
Ωi′ and B ≡ (1−gi+(1−gi′)Ωi′). Note
that κ,B > 0. The derivative of (2.36) with respect to gi′ is given by
∂2gi
(∂gi′)2
=
−κ
[
∂2ϑi
∂gi∂gi′
B2 − ∂ϑi
∂gi
2BΩi′
]
[
∂ϑi
∂gi
B2
]2
Making use of ∂
2ϑi
∂gi∂gi′
= −2κ
B3
we can write
∂2gi
(∂gi′)2
=
−2κ
≡Z︷ ︸︸ ︷[−κ
B2
− ∂ϑi
∂gi
Ωi′
]
(
∂ϑi
∂gi
)2
B3
Now we have to determine the sign of Z by using eq. (2.35).
Z =
−κ
B2
− κ 1
(1− gi)2 +
κ
B2
+ Ωi′
(
η
ν
1
(1− gi)2 − (1− η)
1
(gi)2
)
= Ωi′
[
η
ν
1
(1− gi)2 (1− τ(1− ν)) +
1− η
(gi)2
]
> 0
This implies that ∂gi
∂gi′
is strictly monotone decreasing:
∂2gi
(∂gi′)2
=
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
−2κZ(
∂ϑi
∂gi
)2
B3︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0 .
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As the same is true for
∂2gi′
(∂gi)2
, we can conclude that the reaction functions intersect only
once.
2.6.4 Proof of Propositions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Since the value of imports equals the value of exports, the vol-
ume of trade (denoted by V T ) is given by V T = 2
∫ τ
0
pFy
H
F nFjdj. According to (2.13)
yHF =
xF
1+IF /IH
, net income IH and therefore demand for a variety produced in F and
consumed in H depend negatively on an increase of gH while the other values remain
unaffected. Therefore, the volume of trade depends negatively on gH .
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Proposition 2.2 is easily shown by applying the implicit function
theorem on the first order condition (equation (2.22)).
dgi
dgi′
= −
−ητ 1−ν
ν
Ωi′
(1−gi+(1−gi′ )Ωi′ )2
∂ϑi
∂gi
(2.36)
The expression ∂ϑi
∂gi
is the second order condition which is negative. Therefore, dgi
dgi′
< 0, if
τ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Again, the implicit function theorem is applied on the first order
condition for given public foreign expenditure to get
dgi
dΩi′
∣∣∣∣
gi′constant
= −
−ητ 1−ν
ν
−(1−gi′ )
(1−gi+(1−gi′ )Ωi′ )2
∂ϑi
∂gi
> 0 .
The expression ∂ϑi
∂gi
is the second order condition which is negative. Neglecting the effect
of Ωi′ on gi′ the result above means that for given gi′ optimal gi is higher the higher Ωi′ .
Since Ωi′ = (Ωi)
−1, by the same argument, a higher Ωi′ leads to a lower gi′ for any given
gi. The lower gi′ due to the higher Ωi′ has an additional positive effect on gi as I have
shown in proposition 2.2. Hence, any change in the fundamentals, which makes country i′
bigger (higher K¯i′/K¯i and L¯i′/L¯i) and more productive (higher Ai′/Ai and lower K
∗
i′/K
∗
i )
lowers the equilibrium value of gi′ and increases gi. Graphically the reaction function
gi(gi′) rotates outwards and gi′(gi) rotates inwards.
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2.6.5 N Symmetric Countries
A nice feature of the Krugman framework is its easy extendability to a multi-country
model. Assume N identical countries, indexed with i = 1, ..., N .
The market clearing condition for each tradable variety is given by
xk =
N∑
i=1
yik = Nyk
where yik denotes consumption of variety k by household i and xk the production of
variety k. A constant fraction of each tradable good is consumed in each country. Because
firms are identical, each household consumes an equal amount of each variety. Therefore,
we can neglect the indices and write
y =
x
N
.
Further we assume that the public sector has only an effect on the number of firms.
ni(gi) may be potentially different between countries. Subutility of an individual house-
hold for a tradable industry can be written as
Yj≤τ ({gi}i=1,...,N) =
(
N∑
i=1
∫ ni
0
yνdk
) 1
ν
=
(
N∑
i=1
niy
ν
) 1
ν
=
(
N∑
i=1
ni
) 1
ν
x
N
.
For the non-tradable industry nothing changes.
Yj>τ (gi) = (ni(gi))
1
ν x
Governments’ objective function is utility of the representative household:
max
gi
ητ log Yi,j≤τ ({gl}l=1,...,N) + η(1− τ) log Yi,j>τ (gi) + (1− η) logGi(gi) .
Since government i takes as given the government shares of the other countries when
determining its optimal gi, the first order condition is given by
ητ
1
ν
1∑N
l=1 nl
∂ni
∂gi
+ η(1− τ)1
ν
1
ni
∂ni
∂gi
+ (1− η) 1
gi
= 0
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which is equivalent to
ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
1− gi −
1
1− gi +
∑
i′ 6=i(1− gi′)
)
− η
ν
1
1− gi + (1− η)
1
gi
= 0 . (2.37)
As in a symmetric equilibrium gi = gi′ = g for all i, i
′ = 1, ..., N , i 6= i′, the following
symmetric government share results
g =
1− η
1 + η 1−ν
ν
(1− τ N−1
N
)
. (2.38)
An increase in the number of countries has qualitatively the same effect as a decrease
of i’s country size. As the number of countries increases, the cost of public good provision
decreases since the relative number of imported goods to domestically produced goods
increases. As a result, unilateral optimal government size increases.
2.6.6 Overprovision
This section shows that unilateral fiscal policies are too expansionary from an aggregate
welfare point of view. A social planner seeks to maximize aggregate welfare and hence,
she takes into account the negative externality on the foreign country’s welfare.
Aggregate utility is given by
UH + UF =ητ
1− ν
ν
(log(IH + IF )− log(IH)) + η
ν
log nH + η log xH + (1− η) logGH
+ητ
1− ν
ν
(log(IH + IF )− log(IF )) + η
ν
log nF + η log xF + (1− η) logGF .
The social optimum for gH is determined by the following equation (analogous for gF ):
∂(UH + UF )
∂gH
=ητ
1− ν
ν
(
∂ log(IH + IF )
∂gH
− ∂ log IH
∂gH
)
+
η
ν
∂ log nH
∂gH
+ (1− η)∂ logGH
∂gH
+ ητ
1− ν
ν
∂ log(IH + IF )
∂gH
= 0 .
(2.39)
Comparing this first order condition with equation (2.34) it can be noted that they differ
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in the additional last term in equation (2.39). This term captures the negative effect
on the foreign country. We have ητ 1−ν
ν
∂ log(IH+IF )
∂gH
= −ητ 1−ν
ν
1
1−gH+(1−gF )ΩF < 0. Thus
∂(UH+UF )
∂gH
< 0 at the solution of (2.34), which together with the second order condition
implies that the socially optimal level is higher than the individual optimum.
2.7 Appendix B: Further Technical Discussions
2.7.1 Terms of Trade Effect
This section isolates the terms of trade effect which can be obtained when the public sector
produces exclusively with labor. This is a nice exercise to compare the two extremes “only
love of variety effect” versus “only positive terms of trade effect” and to close the circle
to the existing literature. The following simple production function for the public good
is assumed:
Gi = giL¯i.
The full employment conditions for capital and labor are thus given by
∫ 1
0
nijdjKi = K¯i (2.40)∫ 1
0
nijdjLi = (1− gi)L¯i (2.41)
The range of firms per country follows directly from (2.40)
ni =
∫ 1
0
nijdj =
K¯i
K∗i
(2.42)
Equations (2.41), (2.9) and (2.42) determine the relative factor prices:
ri
wi
=
1− ν
ν
(1− gi)L¯i
K¯i
. (2.43)
It follows that
xi = AiK
∗
i
(1− gi)L¯i
K¯i
i = H,F (2.44)
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Li = K
∗
i
(1− gi)L¯i
K¯i
i = H,F (2.45)
Because of pH = 1 und (2.43) it follows
wH = AHν and rH = (1− ν)(1− gH)L¯H
K¯H
AH
Because of xF
xH
=
(
pH
pF
) 1
1−ν
and using (2.44) and pH = 1: we have for pF
pF =
(
AHK
∗
H(1− gH)L¯HK¯F
AFK∗F (1− gF )L¯F K¯H
)1−ν
(2.46)
and hence for the foreign factor prices it follows
wF = ν (AF )
ν
(
AHK
∗
H(1− gH)L¯HK¯F
K∗F (1− gF )L¯F K¯H
)1−ν
rF = (1− ν)
(
(1− gF )L¯F
K¯F
AF
)ν (
AHK
∗
H(1− gH)L¯HK¯F
K∗F K¯H
)1−ν
Finally, the net incomes are given by Ii(gi) = (1− gi)AiL¯ipi.
The effect of government spending on the equilibrium values is summarized in the
following:
∂ni
∂gi
= 0
∂xi
∂gi
< 0,
∂Li
∂gi
< 0
∂wi/ri
∂gi
> 0
∂pi/pi′
∂gi
> 0,
∂wi/wi′
∂gi
> 0,
∂ri/ri′
∂gi
< 0 .
An increase in government production does not affect the range of firms. Due to an
increased demand for labor, labor gets relatively scarce in the private sector and the
relative wage rate increases. Demand for labor of each individual private firm decreases
and hence, each firm produces a lower quantity. This in turn leads to a terms of trade
improvement. In contrast to the model where the public sector crowds out firms, here,
the public sector crowds out only production of each firm but does not affect the diversity
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of firms.
Optimal public good provision is found by maximizing utility of the representative
household. Remind that the subutilities are given by
Yi,j>τ = (ni)
1
ν xi and Yi,j≤τ =
(
Ii + Ii′
Ii
) 1
ν
−1
(ni)
1
ν xi .
In contrast to the main part of this chapter, ni does not depend on gi, however xi and the
relative prices depend on gi. Let us consider for the moment the expression
Ii+Ii′
Ii
with
Ii = (1− gi)AiL¯ipi.
Ii + Ii′
Ii
= 1 +
1− gi′
1− gi
Ai′L¯i′
AiL¯i
pi′ = 1 +
(
1− gi′
1− gi
)ν
Ωi′ (2.47)
where we used pi′ =
(
1−gi
1−gi′
AiK
∗
i L¯iK¯i′
Ai′K∗i′ L¯i′K¯i
)1−ν
and the definition Ωi′ =
(
Ai′
Ai
L¯i′
L¯i
)ν (
K∗i
K∗
i′
Ki′
Ki
)1−ν
.
Governments maximization of the household’s utility (2.21) subject to (2.44) and (2.47)
is equivalent to
max
gi
ητ
1− ν
ν
log
[
1 +
(
1− gi′
1− gi
)ν
Ωi′
]
+ η log(1− gi) + (1− η) log gi
This yields the following first order condition:
0 = ητ(1− ν) 1
1 +
(
1−gi
1−gi′
)ν
Ωi
1
1− gi − η
1
1− gi + (1− η)
1
gi
(2.48)
with Ωi = (Ωi′)
−1. The FOC can be interpreted as follows. Again the last term is the
positive marginal utility of an increase in the public good provision. The middle term is
the negative marginal effect due to the crowding out of production of each variety. The
first term dampens the negative marginal effect the more the country is open, i.e., τ is
high.
If the countries are identical, the symmetric equilibrium with gi = gi′ = g is given by:
g =
1− η
1− η τ
2
(1− ν) .
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It is no surprise, that openness τ has a positive effect on the optimal government share.
An increase in the parameter ν reduces the optimal government share. This is exactly the
opposite we obtained in Section 2.3.2 because here the parameter ν captures the elasticity
of substitution between varieties and not the love of variety.32 The public sector has no
effect on the available varieties, but on the relative price between the two countries and
hence on the terms of trade. The intuition is in line with the one in Epifani and Gancia
(2009) which is that a higher ν implies better substitutable varieties. For a government to
have a strong positive terms of trade effect, varieties are required to be weak substitutes.
Therefore, a low ν implies lower costs of public good provision or to put it differently,
more costs of public good provision are exported.
In order to support the intuition lets consider the relative price of foreign varieties
(remind that we normalized pi equal to one):
pi′ =
(
1− gi
1− gi′
)1−ν
Ω˜
where Ω˜ ≡
(
AiK
∗
i L¯iK¯i′
Ai′K∗i′ L¯i′K¯i
)1−ν
. It follows that
∂pi′
∂gi
= −(1− ν)
(
1− gi
1− gi′
)−ν
1
1− gi′ Ω˜ < 0.
For ν → 1 (perfect substitutes), the price of foreign varieties equals the price of domestic
varieties. Therefore, an increase in government spending has no effect on the terms of
trade. The smaller ν (imperfect substitutes), the stronger is the negative effect of gi on
pi′ and the stronger the positive effect on the terms of trade.
2.7.2 LOV- versus TOT-Effect
In Section 2.3 and Section 2.7.1 we derived optimal government spending under the two
extreme assumptions, either only love of variety effect or only terms of trade effect. In
the general framework discussed in Section 2.4.2 the two effects were combined. The
32One might execute the calculation of the optimal public good provision assuming a Benassy-utility
function - distinguishing between love of variety ρ and elasticity of substitution ν - to see that the
parameter for love of variety ρ has no effect on the optimal government share.
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first order condition in this general setting can be split into the different costs, and the
dampening effects which arise in an open economy. Consider welfare of a household in
country H:
max
gLH
ητ
1− ν
ν
log
(
1 +
IF
IH
)
+ η log (nH)
1
ν xH + (1− η) logGH .
Relative income or relative expenditure for private goods is given by IF
IH
= nF xF pF
nHxHpH
. Using
the equilibrium condition, xH
xF
=
(
pF
pH
) 1
1−ν
, we define M := 1 + IF
IH
= 1 + nF
nH
(
xF
xH
)ν
. Using
this, the expressions (2.30), (2.31) and Gi = gLiL¯i derived in Section 2.4.2, the first order
condition of the maximization problem above is given by
η
νnH
∂nH
∂gLH
+
1− ν
ν
ητ
1
M
∂M
∂nH
∂nH
∂gLH
+
η
xH
∂xH
∂gLH
+
1− ν
ν
ητ
1
M
∂M
∂xH
∂xH
∂gLH
+
1− η
GH
∂GH
∂gLH
= 0
(2.49)
The effect of government activity on the private sector can be split into two parts:
crowding out of the extensive margin (first row of equation (2.49)) and crowding out
of the intensive margin (second row of equation (2.49)). While the former contains the
love of variety effect the latter reflects the terms of trade effect. The first term in the
first row is the marginal costs of public good provision due to the crowding out of firms.
The second term in the first row describes the dampening effect due to imports of foreign
varieties (the love of variety effect). The first term in the second row is the marginal
costs of crowding out the intensive margin of production. The second term in the second
column is the dampening effect which describes the terms of trade effect. Note, we see in
the equilibrium condition
(
xH
xF
)1−ν
= pF
pH
that a change in the relative intensive margin of
production must result in a change in relative prices (the terms of trade).
We see that the dampening effect of openness, τ , on public good provision comes
either due to the love of variety effect (second term, first row) or the terms of trade effect
(second term, second row). The strength of the two effects depends i.a. on the degree
of crowding out of the two margins of production. The crowding out of the two margins
depends on the relative labor intensity in the public sector as discussed in Section 2.4.2.
2.7. APPENDIX B: FURTHER TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS 57
2.7.3 LOV for Public Goods
I assumed that the household has a love of variety. However, I restricted this assumption
to the private sector. In order to generalize the model and to take the assumption of love of
variety serious, this section assumes that there is also love of variety for the public goods.
I assume that the public sector produces a range of different varieties nG. For simplicity
I assume that the public sector provides a fix amount of each public variety which is
normalized to one, G˜ = 1. Hence, a bigger public sector implies only a broader range of
different public goods. Again the public sector employs a share g of total endowment:
nG = gL¯ .
Utility of the representative household is given by
Ui = η
1∫
0
log Yijdj + (1− η) logGi for i = H,F (2.50)
where G =
(∫ nG
0
G˜νGdl
) 1
νG = n
1
νG
G = g
1
νG L¯
1
νG and νG ∈ (0, 1) captures the love of variety
for the public goods.
The first order condition changes as follows:
ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
1− gi −
1
1− gi + (1− gi′)Ωi′
)
− η
ν
1
1− gi +
(1− η)
νG
1
gi
= 0 (2.51)
The first two terms are the cost of public good provision and are of course independent of
the love of variety for public goods. The third term which describes the positive marginal
utility increases in 1
νG
. If νG < 1, positive marginal utility is higher and marginal costs
are identical to (2.22). Therefore, (2.51) results in higher public good provision than in
(2.22). In a symmetric equilibrium (Ωi′ = 1) with gi = gi′ = g the first order condition
simplifies to the following equation
g =
1−η
νG
1−η
νG
+ η
ν
− ητ 1−ν
ν
1
2
. (2.52)
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If the preference for variety is the same for both the private and public goods, i.e., ν = νG,
optimal g reduces to
g =
(1− η)
1− ητ(1− ν)1
2
(2.53)
which is identical to the optimal government share if the public good is only produced
with labor as discussed in Section 2.7.1.
Since the subutility of one unit of a public good is the same as one unit of a private
good, in a closed economy, optimal g equals the preference for the public good, g = 1− η.
This is the same result as if we assume one homogeneous private good (perfect substitutes
and perfect competition) and one public good. This is in contrast to the optimal g in the
closed economy found in Section 2.3. There we have g = (1−η)
1−η+ η
ν
< 1− η. This difference
comes from the fact that in the latter there is an additional cost of public good provision.
An increase of public good provision crowds out the private sector which decreases utility
not only because the amount of private consumption nx decreases but also since the
number of varieties decreases. This loss in utility due to a decrease in the number of
varieties is compensated if the public sector provides additional public goods.
3The Effect of Trade Liberalization on
Government Size: Empirical
Analysis
Due to the increasing international integration of goods markets new challenges for the
public sector arise. As outlined in the introduction, on the one hand, a large literature
points out that an increase in competition between countries puts pressure on governments
and leads to a race to the bottom in public good provision. On the other hand, several
empirical studies find that trade openness (export plus import relative to GDP) has a
positive effect on government size (see the discussion in Section 1.2.2). The two prominent
explanations are the risk compensation hypothesis and the terms of trade effect (TOTE).
Rodrik (1998) explains, governments have to increase transfers in open economies because
they have to compensate for the external risks. The TOTE may be illustrated as follows.1
Since the public sector has a stronger home bias than the private sector, a shift from
private to public expenditure increases the demand for domestic goods. This public
expansion raises the scarcity of domestic goods and a rise of export prices relative to
the import prices. This dampens the costs of public expansion for domestic consumers
since foreign consumers share some of the burden by the changed terms of trade. This
effect is stronger if the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is
1The terms of trade effect is discussed by van der Ploeg (1987), Turnovsky (1988), Devereux (1991),
Anderson et al. (1996) and Epifani and Gancia (2009).
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low. Epifani and Gancia (2009) provide empirical evidence for the TOTE. That is, the
positive effect of trade openness on the share of government consumption is conditional
on a low elasticity of substitution.
A new theoretical channel, the love of variety effect (LOVE), was highlighted in Chap-
ter 2. It results from intraindustry trade with differentiated goods as modeled in the
Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman framework. If the public sector produces a consumption good
and employs the same resources as the private sector, an important cost of the public
sector is its negative effect on the number of firms. However, when goods markets are
integrated, consumers have also access to foreign varieties. Therefore, the national costs
of public good provision in terms of utility are lower and optimal public good provision
is higher in open economies than in closed ones. One crucial assumption for this result
to hold is that consumers have a love of variety. Almost three decades ago, new trade
theory starting with Krugman (1979, 1980) and Ethier (1982) emphasized the impor-
tance of gains from trade due to the import of new varieties. It took some time until first
empirical studies quantified these gains from variety. Broda and Weinstein (2004) show
that new imported varieties on the four-digit level have lowered prices and brought an
increase in welfare for many countries (a similar result is provided in Broda and Weinstein
(2006) for the United States and more disaggregated trade data). In another study Broda
et al. (2006) show that there are productivity gains in various countries arising from new
imported products.
The contribution of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence for the LOVE and
hence, for the following hypotheses deduced from the theoretical model presented in Chap-
ter 2.2 First, a broad access to foreign varieties should increase the government share of
GDP. Second, if the love of variety is high in a country, the government share should
be small. This finding comes from the high costs of public good provision if there is a
high love of variety. Moreover, since gains from variety are larger the smaller the country,
country size should be negatively correlated with the government share. In addition, the
positive effect of imported varieties on government share should be smaller the larger the
country.
The measure for the diversity of imports is obtained by counting the different imported
2This chapter is based on Hanslin (2010).
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products from the rest of the world. In this chapter, a product is defined at the four-
digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) code, Revision 2,
reported in the NBER U.N. trade data by Feenstra et al. (2005). Unfortunately, there is
a structural break in reporting trade data in 1984. While for the years 1964 - 1983 each
product is reported without considering the trade value, for 1984 - 2000 trade flows below
$100’000 are not reported. Because of data reliability and the aforementioned censoring,
the main focus is put on the early OECD sample covering the years from 1964 to 1983.
Estimating panel fixed effect regressions for OECD and non-OECD countries and
different time spans, I find strong and very robust results for the LOVE in the early
(years 1964 - 1983) non-censored OECD sample. The number of imported products has a
positive effect on government consumption as a share of GDP. This positive effect works
especially if it is interacted with the share of differentiated3 in total imported products.
Furthermore, the positive effect of new imported varieties on government consumption is
decreasing in country size which is in line with the theoretical model. In addition, the share
of differentiated products in imports affects government consumption negatively. I use
the share of differentiated products in imports as a proxy for the share of differentiated
products in the consumption basket which is assumed to be positively correlated with
the love of variety. Therefore, costs of public good provision are high and government
consumption low if the share of differentiated imports is high.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 presents a simple version of the
theoretical model described in Chapter 2 from which five testable implications are derived.
Section 3.2 describes the empirical model and the data. Section 3.3 presents the main
results and Section 3.4 provides robustness checks. Section 3.5 concludes. All the tables
of the regression results are reported in Appendix 3.6.
3.1 Theoretical Model
This section presents a simple version of chapter 2 in order to focus on the main implica-
tions of the model and to highlight the hypotheses which I am going to test empirically.
Compared to Chapter 2 the main simplification is that labor is the only factor of produc-
3According to the classification by Rauch (1999).
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tion. There is no capital. Apart from simplification, this sharpens the focus on the LOVE.
For the sake of readability, I repeat all basic features of the model as well as important
results and intuitions. For technical details and derivations, however, I refer to Chapter
2.
There are two countries, home (H) and foreign (F ), which differ in the amount of labor
endowment (country size). In each country there is a private and a public sector, both
producing consumption goods. The public sector employs a share gi (i = H,F ) of labor
endowment L¯i and produces the non-traded public good according to a linear production
function, Gi = giL¯i. The representative household’s income is given by wiL¯i, where wi
denotes the wage rate in country i. Net income - income available for consumption of
private goods - is given by Ii := wiL¯i − Ti, where Ti = giwiL¯i is the tax imposed by the
government. The private sector is characterized by a continuum of industries of measure
1 indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. In each industry and in each country various firms produce
differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. Each firm is a monopolist for one
variety, after having incurred some fixed cost. There is free market entry, that is, the
equilibrium number of firms in an industry is endogenously determined. I assume free
trade between the two countries in an exogenous fraction of industries τ ∈ [0, 1] and
no trade for the remaining fraction 1 − τ . Without loss of generality I refer to trading
industries with index j ≤ τ and to the non-trading industries with index j > τ .
The representative household derives utility from consumption of different varieties in
each industry and the domestic public good G. Household’s preferences for private goods
versus the public good is captured in the parameter η ∈ (0, 1).
Ui = η
∫ 1
0
log [Yij] dj + (1− η) log [Gi] for i = H,F (3.1)
where subutility Yij is a CES aggregator of the varieties consumed in industry j
Yij =
(∫
k∈Nij
(
yikj
)ν
dk
) 1
ν
, i = H,F, (3.2)
with ν ∈ (0, 1). Nij is the index set of all varieties from industry j which are available in
country i and yikj denotes consumption of variety k from industry j by the representative
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household in country i. The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties from
industry j is given by σ = 1
1−ν . The assumption ν ∈ (0, 1) implies that σ > 1 and that
the household has a love of variety. Within any industry j > τ , the household can only
consume varieties produced in the own country, within an industry j ≤ τ , the household
consumes all varieties produced in both countries. An increase in τ implies broader
access to foreign varieties and, because of love of variety, an increase in utility. Since the
elasticity of substitution between the subutilities Yij is equal to 1, the household allocates
net income equally among all industries. Moreover, since the measure of all industries is
equal to 1, expenditures per industry equal net income Ii.
Each firm in an industry produces one variety with labor according to the following
production function with increasing returns to scale
xkj =
A(Lkj − L
∗) if Lkj ≥ L∗
0 otherwise
(3.3)
where xkj denotes output of firm k in industry j located in country H or F . Lkj is
the labor input of an individual firm, A denotes labor productivity and L∗ the overhead
labor needed to run the plant. Because of the fix cost the firms have an incentive to
specialize and the number of firms (ni) equals the number of varieties. The assumption of
monopolistic competition with free firm entry within each industry implies for the price
and quantity of each variety, and the number of firms
p =
w
Aν
, x =
AL∗ν
(1− ν) , ni =
(1− gi)L¯i
L∗
(1− ν) , (3.4)
respectively.4 Because firms are identical and countries differ only in country size and
government share, output per firm x and price p are equal for all firms and independent
of country of production.5 The government employs giL¯i for public good production
and (1 − gi)L¯i remains available for production of private goods. The price p and the
4As we have seen in Chapter 2, ni is the average number of firms per country, the number of firms
per non-tradable industry and the average number of firms in tradable industries.
5Note that all considerations in Chapter 2 about demand, goods market, trade account and subutilities
are independent of the technology assumption and remain valid in this simplified setting. Wages are equal
between the two countries since pHpF =
(
xF
xH
) 1
σ
holds in equilibrium.
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quantity per firm x are independent of government activity and equalized between the
two countries. However, the number of firms varies with country size. Moreover, since the
endowment left for the private sector is decisive for the number of firms in the market,
an expansion of the public sector reduces the number of active firms.6
In order to determine optimal public good provision the indirect utility of the repre-
sentative household is maximized. The government share in the foreign country is taken
as given.
max
gi
ητ log [Yi,j≤τ (gi, gi′)] + η(1− τ) log [Yi,j>τ (gi)] + (1− η) log [Gi(gi)] . (3.5)
s.t.
Yi,j>τ (gi) = (ni(gi))
1
ν x
Yi,j≤τ (gi, gi′) =
(
Ii(gi)+Ii′ (gi′ )
Ii(gi)
) 1−ν
ν
Yi,j>τ (gi)
(3.6)
where Ii(gi) = ni(gi)px. This optimization problem results in the following first order
conditions:
ητ
1− ν
ν
(
1
1− gi −
1
1− gi + (1− gi′)L¯i′/L¯i
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
−η
ν
1
1− gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− η) 1
gi︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0 , (3.7)
for i, i′ ∈ {H,F} and i 6= i′. Note that (3.7) is a special case of (2.22) with Ωi′ = L¯i′L¯i . So
we can recall the economic interpretations from Chapter 2.
The third term in equation (3.7) represents the positive marginal utility of a higher
supply of the public good. The second term represents the marginal utility loss due to the
crowding out of private firms in tradable and non-tradable industries. The first bracket
is positive and dampens the negative effect of the second term. This positive effect comes
from the fact that domestic public good production affects only the number of domestic
firms - not the number of available foreign varieties. Since households have a love of
variety, subutility in open industries is higher than in closed ones. Due to the crowding
out of domestic firms, the number of domestic relative to foreign varieties decreases which
increases the relative utility gain in open industries. The dampening effect (first term in
(3.7)) is larger the more varieties the country imports (measured by τ). Furthermore, it
6Note that there are no terms of trade effects.
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is larger if the love of variety is stronger or the country is smaller.
Since households have a love of variety (ν < 1), an increase in τ reduces the national
cost of public good provision. For instance, a decontrol of protected industries or new
technologies which make trade in certain industries feasible may be reflected in an increase
in τ . An opening of industries enables access to new varieties and therefore, households’
utility increases. Moreover, the crowding out of firms by public good provision hurts less
since foreign varieties are available over a larger range of industries.
According to equation (3.7) we can conclude that costs of public good provision are low
if the country imports a lot of different varieties (τ large), if love of variety is low (ν large)
and the country is relatively small (L¯i low). Since the share of government consumption
is higher the smaller the national costs of public good provision, the following holds
(applying the implicit function theorem to equation (3.7)):7
∂gi
∂τ
> 0 ,
∂gi
∂ν
> 0 ,
∂gi
∂L¯i
< 0 . (3.8)
Furthermore, the larger the country, the smaller the gains from imported varieties:
∂2gi
∂τ∂L¯i
< 0 . (3.9)
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the empirical analysis of the model’s main
results.
3.2 Econometric Model and Data
The empirical work attempts to provide evidence on the following hypotheses:
(I) The number of imported products has a positive effect on the government share.
(II) The positive effect of imported products on the government share is decreasing in
the country size.
(III) A high share of differentiated products in imports implies a low government share.
7The derivations are given in Chapter 2.
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(IV) The interaction term between the number of imported products and differentiated
products has a positive effect on the government share, while the direct effect of
hypothesis (I) should decrease.
(V) A high GDP implies a low government share.
While hypotheses (I), (II) and (V) should be intuitively clear, hypothesis (III) and
(IV) require an explanation. I argue that the composition of the consumption basket
and therefore also the composition of the imported products provide information for the
country’s preferences. If the share of differentiated products on total imported products
is large, households value differentiated goods more. As a consequence the love of variety
(LOV) is high (i.e. ν is low in the model). The theoretical model predicts that LOV has
a negative effect on the government share because of higher costs of public good provision
(∂gi
∂ν
> 0, according to (3.8)). Therefore, we should observe a negative correlation between
the share of differentiated imports and the government share. This motivates hypothesis
(III). Hypothesis (IV) accounts for the fact that LOV is crucial for the positive effect of
the number of imported products on the government share.
In view of the aforementioned hypotheses the following equation is estimated.
git =β1importdivit + β2 (importdivit × loggdpit) +
β3diffit + β4 (importdivit × diffit) +
β5loggdpit + β
′
6Xit + ηt + µi + it
(3.10)
where i indexes countries, t indexes time, git denotes government consumption as a log
share of GDP, importdivit is the number of different imported products (normalized),
diffit is the share of differentiated products on total imported products, loggdp is log of
GDP, other time varying potential covariates are included in the k × 1 vector Xit (k is
the number of controls which are described below), βi, i = 1, ..., 5 and the k× 1 vector β6
are the parameters to be estimated, ηt are time fixed effects (controls for global shocks),
µi denotes country fixed effects (controls for time-invariant omitted-variable bias) and it
is the idiosyncratic error term.
The data are drawn from various sources. Following the previous studies on openness
and government spending, as for instance Rodrik (1998) and Epifani and Gancia (2009),
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the measure for government size (g) is government consumption as a share of GDP from
Heston et al. (2006) (Penn World Tables 6.2, henceforth PWT).8 Figure 3.1 plots the
unweighted sample means of the share of government consumption over time for OECD9
and non-OECD countries separately. A few things stand out. The share of government
consumption is much lower in the OECD subsample. The peak around 1993 in the OECD
subsample is due to Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovak Republic. The jump in
1970 in the non-OECD sample is mainly due to the high government share of countries
for which data for government spending is only available since 1970.10
In this chapter a product is defined on the four-digit level. The measure for import
diversity (importdiv) used in this empirical part is the number of different imported
products from the rest of the world, normalized by the sum of all traded products in the
world between 1964 and 2000.11 Let J jit = 1 if country i imports a strictly positive amount
of product j in year t and zero otherwise.
importdivit =
∑
j J
j
it∑
i
∑
t
∑
j J
j
it
where the denominator is equal to 1069 for the time period 1964 to 2000. The data
source for the measure of import diversity is the NBER U.N. trade data by Feenstra
et al. (2005) where imports and exports are reported in the Standard International Trade
Classification (SITC) code, revision 2, at the four-digit level. The disadvantage of these
less disaggregate four-digit trade flows is that the increase in the number of varieties is
underestimated. However, since I am primarily interested in providing evidence for the
LOVE, I am more concerned about qualitative than quantitative effects. The advantage of
the four-digit data is its insensitiveness against false increases due to splitting of product
8According to Rodrik (1998) this measure includes only government consumption and neither public
investments nor income transfers.
9From the OECD sample Luxembourg is dropped since trade data are only available for Belgium-
Luxembourg. We treat Luxembourg as negligibly small and assign the combined information to Belgium.
Results are robust concerning the exclusion of Belgium. The observations of Norway for the second period
are dropped since the trade data show a curious pattern (extreme outliers in some years). Results are
also robust if Czech and Slovak Republic are excluded.
10Note that the data includes expenses for defense. Therefore, the econometric analysis will control for
an index which measures the involvement in wars.
11The reason for this normalization is to obtain a measure between zero and one. importdiv = 1
implies that a country imports each four-digit product which has been traded at least once between 1964
and 2000 between any two countries.
68 3. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND GOVERNMENT: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
categories and “replaced” products due to technological progress. Endogeneity might not
be a big issue in this case since variation on four-digit level are driven rather through trade
liberalization than changes in demand (see Kehoe and Ruhl (2009)). Moreover, goods on
this aggregate level are more differentiated. As a result, consumption of an additional
variety brings about larger gains.12
The share of differentiated imported products is computed using Rauch’s (1999) liberal
classification.13 Rauch (1999) divides commodities into three categories: Differentiated
goods, reference priced goods and goods traded on organized exchanges.14 According to
Rauch (1999): “Possession of a reference price distinguishes homogeneous from differenti-
ated products. Homogeneous commodities can be further divided into those whose reference
prices are quoted on organized exchanges and those whose reference prices are quoted only
in trade publications” (p. 10).15 Broda and Weinstein (2006) provide estimations of the
elasticity of substitution for the three commodity groups which are summarized in ta-
ble 3.19 (Appendix 3.7). They find that the average elasticity of substitution of goods
classified as differentiated is much lower than the one of goods traded on organized ex-
change. Goods classified as reference priced have (on average) a slightly higher elasticity
of substitution than differentiated goods and a much lower elasticity than goods traded
on organized exchange. Therefore, countries with a large share of differentiated goods
have on average a lower elasticity of substitution. Based on these elasticities, it is not
obvious that one should focus on the group of differentiated goods only. One can argue
that the group classified as differentiated captures too few differentiated goods. However,
the group of reference priced goods is quite heterogeneous regarding the estimated elastic-
ities and may contain a too broad set of goods. Nevertheless, since the difference between
the average elasticity of substitution of reference priced goods and differentiated goods
12The distribution over time of the diversity measure is provided in figure 3.2.
13Rauch (1999) distinguishes between the liberal and conservative measure. He writes: “Because
ambiguities arose that were sometimes sufficiently important to affect the classification at the [...] four-
digit level, both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ classifications were made, with the former minimizing the
number of [...] four-digit commodities that are classified as either organized exchange or reference priced
and the latter maximizing those numbers” (p. 15).
14The shares of four-digit products falling into these liberal classifications are 55%, 28% and 18%
respectively.
15Examples of differentiated goods are (separated by ;): newspapers journals, periodicals; spectacles
and spectacle frames; footwear; blouses of textile fabrics; telecommunications equipment; cutlery; woven
fabrics; fresh or dried figs; non alcoholic beverages; etc. Reference priced goods are, for instance: fresh
milk and cream; frozen fish fillet; fresh apples; natural honey; cigarettes; electric current; etc.
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is very small, I distinguish between two measures for the share of differentiated imports.
The restrictive measure diffr stands for the share of differentiated commodities while the
liberal measure diffl for the share of differentiated goods plus the share of reference priced
goods. Formally, we have:
diffr =
∑
j d
jJ jit∑
j J
j
it
diffl =
∑
j(d
jJ jit + r
jJ jit)∑
j J
j
it
where dj = 1 (rj = 1) if product j is classified by Rauch as differentiated (reference priced)
and equal to zero otherwise. Figure 3.3 plots the distributions of the two measures over
time.
The variable loggdp is the log of real GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars at
2000 prices (Laspeyres) which is drawn from PWT. Other variables drawn from PWT are
population and the widely used measure for trade openness which is export plus import as
a share of real GDP in constant prices. Following the previous literature trade openness
is lagged one period to reduce the endogeneity problem. Both variables are logarithmized
and in the following referred to logpop and lagopenness. Further potential covariates
which are controlled for are the political regime (polity2 from the Polity IV dataset),
dependency ratio (depend) to control for demographic characteristics, urbanization rate
(urban) and whether the country was affected by or involved in violence and wars (war).
The polity2 is a composite policy index which ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to
10 (consolidated democracy). It is the difference between the Polity Democracy index
and the Polity Autocracy index (both ranging from zero to ten). The dependency ratio,
which is the share of population below 15 and beyond 64, relative to the population
between 15 and 64, is constructed using World Development Indicators from the World
Bank (henceforth WDI). The urbanization rate (the share of population living in urban
areas) is also drawn from WDI. The measure for violence/war is ACTOTAL from Major
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and conflict regions which ranges from zero (no
violence) to ten. This composite index consists of international violence and war, civil
violence and war and ethnic violence and war. A detailed list of sources and definitions
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for each variable is provided in table 3.1 (Appendix 3.6).
The unbalanced panel data covers 156 countries (the full list is reported in Appendix
3.7, table 3.20) and the years 1964 - 2000. As already mentioned above, there is a change
in reporting trade flows in the World Trade Data between 1983 and 1984. After 1984 trade
flows below $100’000 per year were not reported in the original data from United Nations.
However, Feenstra et al. (2005) indicate that some adjustments had been made for these
low valued trade flows. This break can be seen clearly in figure 3.2, where the distribution
of the variable importdiv is plotted over time. The difference between the OECD and
non-OECD countries is distinct. While the sample average among OECD increased after
1983 it dropped for non-OECD. Furthermore, the distribution for non-OECD after 1983
is much broader than it is before, especially there is a much longer tail at the bottom.
This indicates that for many developing countries a lot of low valued trade flows were
not reported and therefore, the number of imported varieties is underestimated for many
countries.16 The distribution for the OECD sample has increased only slightly. The
reason for this upward jump may lie in the different data source. If this structural break
in importdiv is only a level effect we control for it with the inclusion of time dummies.
However, figure 3.2 suggests that it seems wise to look at the different time periods and
country sample separately.
All variables are computed as four year averages, except the last period which covers
five years.17 Hence, there are five periods from 1964 until 1983 and four periods from 1984
to 2000. Averaging helps to smooth cyclical variations that are likely to be present in
yearly data. Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics (sample means, standard deviations
and extreme values) of the variables, separately for OECD and non-OECD and the two
time periods.
16A further reason for the underestimation of the number of imported goods might be that after 1984
there are only 72 reporting countries. For the non-reporting countries import data is only available
through the export information of the reporting countries.
17The results are similar if yearly data are taken. Results are only reported for the early OECD sample
(discussion in Section 3.4).
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3.3 Regressions
According to the hypotheses we have the following predictions on the coefficients in
equation (3.10). We expect β1 to be positive if we do not include the interaction term
importdiv× diff . If we include the interaction term, β1 should not be significantly differ-
ent from zero while β4 should be positively significant. The reason is, that import of new
varieties does only bring gains from trade if the goods are differentiated. And the more
so, the more differentiated the varieties. β2 is expected to be negative, since the gains
from variety should decrease in the country size.18 The sign of β3 is also expected to be
negative. As argued, a high share of differentiated goods in the import basket implies that
differentiated varieties are more important for the consumer, indicating a higher love of
variety. A high love of variety implies that there are high national cost of public good pro-
vision. The parameter for market size, loggdp, is expected to be negative. Because of the
interaction term of GDP with the diversity of imports, β5 might also become insignificant
as the parameter β2 captures the lower gains from trade if the country is larger.
These aforementioned variables are highlighted (printed in bold-face type) in the
regression-output as they are the variables I am interested in most. In all regressions,
the fixed effect estimator is used (to control for time invariant unobserved country char-
acteristics) and standard errors are robust (i.e., standard errors are heteroskedasticity-
consistent).19
The analysis starts with a baseline regression of pooling all countries and time periods.
The main focus, however, lies on the OECD country sample with special weight on the
first period where data quality is best (no censoring of trade data).
18Existing theories about how country size may affect the share of government consumption is manifold.
Assuming that the public good is a normal good we should expect it to increase with GDP. According
to Wagner’s law the government share should increase as the economy develops. According to Alesina
and Spolaore (1997) larger countries have a smaller government share due to economies of scale in public
good provision. Empirical evidence for these hypotheses is given in Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) where it
is shown that the share of government consumption is smaller in larger countries and that small countries
tend to be more open to trade.
19The random effects estimator might be an alternative to the fixed effects estimator. However, random
effects estimator is only consistent if country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the other explanatory
variables (see e.g., Hayashi, 2000, pp. 330-335) which is unlikely the case in such country data. The
Hausman test rejects the random effects estimator.
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3.3.1 Baseline Regression
Table 3.4 presents regression results for the whole country sample. In addition to time
dummies, the dummy variable oecd×after84 allows for different structural breaks between
the two country groups (as suggested by figure 3.2). Further, in all columns I control for
level of development and country size, that is log GDP and log population.20 Log GDP
is negatively and log of population positively significant, implying that log of GDP per
capita has a negative effect.
In the first column the number of imported varieties is insignificantly different from
zero. Including the interaction term of importdiv with log GDP in column (2), increases
the effect of importdiv to 1.9 while the interaction term has a negative effect. Both
variables are significant at the 1% level. The interpretation of this result is in line of the
above constructed hypotheses. An increase in the number of imported varieties increases
the government share. This increase is lower, the larger the country. In columns (3) and
(5), the shares of differentiated imports (the restrictive and liberal measure respectively)
is included controlling for the love of variety. In both columns the respective coefficient is
negative and significant at the 5% and 10% level respectively. The negative sign is also in
line with the theoretical model and the hypothesis mentioned above. Further, in columns
(4) and (6) the interaction term of importdiv with diffr and diffl respectively is included.
Against the hypothesis the interaction terms are negative. However, the coefficient of
importdiv increases from 1.9 (2.1) to 4.4 (6.0) compensating the negative effect of the
interaction term. In sum, the effect of an increase in importdiv is still positive. Note that
the interaction terms are highly correlated with the variable importdiv. The interaction
terms are interesting from a theoretical point of view. Empirically, however, it may
incorporate some problems of multicollinearity.21 If two variables are highly correlated,
the standard errors can become very large and the estimates insignificant. This is not the
case here. Also, small changes in the data can change the estimated coefficients heavily.
Table 3.5 shows the results with a full set of control variables. The results of the
main measures of interest do not change qualitatively. Similar to the findings of others
20Note that since GDP and population enter in logs, controlling for log GDP per capita is redundant.
21The correlation is greater than 0.9 between importdiv and importdiv × diff and between importdiv
and importdiv × loggdp. The correlation of some important variables for the early OECD sample are
given in table 3.3.
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(e.g., Rodrik, 1998; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998; Epifani and Gancia, 2009) lagopenness
is significantly positive. The variables polity2, depend and urban are not significantly
different from zero. The violence/war index (war) is positively correlated with the share
of government consumption.
Table 3.4 and 3.5 report the baseline regression including OECD and non-OECD coun-
tries. However, the data within and between these two country groups differ substantially.
It is apparent from figure 3.2 that not only the pattern over time for the number of im-
ported products is very different for the two country samples, but also that within group
heterogeneity is much higher in the non-OECD sample. It might be sensible to look at
the two country groups separately. Since the OECD country group is much more homo-
geneous and, on average, data is more reliable, the following analysis gives special weight
to the OECD countries.
3.3.2 OECD
Table 3.6 reports a first set of regressions for the OECD sample including some selected
control variables. In order to control for the jump in the trade data in 1984, time dummies
are included in each regression. In columns (1) to (5), the main measures of interest
have mostly the expected sign according to the hypotheses derived from the model. In
column (7) importdiv gets negatively significant at the 5% level. In sum however, the
effect of an increase in importdiv is still positive for the average country. Excluding
importdiv (columns (6) and (8)) does not alter the main message but reduces the problem
of multicollinearity and lowers the standard errors. This is the case since the number
of imported varieties is highly correlated with the number of differentiated imported
varieties. While in table 3.6 the main variables and the interaction terms are successively
introduced for a given set of controls, table 3.7 tests the robustness of the main variables’
estimates when the set of controls varies. As table 3.7 shows, the results of the variables
in bold (except loggdp) are not robust and depend heavily on the chosen set of controls.
According to this table, there is only support for the hypotheses under certain set of
controls. Later on it is shown that results stay more robust when fixed effects are different
for the two periods.
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In contrast to the finding of many authors who find a positive effect of trade openness
(export plus import as a share of GDP) on government size, we do not find this effect for
OECD countries (in line with Garrett and Mitchell (2001)). For OECD countries lagged
trade openness is negatively significant at the 1% level.22 Since in table 3.5 lagged open-
ness is positive and in table 3.6 negative, the positive effect of openness on government
size is driven by non-OECD countries.
How we should deal with the structural break in the explanatory variables is not
that obvious. Including time dummies is clearly a necessary procedure. However, if the
change in reporting trade is country specific, the country fixed effect in the early period
differs from the one in the second period. The tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the results if
we allow the country fixed effect to change between the two periods.23 This procedure
doubles the number of groups. A country’s data before and after 1984 are considered
as observations from two different countries. However, standard errors are clustered by
country. An argument for a change in country fixed effects might be that censoring
trade flows below $100’000 affects small and large countries differently. Table 3.8 does
not control for additional covariates. In contrast to table 3.6 and 3.7 loggdp is no more
significantly negative. Column (2) in table 3.8 implies that an increase of import variety
has a positive effect on government consumption for the average country.24 However,
for large countries the overall effect would be negative. In column (4), diffr and the
interaction term importdiv× diffr are included. The variable importdiv gets insignificant
and the interaction term is positive and highly significant. This means that the positive
effect of imported varieties works especially if goods are differentiated. This confirms
our hypothesis. Moreover, also in line with the theoretical prediction, if the share of
22Rodrik (1998) already found the different pattern between richer and poorer countries. He argues
that the positive relation between trade openness and government spending is due to the external risk.
According to Rodrik (1998) developed countries react with an increase in public employment and work
programs, which is reflected in an increase in government consumption. However, developed countries
have social welfare programs. Since social security is not included in the measure for government con-
sumption from PWT, we should not necessarily find an effect there.
23Consider a fixed effects estimation of yit = βxit + ci + D84 + uit, where D84 is a dummy equal to
zero for the first period and equal to one for the second period and ci is a country fixed effect. It follows
that E(yit|βxit, ci, D84) = βxit+ ci+D84. If a structural break in the explanatory variable xit is country
specific, D84 insufficiently accounts for the break in xit. In order to account correctly for country specific
breaks, the country fixed effects should be interacted with the period dummy.
24We have ∂g∂importdiv = 12.824 − 0.638 × loggdp. Hence, for the average country (loggdp ≈ 19)
∂g
∂importdiv = 0.7. For the largest country (loggdp = 22.92) we obtain
∂g
∂importdiv ≈ −1.8.
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differentiated goods in the imported good basket increases, i.e. love of variety increases,
government consumption decreases. Columns (6) and (7) show the same specification as
in (3) and (4) with diffl instead of diffr. Columns (5) and (8) report the results excluding
importdiv since the number of imported goods and the number of differentiated imported
goods are highly correlated. If we compare column (4) with (5) and (7) with (8) it can
be observed that the standard errors mostly decrease fairly strongly. Generally it can be
said that for the average country the number of imported products has a positive effect
on the government share.
The estimation is quite robust with respect to the inclusion of further controls (table
3.9). The effects are slightly attenuated but mostly keep their expected sign and do
not lose significance. In column (4) importdiv is still positively significant (at 5% level),
despite the inclusion of the interaction term importdiv×diffr. One can argue that there are
still differentiated products captured in importdiv since diffr does not take into account all
differentiated products. In column (8) importdiv gets negatively significant, correcting for
what importdiv×diffl overstates the effect of differentiated imported varieties. In order to
reduce the problem of multicollinearity, columns (5), (6), (9) and (10) exclude importdiv.
The estimation of the number of differentiated imported varieties in column (5) is much
higher than the coefficient for importdiv in column (3). Interestingly, controlling for
lagopenness (compare (5) with (6) and (9) with (10)) increases the estimated coefficients
of the variables in bold and reduces their standard errors. Comparing the interaction term
importdiv× loggdp and diff in table 3.6 and 3.7 with tables 3.8 and 3.9, the specification
which allows fixed effects to be different for the two periods yields much more robust
results with respect to the inclusion of controls.
To see whether the evidence for the love of variety effect we have found so far are
robust, I now split the sample in two subperiods. The sources of trade data for the two
periods are different and low valued trade flows below $100’000 are not reported in the
later period. In the early sample no censoring has taken place. A closer look on the early
sample seems appropriate. Tables 3.10 to 3.12 provide estimation results for the OECD
sample and the period from 1964 to 1983. In table 3.10 results without further controls
are shown. The estimated coefficients are quite similar to the regression in table 3.8. The
results are robust with respect to further controls as it can be seen in table 3.11. While
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in column (3) importdiv is significant at the 5% level, importdiv is not significant in
column (7). We may argue that the interaction term importdiv × diffr does not capture
all differentiated products and therefore importdiv stays significant. Since diffl is a less
restrictive measure of differentiated products, importdiv × diffl captures a broader set of
differentiated imports. According to column (3) the effect of importdiv on the share of
government consumption is positive for the average country and equal to 0.45.25 As g is
in logs, an increase in importdiv of 1 percentage point (say from 0.5 to 0.51) - which is an
increase of approximately 11 new imported products - implies that the government share
increases by 0.45 percent. For the smallest country (with loggdp = 14.56) the effect is
even 2.78.
As columns (4) and (8) show, the inclusion of additional controls (the diversity of
exports (exportdiv) and the volume of imports (imports)) does not change sign and sig-
nificance of the coefficients of interest. Both variables could potentially be correlated with
government size and the number of imported products.26 When a country’s production
is concentrated on a few industries (this might be reflected in a smaller range of exported
products) the range of imported goods may be larger. Further, the number of imported
varieties and the volume of imports are positively correlated, the effect of import di-
versity on government spending could just capture the effect of higher import volumes.
Accounting for import volume (imports) indicates that this concern is unfounded.
The interaction term importdiv×diffr represents the number of differentiated imported
goods. So far importdiv × diffr and importdiv have been included in order to show that
the number of differentiated imported goods are more important than the number of
all imported goods. As the two are highly correlated, table 3.12 provides the results
without importdiv. The results show that, without the interaction term importdiv ×
loggdp, the effect of the number of differentiated imported goods is positive but only
weakly significant when we do not control for lagopenness (column (1)). Introducing
lagopenness as a further control reduces the effect of the number of differentiated imported
products which is still positive but not significant (column (2)). A robust result is that
25Note that ∂g∂importdiv = 5.493−0.532× loggdp+9.863×diffr = 0.45 if loggdp = 18.93 and diffr = 0.51.
26Cameron (1978) argues that countries where production is concentrated on few industries are stronger
hit by external shocks. When government provides insurance against these risks, the government share
is larger when industries are concentrated.
3.3. REGRESSIONS 77
a high love of variety (diffr) reduces the share of government consumption. In column
3, the interaction term importdiv × loggdp is significantly negative while the number of
differentiated imported goods is positive and highly significant. The positive effect of
additional imported goods is decreasing in home market size.
The findings for the late OECD sample are provided in table 3.13. Columns (1) to (4)
indicate that the number of imported varieties has a positive effect on the government
share (importdiv and importdiv× diffr are positively significant). Moreover, the effect is
stronger if the imported goods are differentiated. The first four columns also show that
the government share decreases in home market size (loggdp). Columns (5) to (7) test the
other hypotheses. However, the estimated coefficients and standard errors are quite large
which is probably the result of the high correlation between the levels and interaction
terms.
To sum up the results on OECD countries, we can say that we find the expected signs
according to the hypotheses in almost all of the specifications. Hence, the results are
extremely robust and give strong support for the theoretical model. The effect of imported
varieties plays a more important role in rising the government share if the imported goods
are differentiated: in most regressions importdiv×diff is highly significant and larger than
the effect of importdiv . It is impressive that the interaction term importdiv × loggdp is
always negative and mostly highly significant at the 1% level in all regressions in tables
3.8 to 3.12. Also, the share of differentiated imports has mostly a negative and significant
effect. Despite the high correlation between some explanatory variables, the estimation is
able to identify the effects in most cases. The high correlation seems to be only a problem
if one looks at the second period separately.
3.3.3 Non-OECD
Finally, the non-OECD country sample is examined. The data among non-OECD coun-
tries is much more volatile. Separate regressions for the two time periods lead to insignif-
icant estimators.27 The number of observations is too low for the degree of volatility.
Therefore, only the results for the whole time span are reported. Analogously to the
27Results not reported.
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OECD sample the first regression shows the results with constant country fixed effects
(table 3.14) and the second allows the country fixed effects to be different between the two
periods (table 3.15). According to table 3.14 the number of imported goods has a positive
effect on the share of government consumption and the effect is decreasing in country size.
In the first column of table 3.15 importdiv is significant at the 5% level implying that the
government share for countries with a broader set of imported goods is larger. In column
(7) the coefficient on the number of differentiated imported products is higher than in
column (1) on importdiv. This indicates that the effect of imported goods is stronger if
they are differentiated. In column (8) the coefficient of importdiv×diffl gets closer to the
one of importdiv in column (1) as the liberal measure comprises a broader set of goods
(including less differentiated ones) than the restrictive measure. In the other columns the
signs of the coefficients on the variables of interests are in line with the theory, however,
not significant.
3.4 Robustness Checks
The results so far give a strong indication that at least OECD data is consistent with the
hypotheses - the love of variety effect on government consumption implied by the presented
theory. In order to minimize the possibility that the findings above are a coincidence and
a consequence of certain specifications, this section presents various robustness checks for
the early OECD sample.
Log specification
We should be aware that some functional form is imposed by taking logs and the re-
sults may depend on this procedure. For instance, Rodrik (1998) logarithmized all shares
and found a positive relationship between lagged openness and government consumption.
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) replicated Rodrik’s regression with and without logarith-
mized government share and with a more or less similar country sample. They find that
openness is significantly positive with log ratios, however it is not significant in levels.
My motivation of using log government shares comes from the theoretical model in which
shares are the decision variables. Solving equation (3.7) for two symmetric countries
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(L¯H = L¯F ), the shares in both countries is identical and equal to
g =
1− η
1 + η 1−ν
ν
(1− τ/2) .
Taking logs on both sides we obtain
log g = log(1− η)− log(1 + η1− ν
ν
(1− τ/2)) .
For realistic values of the elasticity of substitution (σ > 2, i.e. ν > 0.5) the expression
(η 1−ν
ν
(1− τ/2)) is small and therefore, the following equation holds approximately:
log g ≈ log(1− η)− η1− ν
ν
+ η
1− ν
ν
τ/2 .
However, in view of the different findings depending on taking logs as mentioned above,
it is reasonable to check for the robustness of this specification. Table 3.16 provides the
results and confirms that the log specification does not drive the results. If we compare
the estimations for the variables in bold, they keep their expected sign and are highly
significant. Note however, that the coefficient of lagged openness is now insignificantly
different from zero while it is significantly negative under the log specification.
Dynamic panel estimation
One may argue that the share of government consumption reacts rather slowly on changes
in the economic environment and therefore past realizations of the dependent variable may
affect its current level. In order to capture this persistence a lagged value of government
consumption is included on the right-hand side of the estimation equation.28 This is a
nice robustness check, however, we should not put too much weight on these results as
the number of observations is really small. Table 3.17 shows the results with one-step
Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimator for the early OECD sample, one lag of government
share on the right hand side and first differences in the other variables. It is corrected
28To prevent a loss of observations through the introduction of the lag, the first observation for gov-
ernment consumption is the average of 1960-1963.
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for heteroskedasticity in the error terms by robust standard errors.29 This method as-
sumes that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors. The
null hypothesis of first- and second-order autocorrelation in the error terms is rejected.
The results show some persistence in government consumption. The coefficient on lagged
government share is around 0.3 and significant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, the estima-
tions of the main measures are strongly robust and do not lose their significance. Note,
however, that in contrast to table 3.10 lagopenness has lost its significance.
Alternative measure for importdiv
Further, an objection might be that only counting the number of different products im-
ported from the rest of the world is biased towards counting too few products. There
might also be gains from consuming both German and Italian cars. An alternative to the
importdiv measure used so far is to distinguish between the countries of origin as well.
Columns (1) to (3) in table 3.18 show the results with this alternative measure which
counts a good manifold if classified as differentiated by Rauch (1999). For example, the
product category “passenger motor cars, for transport of passengers and goods” is clas-
sified as differentiated. If a country imports cars from Germany and Italy, the product
category “passenger motor cars, for transport of passengers and goods” is counted twice.
Finally this new measure is logarithmized.30 Hence, the coefficient on importdiv can be
interpreted as an elasticity. According to column (1) a 1% increase in imported varieties
implies a 0.026% increase in the share of government consumption for the average country.
For the smallest country in the sample, a 1% increase in imported varieties would even
increase the share of government consumption by approximately 0.5%. Since this new
measure already accounts for differentiated goods, the interaction term importdiv×diff
is, due to a multicollinearity problem, not included in the regression.31
29The instruments seem to be valid as the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions of the one-step
homoskedastic estimation is not rejected.
30The mean of this new measure is equal to 8.36, the standard deviation is 0.51, minimum and maximum
are equal to 6.88 and 9.36 respectively (these figures are for the OECD sample and the early period).
31If the interaction term importdiv×diff is included, the estimations of the main variables of interest
(in bold) become insignificant.
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Alternative measure for diff
Using the share of differentiated imports is one alternative to proxy the love of variety.
According to Dixit-Stiglitz, the love of variety is inversely related to the elasticity of
substitution. Broda and Weinstein provide an estimation of the elasticity of substitution
(see Broda and Weinstein, 2006), which we are going to take into account next. Consider
the following inverse of a weighted elasticity of substitution:
lovit =
(
sditσ
d + sritσ
r + (1− sdit − srit)σh
)−1
where sdit (σ
d) denotes the share (elasticity) of differentiated goods and srit (σ
r) the share
(elasticity) of reference priced goods and σh the elasticity of homogeneous goods. For
the elasticity of substitution, the average of the two periods provided by Broda and
Weinstein (2006) (see table 3.19) is taken, that is σd = 4.95, σr = 6.85 and σh = 13.45.
As we expect, the correlations between the two diff measures and lov are very high:
corr(lov, diffr) = 0.91 and corr(lov, diffl) = 0.89.
The regression results for this alternative proxy for the love of variety are found in
table 3.18 column (4).32 Again, the results are in line with the hypotheses. While import-
div is not significantly different from zero, its interaction term with loggdp is negatively
significant and its interaction term with lov is positively significant. The new proxy lov
itself is negatively significant.
Yearly data
In order to exclude the possibility that the results depend on averaging the data, the last
three columns in table 3.18 provide the results with yearly data including all controls.
Concerning the significance the results are extremely robust. However, the magnitude of
the estimated effects differs slightly if we compare it with the results in table 3.10.33
32The mean of the variable lov is 0.14, the standard error is 0.003.
33Results (not reported) are robust if I only take every 4 years. This is suggested by Acemoglu et al.
(2008) who prefer to take every 5 years to averaging over 5 years since averaging introduces additional
serial correlation.
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3.5 Conclusion
The possibility of open countries to export costs of public good provision to foreign coun-
tries through the terms of trade effect is well known. Empirical evidence indicates that
this channel exists and that open countries have bigger governments because of the terms
of trade externality.
Accounting for differentiated goods, love of variety and endogenous firm entry, the
theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 has shown a new alternative: the possibility
to export costs of public good provision through the variety effect. If the crowding out
of firms are important costs of public good provision, access to a broad range of foreign
products dampens national costs of public good provision. This chapter provided empir-
ical evidence for this theoretically predicted channel - referred to as the love of variety
effect on government spending.
The main focus of the empirical analysis lies on the OECD country sample and the
time span 1964-1983 where trade data are not censored. For this sample the results are
very robust with respect to the set of controls, log specification, yearly or averaged data.
The number of imported varieties has a positive effect on the share of the public sector.
This positive effect is mainly driven by goods classified as differentiated. This is what we
expect from the theoretical model, since there are only gains from new imported goods
when the goods are differentiated. Furthermore, I find that the positive effect of imported
varieties decreases in country size. Also this is in line with the theory. The intuition behind
this finding is that national costs of public good provision in large countries are dampened
relatively less by intraindustry trade. Last but not least the share of differentiated on
total imported products is negatively correlated with the government share. The share
of differentiated imported products is taken as an indicator for love of variety. National
costs of public good provision are large if love of variety is high since crowding out of
domestic varieties “hurts” more.
The results show that the data for OECD countries fit quite well the theoretical frame-
work. Some evidence is also found for non-OECD countries. Government consumption
share is positively associated with the number of (differentiated) imported goods. How-
ever, the evidence with respect to the other hypotheses is less robust than the one for
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the OECD countries. In sum, this chapter provides empirical support that there is a new
channel for fiscal externalities: the LOVE. Access to foreign varieties due to intraindus-
try trade dampens the costs of public good provision so that, other things equal, trade
liberalization leads to larger governments. Because of the externalities, fiscal cooperation
would be necessary to achieve global efficiency.
By focusing on the extensive margin of imports, this chapter provides first evidence
on the LOVE. The obtained results show that the LOVE is not negligible. A natural next
step is to obtain insights on the relative importance of the terms of trade effect, generated
by the government’s impact on the intensive margin of trade, versus the love of variety
effect, coming through the extensive margin of trade.
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3.6 Appendix A
Figure 3.1: Development of government consumption in OECD and non-OECD (un-
weighted average)
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of import diversity in OECD and non-OECD
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Notes: 1964 refers to the time period 1964-1967, 1968 to 1968-1971 and so on.
50% of the distribution are within the box, the whiskers and adjacent lines
comprise the lower and upper adjacent value and the data points are outlayers.
The lowest outlayers within the OECD sample are Turkey (1964 to 1983) and
Iceland (1984 to 2000).
Import diversity is the number of imported products divided by 1069 (the total
of available product categories).
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of the share of differentiated imported products on total imported
products in OECD and non-OECD
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Notes: diff restrictive refers to the variable diffr and diff liberal to diffl. The for-
mer takes only goods classified as differentiated, the latter combines goods clas-
sified as differentiated and reference priced (classifications by Rauch (1999)).
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Table 3.1: Data and Sources
Variable Description Source
g log-share of government consumption to real
GDP (in %) from Penn World Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
loggdp log real GDP (Laspeyeres method in 2000
prices) from Penn World Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
logpop log of total population in thousands from
Penn World Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
importdiv number of different imported 4-digit prod-
ucts (Standard International trade classifi-
cation, Rev. 2), normalized 0-1
World Trade Data (Feenstra and
Lipsey, 2005) http://cid.econ.
ucdavis.edu/data/undata/undata.
html
diffr share of differentiated on total imported
products
Rauch (1999) and World Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey, 2005)
diffl share of differentiated plus share of reference
priced on total imported products
Rauch (1999) and World Trade Data
(Feenstra and Lipsey, 2005)
polity2 Composite Polity index ranging from -10
(hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated
democracy)
http://www.systemicpeace.org/
inscr/inscr.htm
depend Dependency ratio is the share of population
below 15 and beyond 64 to the population
between 15 and 64 from World Development
Indicators
World Development Indicators 2005,
World Bank
urban The share of total population living in urban
areas from World Development Indicators
World Development Indicators 2005,
World Bank
war ACTOTAL from Major Episodes of Political
Violence (MEPV) and conflict regions, range
from 0 (no violence) to 10
http://www.systemicpeace.org/
warlist.htm
lagopenness log-share of export plus import to real GDP
(in %) from Penn World Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
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Table 3.2: Sample descriptive statistics
OECD non-OECD
1964-1983 1984-2000 1964-1983 1984-2000
g mean (std) 2.80 (0.27) 2.89 (0.29) 2.96 (0.49) 3.08 (0.46)
[min,max] [1.95,3.44] [2.04,3.57] [1.60,4.23] [1.38,4.35]
importdiv mean (std) 0.51 (0.05) 0.66 (0.06) 0.41 (0.09) 0.36 (0.16)
[min,max] [0.36,0.74] [0.41,0.72] [0.06,0.71] [0.03,0.68]
diffr mean (std) 0.51 (0.02) 0.57 (0.02) 0.56 (0.04) 0.63 (0.05)
[min,max] [0.45,0.57] [0.55,0.67] [0.49,0.79] [0.51,0.84]
diffl mean (std) 0.81 (0.02) 0.85 (0.02) 0.85 (0.03) 0.89 (0.02)
[min,max] [0.79,0.86] [0.84,0.93] [0.78,0.99] [0.82,0.97]
loggdp mean (std) 18.93 (1.43) 19.42 (1.43) 16.30 (1.70) 16.69 (1.78)
[min,max] [14.56,22.36] [15.42,22.92] [11.26,20.72] [11.28, 21.57]
logpop mean (std) 9.60 (1.42) 9.74 (1.41) 8.40 (1.83) 8.65 (1.81)
[min,max] [5.26,12.37] [5.49,12.54] [3.78,13.82] [3.67,13.79]
polity2 mean (std) 6.35 (6.47) 8.48 (3.72) -3.49 (6.29) -0.52 (6.52)
[min,max] [-9,10] [-7,10] [-10,10] [-10,10]
depend mean (std) 0.60 (0.11) 0.51 (0.06) 0.86 (0.14) 0.77 (0.18)
[min,max] [0.46,1.03] [0.40,0.84] [0.42,1.15] [0.38,1.17]
urban mean (std) 67.69 (16.58) 73.40 (12.56) 37.33 (23.54) 46.19 (23.67)
[min,max] [24.13,95.61] [38.20,97.19] [2.31,100] [5.04,100]
war mean (std) 0.22 (0.68) 0.18 (0.67) 0.93 (1.93) 1.23 (2.30)
[min,max] [0.00,3.75] [0.00,4.00] [0.00,14.00 [0.00,14.00]
lagopenness mean (std) 3.33 (0.63) 3.76 (0.54) 3.95 (0.76) 4.09 (0.72)
[min,max] [1.73,4.66] [2.52,4.93] [1.95,6.41] [1.42,6.44]
Table 3.3: Correlations of main variables in OECD (1964-1983)
importdiv diffr diffl loggdp importdiv×diffr
diffr -0.19
diffl -0.24 0.94
loggdp 0.47 -0.32 -0.45
importdiv×diffr 0.94 0.15 0.08 0.37
importdiv×loggdp 0.91 -0.24 -0.34 0.79 0.84
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Table 3.4: Country fixed effects regression with all countries (1964-2000), I
Dependent variable: Log of government consumption (in % of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv 0.163 1.934*** 1.941*** 4.366*** 2.145*** 6.040***
(0.115) (0.642) (0.638) (1.208) (0.641) (2.251)
importdiv×loggdp -0.106*** -0.111*** -0.139*** -0.117*** -0.135***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039)
diffr -0.775** 0.047
(0.322) (0.443)
importdiv×diffr -3.121**
(1.339)
diffl -0.797* 0.444
(0.464) (0.813)
importdiv×diffl -4.019*
(2.219)
loggdp -0.201*** -0.162*** -0.156*** -0.153*** -0.160*** -0.163***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
logpop 0.262*** 0.248*** 0.254*** 0.250*** 0.253*** 0.253***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073)
oecd×after84 0.032 0.063* 0.074** 0.073** 0.066* 0.062*
(0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150 1150
# Countries 156 156 156 156 156 156
R2 0.141 0.148 0.154 0.159 0.151 0.154
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.5: Country fixed effects regression with all countries (1964-2000), II
Dependent variable: Log of government consumption (in % of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv 0.155 2.727*** 2.566*** 5.940*** 2.743*** 9.129***
(0.132) (0.848) (0.862) (1.582) (0.840) (2.887)
importdiv×loggdp -0.151*** -0.145*** -0.191*** -0.152*** -0.190***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.053) (0.048) (0.052)
diffr -0.651* 0.441
(0.361) (0.478)
importdiv×diffr -4.078***
(1.546)
diffl -0.084 1.974**
(0.521) (0.961)
importdiv×diffl -6.372**
(2.642)
loggdp -0.229*** -0.172*** -0.165*** -0.162*** -0.172*** -0.180***
(0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.053)
logpop 0.328*** 0.307*** 0.305*** 0.296*** 0.307*** 0.302***
(0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) (0.100)
oecd×after84 0.005 0.047 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.038
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
depend -0.169 -0.178 -0.129 -0.152 -0.175 -0.211*
(0.126) (0.125) (0.128) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126)
polity2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
urban -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
war 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
lagopenness 0.095*** 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.080*** 0.099*** 0.086***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 987 987 987 987 987 987
# Countries 140 140 140 140 140 140
R2 0.176 0.186 0.191 0.198 0.186 0.193
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.10: Country fixed effects with OECD countries (1964-1983), I
Dependent variable: Log of government consumption (in % of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv -0.337 13.827*** 12.733*** 6.521** 10.492** -9.202*
(0.402) (3.174) (2.981) (2.524) (4.163) (5.025)
importdiv×loggdp -0.688*** -0.619*** -0.866*** -0.507** -0.634***
(0.144) (0.140) (0.129) (0.203) (0.166)
diffr -1.539 -10.247***
(0.963) (1.891)
importdiv×diffr 20.364***
(4.790)
diffl -2.382 -15.016***
(1.563) (3.153)
importdiv×diffl 26.536***
(6.774)
loggdp -0.157 0.005 -0.025 0.059 -0.073 -0.035
(0.130) (0.133) (0.138) (0.115) (0.143) (0.123)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 132 132 132 132 132 132
# Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
R2 0.279 0.426 0.444 0.514 0.445 0.515
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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0.009***
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(0.002)
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Table 3.12: Country fixed effects with OECD countries (1964-1983), III
Dependent variable: Log of government consumption (in % of GDP)
(1) (2) (3)
importdiv×diffr 1.007* 0.673 12.820***
(0.604) (0.467) (2.657)
diffr -3.091*** -3.018*** -7.996***
(0.914) (0.694) (1.276)
importdiv×loggdp -0.337***
(0.074)
loggdp -0.479*** -0.263** -0.097
(0.115) (0.124) (0.121)
logpop 0.734*** 0.252 0.159
(0.236) (0.189) (0.178)
depend 0.562** 0.281 0.201
(0.234) (0.209) (0.204)
polity2 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
urban 0.007 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
war 0.038** 0.030** 0.013
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015)
lagopenness -0.281*** -0.277***
(0.042) (0.040)
Time Dummies yes yes yes
# Obs. 127 124 124
# Countries 26 26 26
R2 0.678 0.786 0.811
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.14: Country fixed effects with non-OECD countries (1964-2000)
Dependent variable: Log of government consumption (in % of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv 1.404* 1.509** 4.298*** 6.070*** 5.779*** 2.552**
(0.750) (0.753) (1.342) (1.853) (1.971) (1.108)
importdiv×loggdp -0.073 -0.086* -0.116** -0.189*** -0.198*** -0.150**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.065) (0.071) (0.065)
diffr -0.869** 0.048 0.414 0.309 -0.659
(0.360) (0.469) (0.532) (0.531) (0.417)
importdiv×diffr -3.641** -4.528** -3.793**
(1.484) (1.756) (1.800)
loggdp -0.167*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.168*** -0.141** -0.146**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.059) (0.062) (0.063)
logpop 0.237*** 0.243*** 0.241*** 0.255** 0.297** 0.295**
(0.083) (0.084) (0.086) (0.126) (0.128) (0.127)
polity2 -0.005** -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
depend -0.263* -0.226 -0.187
(0.141) (0.144) (0.145)
lagopenness 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.121***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
aidpc 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
war 0.014*** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.005)
urban -0.004* -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 907 907 907 758 733 733
# Countries 127 127 127 112 109 109
R2 0.141 0.149 0.156 0.199 0.212 0.205
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.16: No log variables, OECD countries (1964-1983)
Dependent variable: Government consumption (in % of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
importdiv -2.597 224.079*** 199.011*** 171.545*** 138.859*** -10.885
(4.765) (52.605) (42.978) (47.316) (50.520) (71.015)
importdiv×gdp -11.307*** -9.589*** -11.945*** -6.524** -7.906***
(2.599) (2.171) (2.483) (2.633) (2.829)
diffr -32.698*** -91.973***
(10.073) (26.365)
importdiv×diffr 136.335**
(63.470)
diffl -55.650*** -161.316***
(17.955) (39.257)
importdiv×diffl 213.220***
(78.660)
gdp -9.193*** -4.214* -4.587** -3.189 -6.172** -5.139**
(2.196) (2.278) (2.190) (2.391) (2.371) (2.495)
pop 13.025*** 12.880*** 11.119*** 9.200** 11.153*** 8.564**
(4.527) (4.095) (4.114) (4.309) (4.066) (4.278)
depend 7.984 10.082** 13.319** 12.134** 13.516** 12.831**
(5.074) (4.598) (5.131) (5.162) (5.371) (5.307)
polity2 0.176*** 0.157*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.157*** 0.159***
(0.053) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054) (0.052)
urban 0.149** 0.104 0.112 0.102 0.119 0.115
(0.073) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.073) (0.071)
war 0.460 -0.369 -0.258 -0.330 -0.223 -0.264
(0.337) (0.359) (0.336) (0.351) (0.359) (0.379)
lagopenness 0.023 -0.001 0.008 0.003 0.011 0.008
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 124 124 124 124 124 124
# Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26
R2 0.592 0.670 0.690 0.700 0.697 0.711
Notes: Country fixed effects estimation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.17: Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, OECD countries (1964-1983)
Dependent variable: Log of government consumption (in % of GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
laggovshare 0.465*** 0.392*** 0.411** 0.306** 0.420** 0.336**
(0.116) (0.124) (0.171) (0.148) (0.164) (0.151)
importdiv -0.363* 6.637*** 6.141*** 4.669*** 5.465** -0.964
(0.190) (2.141) (2.130) (1.744) (2.390) (2.403)
importdiv×loggdp -0.349*** -0.321*** -0.374*** -0.284** -0.303***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.085) (0.122) (0.103)
diffr -3.464***
(0.674)
importdiv×diffr 5.294***
(1.253)
diffl -0.453 -4.972***
(0.917) (1.221)
importdiv×diffl 8.348***
(1.909)
loggdp -0.267*** -0.181*** -0.256*** -0.199** -0.260*** -0.243**
(0.098) (0.068) (0.084) (0.095) (0.087) (0.097)
logpop 0.663*** 0.687*** 0.567*** 0.382** 0.535*** 0.410**
(0.169) (0.174) (0.167) (0.180) (0.173) (0.187)
polity2 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
depend 0.133 0.158 0.171 0.228 0.187 0.206
(0.170) (0.160) (0.191) (0.185) (0.191) (0.196)
lagopenness -0.015 -0.072 -0.016 -0.049
(0.063) (0.062) (0.065) (0.061)
war 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.006
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
urban 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 98 98 98 98 98 98
# Countries 26 26 26 26 26 26
Sargan Test [0.49] [0.46] [0.58] [0.47] [0.53] [0.32]
AR(2) Test [0.22] [0.98] [0.71] [0.95] [0.63] [0.74]
Notes: Country fixed effects estimation.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions is based on the homoskedastic estimator.
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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3.7 Appendix B
Table 3.19: Elasticity of substitution, sample means for Rauch’s classifications
Broda and Weinstein’s (2006)
estimated elasticity of substitution
Rauch’s classification 1972-1988 1990-2001
differentiated goods 5.2 4.7
reference priced goods 7.8 4.9
goods on organized exchange 15.3 11.6
Source: Broda and Weinstein (2006, table VI)
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Table 3.20: List of Countries
Afghanistan Djibouti Laos Samoa
Albania Dominican Republic Latvia Saudi Arabia
Algeria Ecuador Lebanon Senegal
Angola Egypt Liberia Seychelles
Argentina El Salvador Lithuania Sierra Leone
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Macedonia Singapore
Australia§ Estonia Madagascar Slovak Republic§
Austria§ Ethiopia Malawi Slovenia
Azerbaijan Fiji Malaysia Somalia
Bahamas Finland§ Mali South Africa
Bahrain France§ Malta Spain§
Bangladesh Gabon Mauritania Sri Lanka
Barbados Gambia Mauritius St. Kitts and Nevis
Belarus Georgia Mexico§ Sudan
Belgium§ Germany§ Mongolia Suriname
Belize Ghana Morocco Sweden§
Benin Greece§ Mozambique Switzerland§
Bermuda Guatemala Nepal Syria
Bolivia Guinea Netherlands§ Taiwan
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea-Bissau Netherlands Antilles Tajikistan
Brazil Guyana New Zealand§ Tanzania
Burkina Faso Haiti Nicaragua Thailand
Burundi Honduras Niger Togo
Cambodia Hungary§ Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago
Cameroon Iceland§ Norway§ Tunisia
Canada India Oman Turkey§
Central African Republic Indonesia Pakistan Turkmenistan
Chad Iran Panama Uganda
Chile Iraq Papua New Guinea Ukraine
China Ireland§ Paraguay United Arab Emirates
Colombia Israel Peru United Kingdom§
Costa Rica Italy§ Philippines United States§
Cote d‘Ivoire Jamaica Poland§ Uruguay
Croatia§ Japan§ Portugal§ Uzbekistan
Cuba Jordan Qatar Venezuela
Cyprus Kenya Republic of Korea§ Vietnam
Czech Republic§ Kiribati Romania Yemen
Dem. Rep. Korea Kuwait Russia Zambia
Denmark§ Kyrgyzstan Rwanda Zimbabwe
Notes: OECD countries marked by §.

4The Effect of Globalization on
Nominal versus Real Government
Share
In a seminal paper Baumol (1967) argues that a productivity increase in one sector induces
wages to rise in all sectors if labor is mobile across sectors. As a result, the relative costs
and price increase in the sector with lower productivity experience. It implies that the
expenditure share for the low-productivity sector rises if real output shares are constant
(i.e., if demand is price inelastic). This has been commonly called Baumol’s cost disease.1
This phenomenon has been mainly studied in the growth and public finance literature
for closed economies. An analogous mechanism in the trade framework is the so-called
Balassa-Samuelson effect. In a small open economy with integrated capital markets,
higher productivity in the tradable sector leads to higher prices in the less progressive,
labor intensive, non-tradable sector (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964).2 The public sector
1Empirical evidence for Baumol’s cost disease is provided e.g. in Baumol et al. (1985) using U.S. data
from 1947 until 1976. They show that although in real terms there was little shift in output shares between
services and manufactures, the relative price of services has risen. Also, using U.S. data for the period
1948 until 2001, Nordhaus (2008) find that stagnant industries show a higher growth in relative prices
and declining relative real outputs. Spann (1977) provides empirical evidence for Baumol’s hypothesis in
the public sector.
2There is ample empirical evidence for the Balassa-Samuelson effect (e.g. Hsieh, 1982; Asea and
Mendoza, 1994; De Gregorio et al. (1994)). De Gregorio et al. (1994), for example, find for the period
1970-1985 and for OECD countries a higher inflation in non-tradable goods than tradables which they
relate to a faster growth of total factor productivity in tradables and a demand shift to non-tradable
goods. See Froot and Rogoff (1995) for a survey of the econometric literature.
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is typically characterized as labor intensive, exhibits low productivity growth and produces
mainly non-tradable goods. If the elasticity of substitution between the private and public
good is smaller than one, Baumol’s cost disease and the Balassa-Samuelson effect provide
us with an explanation for the steady growth of the public sector.
These insights point to another important channel which can explain the relationship
between international integration and the government share. The rise in public expendi-
tures may be driven by price changes rather than real expansion. This chapter analyzes
the impact of globalization - more precisely integration of capital markets and trade lib-
eralization - on the relative costs of the public sector in a general equilibrium framework.3
Following Baumol (1967), the real public sector share is held constant while the effect
on the expenditure share is analyzed. This procedure allows us to isolate the purely eco-
nomic effects of integration on public sector growth from changes through the political
channel. It is shown that capital market and goods market integration may lead to rising
public budget shares. In particular, the chapter identifies a channel which is related to the
Balassa-Samuelson and Baumol effect, however driven by a decrease in trade costs. Using
a Melitz (2003) framework which accounts for heterogeneous firms, trade liberalization
affects average productivity in the private sector positively which in turn raises the costs
of the public sector. Furthermore, it is shown that capital inflow raises the relative wage
rate and the relative costs in the labor intensive public sector.
The intention of the chapter is to tie in with the “openness and government size”
literature. The standard approach in the theoretical literature dealing with the effect of
globalization on government size is to compare optimal public good provision in open and
closed economies. This approach implies that the public sector reacts actively with its
share to globalization by taking into account the additional costs or benefits provided by
market integration (see the discussion in Section 1.2.1). In this chapter we are interested
in the question of how globalization can explain the gap or ratio between the nominal and
real government share or in other words the ratio between the price level of governments
(which is equal to the costs in the public sector) versus the price level of private goods.4
To focus on that we completely refrain from political decisions on public good provision.
3This chapter draws on Falkinger and Hanslin (2010).
4According to national accounts the public sector is valued by its costs which implies that the price level
of governments is equal to the unit costs in the public sector. These two terms are used interchangeably.
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Although the relationship between openness and government size has been widely dis-
cussed in the literature, as far as I have found, the price level (or unit costs) of governments
relative to the price level of GDP has not yet been related to measures of openness.5 This
is surprising, as data for OECD countries show an interesting correlation between the
relative price level of governments to the price level of GDP and some measures of open-
ness (figures 4.1-4.3). In figure 4.1 the correlation between the price level of government
(relative to the price level of GDP) and FDI flows is plotted. One observation corresponds
to a year between 1981 and 2004. The figure indicates that larger financial openness is
associated with higher relative prices in governments. A similar picture is found for trade
openness and relative prices. Higher exports and imports relative to GDP is positively
correlated with relative price level (figure 4.2). Interestingly not only openness measures
such as flows but also trade liberalization in the sense of a reduction of import tariffs
is positively correlated with the relative price level as it is shown in figure 4.3.6 Given
these simple correlations in the data it seems worth to think about this relationship more
intensely.
In order to analyze capital flows and relative prices of governments a Heckscher-Ohlin
2x2-production model with perfect competition suffices. The analysis shows that capital
inflow depresses the interest rate and raises the relative wage rate which leads to higher
relative public expenditure. Contrary, if opening capital markets leads to capital outflow,
public spending decreases. It is well known from the literature, that higher relative capital
(to labor) endowment leads to higher relative prices in service and/or non-market sectors
(see for example, Bhagwati, 1984 and Gemmell, 1987). However, this literature focuses
on closed factor markets. Relating relative prices to capital mobility has, to the best of
my knowledge, not yet been covered, although capital flows have taken on a dimension
which is far from negligible. Under open capital markets it is not relative endowment but
relative employment of capital which is decisive for the relative factor prices which makes
capital flows an important determinant for relative price levels of the non-tradable and
5It is quite common in the empirical analysis (e.g. Clague (1986) and Kravis and Lipsey (1982)) which
try to explain national price levels (price of non-tradables versus price of tradables) to control for trade
openness. Clague and Tanzi (1972) control also for tariffs.
6One might argue that the negative correlation is simply because the price level of GDP is positively
associated with tariffs. This is however not the case, the two measures are (interestingly) negatively
correlated.
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Figure 4.1: Scatter plot of relative price levels versus financial openness
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Figure 4.2: Scatter plot of relative price levels versus openness in trade
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labor intensive public sector.
To address the question of a goods-trade induced Balassa-Samuelson and Baumol
effect we require a framework where productivity depends on trade liberalization. A
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Figure 4.3: Scatter plot of relative price levels versus average import tariffs
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Note: Due to data availability the sample covers only 15 OECD
countries.
prominent example where average productivity depends on trade liberalization measures
is the theoretical framework by Melitz (2003). Trade liberalization leads to higher average
productivity of firms which lowers unit costs in the private sector and increases the relative
costs of the public sector. Furthermore, the rise in average productivity increases the
relative wage rate which induces an additional public cost push. This productivity change
in the private sector, which is endogenously driven by trade liberalization, induces a rise
in nominal public expenditures even if policy does not react to globalization by adjusting
the real public sector share.
The two theoretical channels are analyzed empirically for a large country sample and
separately for the OECD countries. Two measures for the relative costs of the public
sector are used, both derived from PWT 6.2. One is the price level of governments relative
to the price level of GDP. The other is the ratio between the government consumption
share measured in current prices relative to the one measured in constant prices. It is
investigated whether net capital inflow and trade liberalization have a positive effect on
the two aforementioned measures.
Section 4.1 develops the theoretical framework and highlights the new results on public
112 4. NOMINAL VS. REAL GOVERNMENT SHARE
sector expenditure shares in response to capital market and trade liberalization. Section
4.2 presents the empirical analysis of the two hypotheses derived from the theoretical
model. Section 4.3 concludes.
4.1 Theoretical Analysis
We consider an economy with two sectors, a private and a public one, and two production
factors, capital and labor. Both production factors can move freely between the sectors
within a country. Labor is assumed to be immobile across countries. Generally also
capital is immobile, apart from the section in which capital market integration will be
discussed. The public sector produces one non-tradable public good. The private sector
is assumed to be tradable.
Utility of the representative household depends on the private and public sector output.
Preferences are given by a Leontief function
U = min{Q, λG} , λ > 0 , (4.1)
where G stands for public sector output and Q denotes consumption of private output.
Optimal consumption implies that demand for the public good is proportional to demand
for the private sector output
G =
1
λ
Q . (4.2)
The assumption underlying the specification is that public and private goods are comple-
ments (the elasticity of substitution is zero). This assumption implies that price elasticity
of demand is equal to zero. The assumption is of course extreme. There is however a
strong consensus that demand for public goods is price inelastic. Early estimates of the
price elasticity of demand for public goods were found to lie between -0.4 and -0.5 (see
Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973 and Borcherding, 1985). Hence, assuming an elasticity of
substitution between zero and one would be realistic but makes the analysis more compli-
cated. Sticking to the assumption of complete inelastic demands avoids undue complexity.
It is important to mention here that the obtained results on the gap between nominal and
real government share do not require the strong assumption of no price elasticity.
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The public good G is produced according to linear-homogeneous production function:
G = FG(KG, LG) ,
with ∂F
G
∂K
, ∂F
G
∂L
> 0 and ∂
2FG
∂K2
, ∂
2FG
∂L2
< 0. KG and LG are the inputs of capital and labor.
It is assumed that the public sector takes factor prices as given. There is no direct
price for the public good since it is not ’sold’. The implicit price of the public good is
given by its unit costs, cG. Total costs are financed by a lump-sum tax T = cGG which
is levied on the representative consumer. Cost minimization of the public sector leads to
minimal unit cost
cG(r, w) = aG(ω)w + bG(ω)r
where aG(ω) and bG(ω) are the cost minimal labor and capital coefficients, respectively,
and ω ≡ w/r is the factor price of labor relative to the factor price of capital.7 Capital
intensity in the public sector is given by kG ≡ KGLG =
bG(ω)
aG(ω)
.8
The two central measures for the size of the public sector are (i) the real government
share which is provision of public good relative to the output of the private sector (X):
g ≡ G
X
and (ii) the nominal government share which is the costs of public good provision relative
to the value of the domestic private sector output:
gn ≡ cGG
pX
=
cG
p
g .
In view of (4.2) the real government share is determined by the preference parameter such
that g = 1
λ
if Q = X. To discriminate between the nominal and real ratio of the public
and the private sector provides the possibility to analyze the effects of globalization on
the relative costs of the public sector. Thus the main focus will be on the ratio between
the nominal and real government share gn
g
for which we take the approach to keep real
relative government activity unchanged (g) while analyzing the effects of globalization on
7For ω the term relative factor price of labor is often used.
8See Appendix 4.4.2 for the derivation of the cost-minimal input coefficients.
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gn. The qualitative effect on
gn
g
does not depend on the extreme assumption that public
and private goods are perfect complements.9
This section considers first the effect of capital market integration and turns then to
trade liberalization. The simplest framework to discuss capital market integration is the
2x2 production model with perfect competition in the private sector. In this framework,
Section 4.1.1 shows how opening capital markets, leading to either capital in- or outflows,
affects the relative price of governments.10 Section 4.1.2 proceeds with the heterogeneous
firms model a` la Melitz (2003) with trade between symmetric countries in order to focus on
the effect of trade liberalization on the relative prices. It is shown that trade liberalization
can be responsible for a Balassa-Samuelson effect and a Baumol’s cost disease in the public
sector by rising average productivity in the private sector.
4.1.1 The Effect of Capital Market Integration on Nominal ver-
sus Real Government Share
The private sector produces the homogeneous goodX under perfect competition according
to a linear-homogeneous production function
X = AFX(KX , LX)
with ∂F
X
∂K
, ∂F
X
∂L
> 0 and ∂
2FX
∂K2
, ∂
2FX
∂L2
< 0. The variable A is productivity, KX and LX
represent capital and labor input for private production. Since the homogeneous good
is freely tradable, its price is determined at the world market whose variables will be
asterisked in the following. The world market price p∗ is chosen as the nume´raire.
Cost minimization leads to the minimal unit costs:
cX(r, w,A) = aX(ω,A)w + bX(ω,A)r (4.3)
where aX(ω,A) and bX(ω,A) with
∂aX
∂A
< 0 and ∂bX
∂A
< 0 are the cost minimal labor
9The effect of trade liberalization on gng is simulated for different values of the elasticity of substitution
between zero and one in Appendix 4.4.4.
10Parts of the discussion in this Chapter draws on Falkinger (2008).
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and capital coefficients, respectively.11 Moreover, cX is homogeneous of degree 1 and by
Shephard’s lemma, ∂cX
∂w
= aX and
∂cX
∂r
= bX . An assumption which is essential for some
of the obtained results is that the public sector produces more labor intensive than the
private sector, that is kX > kG.
12
The zero profit condition in the private sector reads
cX(r, w,A) = 1(= p
∗) . (4.4)
Differentiating equation (4.4) implicitly we see that an increase in productivity A for a
given interest rate raises the wage rate w.
Factor input in the two sectors is determined by the input coefficients times respective
output. Hence, the resource constraints read:
aX(ω,A)X + aG(ω)G = L¯ , (4.5)
bX(ω,A)X + bG(ω)G = K¯ , (4.6)
where L¯ is labor endowment available for production of the public and private goods. If
capital markets are closed, there is K¯ capital endowment available. If capital markets
are integrated, the world market interest rate is given and available capital is determined
endogenously. Solving (4.5) and (4.6) for G and X and using bG(ω)/aG(ω) = kG(ω) and
bX(ω)/aX(ω) = kX(ω) we obtain the Rybczynski lines
13
X =
1
aX(ω,A)
K¯ − kG(ω)L¯
kX(ω)− kG(ω) , (4.7)
G =
1
aG(ω)
kX(ω)L¯− K¯
kX(ω)− kG(ω) . (4.8)
Note that kG(ω) <
K¯
L¯
< kX(ω). Combining the two equations yields real government size
11See Appendix 4.4.2 for the derivation.
12With one factor of production (standard Melitz (2003) framework) the positive effect of trade liber-
alization on relative costs in the public sector remains valid.
13See Appendix 4.4.2 for the derivation of the Rybczynski lines. The Rybczynski theorem indicates
that if prices are kept constant and the endowment of some factor rises while the endowment of the other
factor is fixed, not all output can expand. The output of the sector which uses the factor with fixed
endowment relatively intensively falls, output of the other sector increases (Rybczynski, 1955).
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relative to the private sector
g ≡ G
X
=
aX(ω,A)
aG(ω)
kX(ω)− k
k − kG(ω) ≡ Γ(ω,A, k) , (4.9)
where k = K¯
L¯
denotes the relative capital richness of the economy (measured by capital
employment rather than endowment if the capital markets are open).
Lemma 4.1. The function Γ(ω,A, k) depends positively on ω and negatively on k and A
(ceteris paribus).
Proof. See Appendix 4.4.1.
For an exogenous real government share and exogenous relative capital endowment
(closed capital markets), the relative wage rate is endogenously determined as a function
of government size, capital-richness and productivity. By inverting (4.9), we obtain
ω = ω(g, A, k) (4.10)
Proposition 4.1. The relative wage rate, ω, depends positively on g, k and A.
Proof. ∂ω
∂g
> 0 follows directly from Lemma 4.1 since, for given k and A, ω(g, k, A) is the
inverse of Γ. Further, because of Lemma 4.1, for given g, implicit differentiation of (4.9)
gives us ∂ω
∂A
> 0 and ∂ω
∂k
> 0.
The intuition is straightforward: a larger government (higher g) implies a higher
relative demand for labor which raises the relative wage rate. Higher relative capital
endowment k implies that the factor labor is getting relatively scarce in the economy
so that its price rises. An increase of productivity A raises output of the private sector
for given capital and labor demand. However, if we keep relative real government size
constant, production of G must increase which raises relative demand for labor and hence,
the relative wage rate.
The analysis so far provides very interesting insights for the relative cost of labor, a
particularly important cost component of the public sector. These costs react on changes
in the economic environment even if relative real government size remains constant. The
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measure for nominal relative government size (the relative expenditures of the public
sector) is defined as
gn ≡ cG(r, w)G
pX
=
cG(1, ω)
cX(1, ω, A)
g .
The relative costs in relation to the relative real government size is a function of the
relative wage rate, which in turn is determined by (4.10):
gn
g
=
cG(1, ω)
cX(1, ω, A)
≡ κ(g, A, k) . (4.11)
Proposition 4.2. κ(g, A, k) is a positive function of g, A and k.
Proof. See Appendix 4.4.1.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Government expansion raises
relative demand for labor which implies an increase in the relative wage rate for given
factor endowments. Real expansion of the public sector implies a magnified nominal
expansion since the relative costs in the public sector increase additionally. If capital
markets are closed, an increase of the relative capital endowment implies a higher relative
equilibrium wage rate and hence, higher relative costs in the public sector. This channel
is pointed out in Gemmell (1987).14 However, it is clear that if there is capital mobility
and the factor price of capital is determined by the world interest rate, the relative wage
rate is positively correlated with relative employment of capital and not with relative
endowment. The effect of the transition from closed to integrated capital markets on the
relative prices is discussed further below.
A higher productivity has a direct and indirect effect on the relative costs in public
good production. In the private sector per unit costs are reduced and hence relative costs
of the public sector increase (for given factor prices). This direct effect is the Baumol effect
which is independent of relative factor intensities. Moreover, for a given g, public good
production will increase as a response to a larger productivity in the private sector. This
raises the relative wage rate and thus the per unit cost in the public sector (i.e. we have
14Also authors such as Kravis and Lipsey (1982) and Bhagwati (1984) argue that the relative wage
rate and as such the relative price of non-tradables is higher in countries which are abundantly endowed
with capital relative to labor.
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a Balassa-Samuelson effect).15 Note that when capital markets are integrated and the
factor price of capital is determined by its world market price, higher productivity in the
private sector leads - independent of preference assumptions and real government share
- to a higher relative factor price of labor.16 The effect of an increase in productivity is
illustrated in the factor price diagram below (figure 4.4) for closed and integrated capital
markets.
Figure 4.4: The effect of a productivity increase on factor prices
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Capital market integration
In a small open economy with fully integrated capital markets, the interest rate is given
by the world market. In this case ω is determined by the zero profit condition (4.4)
and r = r∗. Hence, ω is independent of the real government share and preferences.17
Nevertheless, transition from closed to open capital markets brings interesting insights
for the relative nominal government size. Assume, for instance, that the autarky interest
15In the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences (which implies a unitary price elasticity of demand) the
relative factor prices are independent of productivity (see Appendix 4.4.2). Because of the direct effect,
the positive effect of A on κ remains.
16That preferences do not matter for the Balassa-Samuelson effect when capital markets are integrated
is emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
17Note, when capital markets are integrated and there is either net capital inflow or outflow, a fraction
of output X is exported or imported and Q 6= X. As a result, the ratio between public and private sector
production is unequal to the ratio between public consumption to private consumption: GX = g 6= 1λ = GQ .
However, the assumption about g and λ is irrelevant for this discussion.
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rate is relatively high (r > r∗), that is, ω is low. Opening capital markets induces inflow
of capital until the domestic interest rate equals the rate on the world market, r = r∗.
As the analysis above has shown, an increase in relative capital endowment increases
the relative wage rate and hence, the relative costs of public good production. The
reverse results if the autarky interest rate is relatively low before opening capital markets.
Globalization in terms of capital market integration may raise or decrease the relative size
of the government, depending on the initial capital richness of the country. Capital rich
countries with low interest rates will experience a capital outflow and a reduction in the
relative wage rate and relative government expenditures decrease. A graphical illustration
of the effect of capital market opening on the factor prices is provided in figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: The effect of capital in- and outflow on factor prices
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4.1.2 The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Nominal versus Real
Government Share
In this section it is shown that trade liberalization can be responsible for a Balassa-
Samuelson effect and a Baumol’s cost disease in the public sector by raising average
productivity in the private sector. In order to illustrate this channel it is assumed that
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the private sector is characterized by heterogeneous firms according to Melitz (2003). I
start to characterize the closed economy before the costly trade equilibrium is discussed.
Closed economy
The private sector of the economy delivers a homogeneous final output Y under perfect
competition. Y is produced by differentiated intermediate inputs. The differentiated
intermediate goods are supplied by a continuum of firms under monopolistic competition.
The production function of the final output producer that uses the intermediate goods as
the only inputs is given by
Y =
[
M−
1
σ
∫
v∈V
x(v)
σ−1
σ dv
] σ
σ−1
, σ > 1 ,
where M is the measure of set V , representing the mass of available intermediate goods,
and σ the constant elasticity of substitution between the varieties. As in Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003), and Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) the external scale effect is excluded
in order to focus on the effect of trade liberalization on the productivity distribution of
active firms. The price index corresponding to the final good Y is given by
P =
[
M−1
∫
v∈V
p(v)1−σdv
] 1
1−σ
.
Profit maximization of the final goods producers leads to the following demand func-
tion for each intermediate variety
x(v) = Dp(v)−σ , (4.12)
with D ≡ Y Pσ
M
= IP
σ−1
M
. I denotes nominal private consumption expenditure which is
total expenditure minus taxes used for public good production.
Intermediate goods are produced by employing capital and labor. We follow Bernard
et al. (2007) and assume that fixed and variable costs of the intermediate goods producer
require both factors of production with identical factor intensity. Variable costs varies
across firms and depend on firm specific productivity A ∈ (0,∞). A is drawn from a
4.1. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 121
lottery with distribution function H(A). All firms face the same fixed overhead costs per
period. The cost function reads
CX = cX(r, w, 1)f + cX(r, w,A)x
where f > 0 denotes the units of output required for overhead fixed investment and x
is output of a firm.18 Note that cX(r, w,A) =
cX(r,w,1)
A
. Because of the fixed production
costs, in equilibrium, each firm produces a different variety. Facing demand function
(4.12), a monopolistic firm with productivity A charges a profit-maximizing price equal
to a mark-up (1 + µ) times marginal costs:
p(A) = cX(r, w,A)(1 + µ)
where µ = 1
σ−1 > 0.
A firms revenue is thus given by
rev(A) = D [cX(r, w,A)(1 + µ)]
1−σ . (4.13)
Available income for private goods, price index and productivity affect demand for each
variety positively and increase revenue. Revenue depends negatively on the government
size as government spending affects available income for private goods negatively. It is
obvious that relative revenue of two firms with productivity A′ and A′′ does only depend
on their relative productivity: rev(A
′)
rev(A′′) =
(
A′
A′′
)σ−1
.
The contribution margin is given by p(A) − cX(r, w,A) = p(A) µ1+µ which implies for
a firms profit19
pi(A) =
µ
1 + µ
rev(A)− fcX(r, w, 1) . (4.14)
Following Melitz (2003) an “average” productivity level A˜ is defined so that aggregate
variables are the same as if there were M identical firms with productivity A˜. That
18It is still assumed that output in the intermediate goods sector is produced by a linear-homogeneous
production function FX with ∂F
X
∂K ,
∂FX
∂L > 0 and
∂2FX
∂K2 ,
∂2FX
∂L2 < 0.
19A realistic additional assumption would be that fixed costs decrease with average productivity in
the market due to spillovers between firms. This assumption does not change aggregate and average
variables. The only difference would be in the equilibrium number of firms and the output per firm.
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means, the firm with productivity A˜ is the representative firm. For final output we have
Y = Mx(A˜) which implies that output of the average firm equals the average output per
firm. The price index simplifies to P = p(A˜), total revenue and profits are represented
by R = PY = Mrev(A˜) and Π = Mpi(A˜). According to Melitz (2003), this average
productivity is given as
A˜ ≡
(
1
1−H(A∗)
∫ ∞
A∗
Aσ−1h(A)dA
) 1
σ−1
,
where H(A) is the productivity distribution and h(A) the respective density function. A∗
is the “cut-off” productivity defined by the zero profit condition. In other words A∗ is
the least productive firm in the market. We make use of the standard assumption that
ex ante firm productivity is Pareto distributed, i.e. H(A) = 1 − ( b
A
)s
.20 b > 0 is the
minimum value of productivity and hence A ≥ b. The variable s determines the skewness
of the Pareto distribution. It is assumed that s > σ−1 in order to ensure that the average
productivity has a finite positive value. In this case average productivity is given by:
A˜ =
(
s
s− σ + 1
) 1
σ−1
A∗ . (4.15)
Before a firm can produce, it must pay a fixed entry cost which is thereafter sunk. For
simplicity it is assumed that the factor intensity of costs of entry and production are the
same, so that entry costs take the form fecX(r, w, 1), fe > 0. After paying this investment
the firm draws a productivity level A from distribution H(A). Each firm has one draw
of an A-level which is fixed after entry. A firm starts to produce if pi(A) ≥ 0. Since
profits are increasing in A, the cut-off productivity for successful entry is determined by
the zero-profit condition pi(A∗) = 0 which is equivalent to
rev(A∗) =
1 + µ
µ
fcX(r, w, 1) . (4.16)
Each firm which draws a productivity A ≥ A∗ will produce, firms which draw a pro-
ductivity below A∗ exit immediately. Combining (4.16) with rev(A˜) =
(
A˜
A∗
)σ−1
rev(A∗)
20The respective density function is h(A) = s b
s
As+1 .
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and pi(A˜) = rev(A˜) µ
1+µ
− fcX(r, w, 1) the zero profit condition can be written as pi(A˜) =((
A˜
A∗
)σ−1
− 1
)
fcX(r, w, 1) with A˜(A
∗) according to (4.15). Hence the zero cut-off profit
condition is given by
pi(A˜) = fcX(r, w, 1)
σ − 1
s− σ + 1 . (4.17)
The entry decision, that is, whether or not a firm invests fecX to get an ex ante
uncertain productivity draw, is determined as follows. There is an infinite number of
periods and if the firm starts to produce it faces an exogenous probability of death, δ,
each period. As there is an unbounded pool of potential entrants, in equilibrium the
expected value of entry - which is equal to the probability of a successful draw times the
expected profitability of producing until death - must equal the sunk cost of entry:
expected value of entry = ρin
pi(A˜)
δ
= fecX(r, w, 1) = sunk entry cost ,
where ρin ≡ 1−H(A∗). Replacing ρin by
(
b
A∗
)s
for the Pareto distribution, the free entry
condition reduces to
pi(A˜) = δfecX(r, w, 1)
(
A∗
b
)s
. (4.18)
The zero cut-off profit (4.17) and the free entry condition (4.18) together determine the
cut-off productivity A∗ which is independent of the factor prices since the unit fixed costs
of entry and production cancel out:21
A∗ = b
(
f
δfe
σ − 1
s− σ + 1
) 1
s
. (4.19)
The resource constraints will complete the characterization of the closed economy
21If fixed costs decrease with average productivity, the zero cut-off profit condition is given by pi(A˜) =
fcX(r, w, 1) (A∗)
−1
(
s
s−σ+1
) −1
σ−1 σ−1
s−σ+1 . Hence, it would be a downward sloping curve in the (A, pi)
space, since the fixed costs are decreasing in average productivity. The free entry condition is given by
pi(A˜) = δfecX(r, w, 1)
(
s
s−σ+1
) −1
σ−1
(A∗)−1
(
A∗
b
)s
. It is downward sloping in the (A, pi) space if s < 1.
For s = 1 average profit is independent of the productivity and for s > 1 it is upward sloping. As it is
assumed that s > σ − 1 and estimates for σ are around 3 or even larger (see for example Bernard et al.
(2003)), the free entry curve is most likely upward sloping. Note, that the assumption that fixed costs
decrease with average productivity does not affect equilibrium cut-off productivity.
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equilibrium. It is assumed that both factors of production are immobile between countries.
Labor and capital market clearing requires that the resources used for total production
(variable (Lv and Kv) and fixed (Lf and Kf ) input) and entry (Le and Ke) plus resources
employed by the public sector (LG and KG) must be equal to the available resource stocks
in the country.
Lv + Lf + Le + LG = L¯ (4.20)
Kv +Kf +Ke +KG = K¯ . (4.21)
Denote by Me the mass of entrants and by ρin = 1 −H(A∗) the success rate. In steady
state the mass of firms which are successful must equal the mass of firms which exit
the market, that is ρinMe = δM . It follows that Me =
δM
ρin
. Therefore, the number
of workers and capital needed to enter the market is given by Le = MefeaX(ω, 1) =
δM
ρin
feaX(ω, 1) and Ke =
δM
ρin
febX(ω, 1). For variable and fixed costs of domestic production
the requirement for labor and capital are Lv = Mx(A˜)aX(ω, A˜), Kv = Mx(A˜)bX(ω, A˜)
and Lf = MfaX(ω, 1), Kf = MfbX(ω, 1).
Total revenue R = Mrev(A˜) = Mp(A˜)x(A˜) equals total costs (inclusive entry and
fixed costs of production).22 Hence, Mp(A˜)x(A˜) = wLX + rKX with LX = Lv + Lf + Le
and KX = Kv + Kf + Ke. The price and the total unit costs in the private sector are
given by
p(A˜) =
wLX + rKX
Mx(A˜)
⇔ cX(r, w, A˜) = wLX + rKX
(1 + µ)Mx(A˜)
.
Using the fact that cX(r, w, A˜) = aX(ω, A˜)w + bX(ω, A˜)r, we can write
(1 + µ)Mx(A˜)aX(ω, A˜)w + (1 + µ)Mx(A˜)bX(ω, A˜)r = wLX + rKX
which implies for total private input of labor LX = (1 + µ)Mx(A˜)aX(ω, A˜) and for total
input of capital in private production KX = (1 + µ)Mx(A˜)bX(ω, A˜). Hence, the resource
22Total profits will cover the total costs for entry Π = Mpi(A˜) = wLe + rKe while total revenue minus
profits cover total costs of production R−Π = w(Lv + Lf ) + r(Kv +Kf ).
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constraints can be written as
aX(ω, A˜)(1 + µ)Y + aG(ω)G = L¯ (4.22)
bX(ω, A˜)(1 + µ)Y + bG(ω)G = K¯ . (4.23)
Solving the resource constraints for G and Y we obtain the Rybczynski lines
Y =
1
aX(ω, A˜)(1 + µ)
K¯ − kG(ω)L¯
kX(ω)− kG(ω) and G =
1
aG(ω)
kX(ω)L¯− K¯
kX(ω)− kG(ω) .
The ratio between public good provision and private sector output is
g =
G
Y
=
aX(ω, A˜)(1 + µ)
aG(ω)
kX(ω)− k
k − kG(ω) (4.24)
which implies that the relative factor price is implicitly determined by real government
size, average productivity and hence cut-off productivity, relative capital endowment and
the mark-up: ω(g, A˜, k, µ).23 For given average productivity, a lower mark-up raises the
relative factor price of labor. It is obvious from (4.24) that an increase in µ has exactly
the opposite effect on ω compared to an increase in productivity.
The nominal government share is determined by gn =
cGG
PY
. For the ratio between
relative costs (expenditures) of the public sector and real government share we have
gn
g
=
cG(1, ω)
cX(1, ω, A˜)
1
1 + µ
≡ κ(g, A˜, k, µ) . (4.25)
We are back to equation (4.11) with one difference which is that the mark-up plays also
an important role in determining the relative prices between the two sectors. Ceteris
paribus, a higher mark-up in the private sector reduces the relative price of governments
κ.
Open economy
We will now consider trade between N + 1 identical countries each of which is modeled
as described in the previous subsection. It is assumed that the final good is traded
23As Q = Y , we have g = 1λ .
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frictionless, while trade in intermediates is costly.24 An intermediate firm faces variable
trade costs of the iceberg form where τ > 1 units have to be shipped in order for 1 unit
to arrive. As a result, the price in the export market is pex = τp. In addition, there are
fixed per period beachhead costs fex to enter a foreign market. It is assumed that this
fixed cost requires domestic resources with the same factor intensity as the other type of
fixed costs.25
Because of symmetry, demand for a variety on a foreign market is given by yex = τ
−σyd
where yd = p
−σD is demand on the domestic market. Hence, an exporting firm’s rev-
enue from one export market is proportional to the domestic revenue:26 revex(A) =
τ 1−σrevd(A) where revd(A) coincides with the revenue in the closed economy. High trans-
portation costs, i.e., more units are lost during transport, reduces relative revenue in the
export market. Not every firm will serve the export market but if the firm exports, it
exports to all N markets. Hence total revenue is given by
rev(A) =
revd(A) if firm does not exportrevd(A) [1 + τ 1−σN ] if firm exports .
An exporting firm obtains profits from each export market of piex =
µ
1+µ
revex(A) −
fexcX(r, w, 1). If piex(A) ≥ 0, the firm exports to all N markets. A firm’s profit can be
written as
pi(A) = pid(A) + max{0, Npiex(A)} ,
where pid(A) corresponds to the profit in the closed economy (equation (4.14)).
In the open economy there are two cutoff productivities, one for successful entry (A∗)
and one for exporting (denoted by A∗ex). A firm with productivity A
∗ will make zero profit
in the domestic market, a firm with productivity A∗ex will make zero profit in the export
markets and positive profit in the domestic market. The cutoff productivity for exporting
24We have Q = Y since countries are identical. It is not important whether the final good is assumed
to be tradable or not.
25For a similar assumption concerning equal factor intensity in production and fixed costs see Bernard
et al. (2007).
26τyex = τ(τp)−σD units have to be shipped in order for yex units to arrive. Thus, revenue from one
export market is given by revex = pexyex.
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is found by piex(A
∗
ex) = 0
revex(A
∗
ex) =
1 + µ
µ
fexcX(r, w, 1) . (4.26)
Together with revex(A˜ex) =
(
A˜ex
A∗ex
)σ−1
revex(A
∗), the zero profit condition for exporting
can be reformulated as
piex(A˜ex) =
(A˜ex
A∗ex
)σ−1
− 1
 fexcX(r, w, 1) . (4.27)
Note that, A˜ex is the average productivity of exporting firms.
Using cX(r, w,A) =
cX(r,w,1)
A
, equations (4.13) and (4.16) can be solved for A∗ =(
f
µD
(cX(r, w, 1)(1 + µ))
σ
) 1
σ−1
and similarly using (4.26) and revex(A) = τ
1−σrevd(A) we
obtain for cut-off productivity of exporting A∗ex = τ
(
fex
µD
(cX(r, w, 1)(1 + µ))
σ
) 1
σ−1
. We see
that A∗ex is proportional to A
∗:
A∗ex = τ
(
fex
f
) 1
σ−1
A∗ . (4.28)
By assumption, a firm can only export if it is active in the domestic market. Moreover,
exporting firms are more productive than non-exporting firms, that is, productivity of the
marginal exporter is larger than cut-off productivity for the domestic market: A∗ex > A
∗.
Let us assume that fex ≥ f which guarantees τ
(
fex
f
) 1
σ−1
> 1 for all τ > 1, this implies a
selection of the more productive firms into the export market.
In equilibrium the expected value of entry must equal the sunk cost of entry:
1
δ
[
(1−H(A∗))pid(A˜) + (1−H(A∗ex))Npiex(A˜ex)
]
= fecX(r, w, 1) (4.29)
with pid(A˜) and piex(A˜ex) are the expected profit for the domestic market and for one
export market respectively.
The free entry condition together with the zero cut-off productivity condition can be
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written as27
fe =
1
δ
(1−H(A∗))f
( A˜
A∗
)σ−1
− 1
+ (1−H(A∗ex))Nfex
(A˜ex
A∗ex
)σ−1
− 1
 ,
(4.30)
where
A˜ =
(
s
s− σ + 1
) 1
σ−1
A∗ and A˜ex =
(
s
s− σ + 1
) 1
σ−1
A∗ex .
A˜ is average productivity of all domestic firms producing either only for the domestic
market or for both the domestic and foreign market. A˜ex is average productivity only of the
exporting firms. Equation (4.30) together with (4.28) determine the cut-off productivity
A∗. Solving for the cut-off productivity under the assumption that productivity is Pareto
distributed28 we obtain
A∗ = b
(
f
δfe
σ − 1
s− σ + 1
[
1 +N
(
fex
f
)σ−1−s
σ−1
τ−s
]) 1
s
. (4.31)
There are M firms active in a country. Their average productivity is A˜. The number of
exporting firms is denoted by Mex = ρexM where ρex =
1−H(A∗ex)
1−H(A∗) is the ex ante probability
of exporting conditional on successful entry. The average productivity of an exporting
firm is denoted by A˜ex. Hence, total number of firms competing in the domestic market,
that is also the mass of intermediate goods available for production of the final good,
is given by Mt = (1 + ρexN)M . The average productivity of these firms is denoted by
A˜t =
[
M−1t
(
MA˜σ−1 +NMex(τ−1A˜ex)σ−1
)] 1
σ−1
. Note that the productivity of foreign
firms are corrected by the trade costs τ . The average productivity of all firms competing
in the domestic market can be written as A˜t =
[
1+Nρex
fex
f
1+Nρex
] 1
σ−1
A˜.29 The private sector
price index in the open economy is a weighted average of prices of all available goods
27Replace pid(A˜) =
((
A˜
A∗
)σ−1
− 1
)
fcX(r, w, 1) and piex(A˜ex) =
((
A˜ex
A∗ex
)σ−1
− 1
)
fexcX(r, w, 1) in
(4.29) to obtain (4.30).
28We use A˜A∗ =
A˜ex
A∗ex
=
(
s
s−σ+1
) 1
σ−1
, (4.28) and 1−H(A) = ( bA)s.
29Using the fact that A˜ =
(
s
s−σ+1
) 1
σ−1
A∗, A˜ex =
(
s
s−σ+1
) 1
σ−1
A∗ex and A
∗
ex = τ
(
fex
f
) 1
σ−1
A∗, we can
write A˜t =
[
M−1t
(
MA˜σ−1 +NMex(τ−1A˜ex)σ−1
)] 1
σ−1
=
[
1+Nρex
fex
f
1+Nρex
] 1
σ−1
A˜.
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(domestic and imported varieties from N countries), that is, M goods at a price p(A˜) and
NρexM varieties at a price τp(A˜ex):
P =
[
M−1t
(
M(p(A˜))1−σ +NρexM
(
τp(A˜ex)
)1−σ)] 11−σ
.
It is equivalent to P = p(A˜t) (see Appendix 4.4.2 for the derivation). Note that if the fixed
costs of exporting are equal to the fixed costs of domestic production fex = f we have
A˜t = A˜ which is that the average productivity of competing firms is equal to the average
productivity in the domestic market. Aggregate private supply in a country is determined
by Y = Mtx(A˜t) and aggregate revenue R = PY = Mtp(A˜t)x(A˜t) = Mtrev(A˜t).
30 In the
open economy, additional resources are required for exporting. Hence, total employment
of capital in the private sector is given by LX = Lv +Lf +Lex +Le and KX = Kv +Kf +
Kex +Ke respectively. We have Lv = Y aX(ω, A˜t), Kv = Y bX(ω, A˜t), Le =
δM
ρin
feaX(ω, 1),
Ke =
δM
ρin
febX(ω, 1), Lf = MfaX(ω, 1), Kf = MfbX(ω, 1). For fixed costs of exporting
an amount of labor, Lex = MρexNfexaX(ω, 1), and capital, Kex = MρexNfexbX(ω, 1), is
required.
Total revenue in the private sector has to be equal to total costs in the private sector
PY = wLX + rKX which can be written as
cX(r, w, A˜t)(1 + µ)Y = w(Lv + Lf + Lex + Le) + r(Kv +Kf +Kex +Ke) .
Using cX(r, w, A˜t) = aX(ω, A˜t)w + bX(ω, A˜t)r we can write demand for labor and capital
in the private sector as LX = (1 + µ)Y aX(ω, A˜t) and KX = (1 + µ)Y bX(ω, A˜t) with
Y = Mtx(A˜t).
31 The resource constraints can be written as follows:
aX(ω, A˜t)(1 + µ)Y + aG(ω)G = L¯ , (4.32)
bX(ω, A˜t)(1 + µ)Y + bG(ω)G = K¯ . (4.33)
30Using equation (4.13) and A˜t =
[
1+Nρex
fex
f
1+Nρex
] 1
σ−1
A˜ we can also write R = M(1 +Nρex fexf )rev(A˜).
31The mark-up captures the amount of capital and labor used for the three type of fixed costs. This
implies that µY = MA˜t(f + ρexNfex + δρin fe).
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The two equations can be combined to
g =
G
Y
=
aX(ω, A˜t)(1 + µ)
aG(ω)
kX(ω)− k
k − kG(ω) . (4.34)
Again, the relative wage rate ω is implicitly determined as a function of A˜t, k, g and µ,
ω(g, A˜t, k, µ).
32 The relative price level is given by
κ =
cG(1, ω)
cX(1, ω, A˜t)(1 + µ)
.
Trade liberalization
This subsection analyzes the effects of trade liberalization on the relative costs of public
good production. Lemma 4.2 recapitulates the effects of trade liberalization on average
productivity provided by Melitz (2003).
Lemma 4.2. Trade liberalization (a reduction in transportation costs τ , an increase in
the number of trading partners N or lower fixed costs of exporting fex) raises average
productivity A˜t.
Proof. Lemma 4.2 follows directly from (4.31), (4.15), (4.28) and A˜t =
[
1+Nρex
fex
f
1+Nρex
] 1
σ−1
A˜
with ρex =
(
A∗ex
A∗
)
. (See also Melitz, 2003.)
Together with the analyzes of the effects of productivity on relative prices, the following
Propositions result immediately.
Proposition 4.3. Trade liberalization raises the relative factor price ω.
Proof.
∂ω
∂τ
=
∂ω
∂A˜t
∂A˜t
∂τ
< 0 ,
∂ω
∂fex
=
∂ω
∂A˜t
∂A˜t
∂fex
< 0 ,
∂ω
∂N
=
∂ω
∂A˜t
∂A˜t
∂N
> 0
Use Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.1.
32See Appendix 4.4.3 for solving for all other variables in the equilibrium.
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Proposition 4.4. Trade liberalization raises the relative price in the public sector κ.
Proof.
∂κ
∂τ
=
∂κ
∂A˜t
∂A˜t
∂τ
+
∂κ
∂ω
∂ω
∂τ
< 0 ,
∂κ
∂fex
=
∂κ
∂A˜t
∂A˜t
∂fex
+
∂κ
∂ω
∂ω
∂fex
< 0 ,
∂κ
∂N
=
∂κ
∂A˜t
∂A˜t
∂N
+
∂κ
∂ω
∂ω
∂N
> 0
according to the proof of Proposition 4.2 and Lemma 4.2.
An increase in the average productivity raises the relative wage rate which leads to a
higher relative price in the public sector and to an increase in the relative public budget
share. Figure 4.6 illustrates the effect of trade liberalization on private (inclusive set up
investment) and public production. Trade liberalization increases average productivity
and the production possibilities frontier (PPF) rotates outwards since for given factor
inputs in the private sector private production increases. Keeping the real relative gov-
ernment size g constant, the new equilibrium is determined by the intersection between
g 1
1+µ
and the exterior curve. In the new equilibrium the slope is flatter which implies that
the costs of government relative to the private sector must be higher.33 Let us choose
the aggregate price P = p(A˜t) as the nume´raire. We see that the relative wage has to
increase. The effect of trade liberalization in the factor price diagram for a given aggre-
gate price P is provided in figure 4.7. The higher ω implies that both the private and
public sector produce more capital intensive. Since average productivity in the private
sector increases, its unit cost curve is shifted outward. This pushes up unit cost in the
public sector which cannot compensate the rising factor prices by productivity growth.
How trade liberalization affects employment of the two factors in the two sectors can be
best illustrated in the Edgeworth box (see figure 4.8). Employment of capital and labor
in the public sector increase while employment of both input factors in the private sector
decrease and both sectors produce more capital intensive.
33Note that the slope of the curve in figure 4.6 is − cXcG . The ‘price’ of the ‘good’ on the horizontal axis
is cX .
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Figure 4.6: The effect of trade liberalization on production
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Figure 4.8: The effect of trade liberalization on factor employment
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4.2 Empirical Evidence
The following two hypotheses from the theoretical models are going to be investigated
empirically.
(I) Net capital inflow has a positive effect on the unit costs of the public sector relative
to the private sector price.
(II) Trade liberalization has a positive effect on the unit costs of the public sector relative
to the private sector price.
The data are obtained from various sources. For relative unit costs, that is denoted by κ
in the model, two different measures are taken. A first variable will be the relative price
levels of government versus the price level of GDP. A second measure is the government
consumption share measured at current prices relative to the government consumption
share at constant price (nominal versus real government share). From the theoretical
point of view the two measures should be identical
κ =
cG
p
=
gn
g
.
In the data, however, the two measures are not correlated. For robustness checks the
results for both endogenous variables are always provided.
The price levels of government versus the price level of GDP is denoted by pG/pGDP
the government consumption share at current prices relative to the one at constant price
is denoted by govcur/gov (from Heston et al. (2006) PWT 6.2).
34 For the explanatory
variables concerning the capital market we have net foreign direct investment inflows
(FDInetinflow) derived from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) provided by
IMF. Net FDI inflow is a close measure to the model as capital is thought to be pro-
duction capital. Nevertheless, also results for a more aggregate net financial inflow, the
capital account CA (also derived from the IFS) are provided. Two measures are used
34That the version of PWT may matter for the results we know at the latest from Ponomareva and
Katayama (2010). Here, also different results are obtained with the newest version of PWT 6.3, namely:
FDI net inflow are alleviated and insignificant and in return the trade freedom index is found to be
positively significant in the govcurgov regression. We have chosen to take PWT 6.2 instead of 6.3 as the
authors suggest to wait for PWT 7.0 (see “What is new in PWT 6.3”).
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for trade liberalization: on the one hand the average applied tariff rates (tariff ) provided
by the World Bank and on the other hand the Trade Freedom index from the Heritage
Foundation and Wall Street Journal (tradefreedom). The Trade Freedom index is based
on trade-weighted average tariff rates and on non-tariff barriers. Population (pop), gdp
and openness are also derived from PWT 6.2. The urbanization rate (urban) and the
dependency ratio (depend) are from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
Moreover, it is controlled for the political regime (polity2 from the Polity IV dataset),
whether the country was affected by violence or wars (war from MEPV) and black mar-
ket premium (blackpremium from the Development Research Institute).35 The result is
an unbalanced panel of yearly data for the time span 1970-2004. All the regressions are
executed with country and time fixed effects and standard errors are robust. The three
variables gov, gdp and openness are lagged by one period.36
Tables 4.1 to 4.4 present the results for net capital inflow. When all controls are
taken into account the number of observations is reduced noticeably because black market
premium is only available until 1999. There is only partial evidence for hypothesis (I).
Table 4.1 presents the results for a sample of 120-163 countries. The relative price level is
not significantly affected by net FDI inflow. Significantly positive effects are obtained for
the nominal versus real government share regression (columns (4)-(6)). The estimation
for net FDI inflow is positively significant at the 1% level and the estimation of net FDI
inflow lagged one period is positively significant at the 10% level. Table 4.2 provides
the results for 26-30 OECD countries. Except in column (1) and (6) the estimations for
(lagged) net FDI inflow are significantly positive.
The estimations for the effect of the capital account are provided in tables 4.3 and 4.4.
The estimations for the effect on the relative price levels are (mostly) significantly positive
at the 1% level in both the large country sample and the subset of OECD countries. The
regressions for the effect on the nominal versus real government share look different. In
both country samples these effects of the capital account are negatively significant.
The time series for the trade measures are much shorter. The trade freedom measure
starts in 1995 and the earliest average tariffs are available for 1981. The results for trade
35A complete list of the variable description and sources is provided in table 4.9.
36The estimates are quite similar whether the explanatory variables are lagged or contemporaneous.
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liberalization are mixed (tables 4.5 to 4.8). According to table 4.5 there is no evidence
for hypothesis (II) in the pooled regression of the large country sample. The OECD
sample, however, shows significant and positive effects of tradefreedom on the relative
price level of governments (column (1)-(3) in table 4.6). The estimations are slightly
negative but insignificant when the endogenous variable is nominal versus real government
consumption. Only tradefreedom lagged one period shows a weakly significant negative
effect at the 10% level. No evidence for the hypothesis (II) is found in the tariff regressions
(table 4.7 and 4.8) which show mostly nonsignificant estimates.
The measures for trade liberalization are far from perfect. As import tariffs are an
important source for financing government spending in developing countries, it is very
likely an endogenous variable. Also, tariffs are hard to measure and to aggregate. Since
the variable tradefreedom captures not only tariffs but also non-tariff barriers it seems to
be a slightly better measure.
The empirical results show that the real government share is mostly negatively corre-
lated with the relative price levels. An explanation for the negative correlation found in
the data might be the endogeneity of the government share. Higher prices of the public
good will lead to a reduction in real consumption share if there is some degree of a price
elasticity of demand. As the main purpose is to give some tentative evidence I am not
going to deal with the endogeneity issue here except that the variable is lagged. Excluding
the potentially endogenous variable “real government size” on the right hand side does
hardly change the estimation results (results not reported).37
Since richer countries have higher national price levels, we would expect that for given
population a higher GDP is positively correlated with relative prices of governments. In
tables 4.1 to 4.4 most of the relative price level regression show this pattern. In columns
(4) to (6) in most tables, we do not find this effect. Also in columns (1)-(3) in tables 4.6
and 4.8 GDP has mostly a negative effect on relative prices of governments.
37The biggest difference when gov is excluded is that the estimates of the capital account in table 4.3
lose their negative significance.
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4.3 Conclusion
This chapter identifies a so far neglected channel how globalization can explain an in-
crease in government expenditure shares. It is refrained from political decisions on public
good provision and the real government share is kept constant. Doing so the effects of
globalization on the costs of public good production relative to the private sector can be
isolated without influence due to changes in the real share. The effects of two features of
globalization are considered: international capital flows and trade liberalization.
It is found that capital inflow leads to a higher relative wage rate and to higher
relative costs in the labor intensive public sector. As a result, the nominal government
share increases as real government share is constant. Capital outflow has exactly the
opposite effect. There is some empirical evidence which supports this hypothesis. Net
FDI inflow has a positive effect on the nominal versus real government consumption share.
Furthermore, the relative price levels between governments and GDP for OECD countries
depend positively on net FDI inflows.
Moreover, in the Melitz framework, trade liberalization increases average productivity
in the private sector which leads to a rise in the relative unit costs in the public sector.
Furthermore, for given real government size, the relative wage rate increases which addi-
tionally pushes up the costs of public good provision relative to the price of private goods.
In order to test this prediction average tariffs and the Trade Freedom index are used as
a measure for trade liberalization. The results are mixed with not much evidence for the
prediction. The only support for the hypothesis is obtained for OECD countries. There
it is found that the trade freedom index has a positive effect on the relative price level of
governments (relative to price level of GDP).
The empirical evidence provided in this chapter is rather preliminary. It might be
taken as a starting point for more detailed empirical investigations. On the one hand,
one may tackle the endogeneity issue and look at different and probably more suitable
measures for trade liberalization. On the other hand, one can investigate the correlation
with different estimation methods.
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4.4 Appendix
4.4.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.2
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Using the fact that kX(ω) = bX(ω,A)/aX(ω,A) and kG(ω) = bG(ω)/aG(ω) we can rewrite
expression (4.9) as
Γ(ω, k, A) =
bX(ω,A)− aX(ω,A)k
aG(ω)k − bG(ω) .
It follows
∂Γ
∂ω
=
(
∂bX
∂ω
− ∂aX
∂ω
k
)
(aGk − bG)− (bX − aXk)
(
∂aG
∂ω
k − ∂bG
∂ω
)
(aGk − bG)2 .
Hence, ∂Γ
∂ω
> 0 is equivalent to
(
∂bX
∂ω
− ∂aX
∂ω
k
)
(aGk − bG) > (bX − aXk)
(
∂aG
∂ω
k − ∂bG
∂ω
)
,
which holds since ∂bi
∂ω
> 0, ∂ai
∂ω
< 0, aGk − bG > 0 and bX − aXk > 0 (because of
kX > k > kG). The left hand side of the inequality is positive while the right hand side
is negative.
Moreover,
∂Γ
∂k
=
aXaG
(
bG
aG
− bX
aX
)
(aGk − bG)2 < 0
since bG
aG
= kG < kX =
bX
aX
. And
∂Γ
∂A
=
∂aX
∂A
(kX − k)
aG(k − kG) < 0
since kX > k > kG and
∂aX
∂A
< 0 . (Note that kX is invariant with respect to A.)
Proof of Proposition 4.2
∂κ
∂ω
=
∂cG(1,ω)
∂ω
cX(1, ω, A)− ∂cX(1,ω,A)∂ω cG(1, ω)
(cX(1, ω, A))2
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It follows that (making use of Shepard’s Lemma (∂ci
∂w
= ai, i = G,X))
∂κ
∂ω
> 0⇔ aG(waX + rbX) > aX(waG + rbG)
⇔ aGbX > aXbG ⇔ kX > kG .
Further, according to Proposition 4.1 we have
∂κ
∂g
=
∂κ
∂ω
∂ω
∂g
> 0 and
∂κ
∂k
=
∂κ
∂ω
∂ω
∂k
> 0 .
Moreover,
∂κ
∂A
=
∂κ
∂ω
∂ω
∂A
−
∂cX
∂A
cG
(cX)2
> 0
because of ∂cX
∂A
< 0.
4.4.2 Derivations
Cost Minimal Input Coefficients
Assuming that the production function j = AjF
j(Kj, Lj), j = X,G, is linear-homogeneous.
Then,
∂F j(Kj ,Lj)
∂K
= F jK(Kj, Lj) and
∂F j(Kj ,Lj)
∂L
= F jL(Kj, Lj) are homogeneous of degree
zero. Cost minimal factor combination is given by the condition
ω =
F jL(kj, 1)
F jK(kj, 1)
= MRTS j(kj)
where ω = w/r and kj = Kj/Lj. This determines relative factor input kj(ω). Using
Lj =
j
Aj(F j(kj ,1))
and Kj =
j
Aj(F j(1,1/kj))
the unit cost function (cj = r
Kj
j
+ w
Lj
j
) can be
written as
cj =
1
Aj
(F j(kj, 1))
−1w +
1
Aj
(F j(1,
1
kj
))−1r .
Thus, the cost minimal input coefficients are aj(ω,Aj) =
1
Aj
(F j(kj(ω), 1))
−1 and bj(ω,Aj) =
1
Aj
(F j(1, 1
kj(ω)
))−1. Note that bj(ω,Aj)
aj(ω,Aj)
=
F j(kj(ω),1)
F j(1,1/kj(ω))
= kj(ω).
140 4. NOMINAL VS. REAL GOVERNMENT SHARE
Rybczynski Lines
Solving the capital market clearing condition (4.6) for G and replacing in (4.5) results in
aX(ω,A)X + aG(ω)(K¯ − bX(ω,A)X) 1bG(ω) = L¯. With some rearranging we obtain
X =
1
aX(ω,A)
bG(ω)
aG(ω)
L¯− K¯
bG(ω)
aG(ω)
− bX(ω,A)
aX(ω,A)
=
1
aX(ω,A)
K¯ − kG(ω)L¯
kX(ω)− kG(ω)
where we used bG(ω)
aG(ω)
= kG(ω) and
bX(ω,A)
aX(ω,A)
= kX(ω). ReplacingX inG = [L¯−aX(ω,A)X] 1aG(ω)
we get
G =
1
aG(ω)
[
L¯−
bG(ω)
aG(ω)
L¯− K¯
bG(ω)
aG(ω)
− bX(ω,A)
aX(ω,A)
]
=
1
aG(ω)
kX(ω)L¯− K¯
kX(ω)− kG(ω) .
Cobb-Douglas Preferences
With Cobb-Douglas preferences over the public and private output, relative expenditure
shares and hence nominal government share gn are constant. Combining gn =
cG
p
g with
g = aX
aG
kX−k
k−kG and using ci = aiw + bir and
bi
ai
= ki, i = G,X leads to
gn =
cG
cX
aX
aG
kX − k
k − kG =
ω + kG
ω + kX
kX − k
k − kG .
This expression implicitly determines relative factor prices ω(gn, k) which will be inde-
pendent of productivity. We have
∂ω
∂k
=
(ω + kG)(ω + kX)
(kX − k)(k − kG) > 0
as kX > k > kG. Moreover,
∂ω
∂gn
=
(ω + kX)
2(k − kG)
(kX − k)(kX − kG) > 0 .
An increase in the relative expenditure share for public goods raises relative factor price
of labor.
According to the proof of Proposition 4.2, the effect of productivity A on κ is still
positive: ∂κ
∂A
= −
∂cX
∂A
cG
(cX)2
> 0.
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Open Economy Price Index
The aggregate price in the open economy is given by
P =
[
M−1t
(
M(p(A˜))1−σ +NρexM
(
τp(A˜ex)
)1−σ)] 11−σ
.
Using p(A˜) = A˜−1cX(r, w, 1)(1 + µ) and p(A˜ex) = A˜−1ex cX(r, w, 1)(1 + µ), the price index
can be written as
P =
[
M−1t (cX(r, w, 1)(1 + µ))
1−σ
(
M(A˜−1)1−σ +NρexM
(
τA˜−1ex
)1−σ)] 11−σ
= cX(r, w, 1)(1 + µ)
[
M−1t
(
MA˜σ−1 +NρexM
(
τ−1A˜ex
)σ−1)] 11−σ
.
Use A˜t =
[
M−1t
(
MA˜σ−1 +NρexM(τ−1A˜ex)σ−1
)] 1
σ−1
to write
P = cX(r, w, 1)(1 + µ)A˜
−1
t
= p(A˜t) .
4.4.3 Solving the Equilibrium
Closed Economy
Note that we cannot explicitly solve for the variables without simulations. In the following
the equilibrium is summarized and described how one would proceed to solve for the
endogenous variables.
The cut-off productivity, A∗, is determined by equation (4.19). Hence, we have average
productivity, A˜, according to (4.15). The resource constraints, equations (4.22) and (4.23),
together with G = gY determine ω(g, A˜, k), G(g, A˜, k) and Y (g, A˜, k). Normalizing the
aggregate price P = cX(r, w, A˜)(1 + µ) = 1, we have r(ω) and w(ω). Given r and w
we have average revenue, rev(A˜) = s
s−σ+1
1+µ
µ
fcX(r, w, 1), and average profit, pi(A˜) =
σ−1
s−σ+1fcX(r, w, 1). R follows from R = PY = Y (ω). Note that as P = 1 we have x(A˜) =
rev(A˜). Because R = Mrev(A˜), we obtain M , and the number of firms which enter the
market is Me =
δM
ρin
with ρin =
(
b
A∗
)s
. We obtain LX , KX , KG, LG, Le, Lf , Lv, Ke, Kf
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and Kv according to
LG = GaG(ω) KG = GbG(ω)
LX = (1 + µ)Y aX(ω, A˜) KX = (1 + µ)Y bX(ω, A˜)
Le =
Mδ
ρin
feaX(ω, 1) Ke =
Mδ
ρin
febX(ω, 1)
Lf = MfaX(ω, 1) Kf = MfbX(ω, 1)
Lv = Y aX(ω, A˜) Kv = Y bX(ω, A˜) .
(4.35)
Open Economy
Equation (4.31) determines the cut-off productivity, A∗. According to (4.15) and (4.28)
we have average productivity of domestic firms, A˜, and the cut-off productivity for ex-
porting, A∗ex. We obtain the probabilities ρin =
(
b
A∗
)s
and ρex =
(
A∗ex
A∗
)s
. Hence, we have
average productivity of competing firms in the domestic market A˜t =
[
1+Nρex
fex
f
1+Nρex
] 1
σ−1
A˜.
Using (4.32) and (4.33) together with G = gY we obtain ω(g, A˜t, k), and G and Y .
Choosing the price index as the nume´raire P = rcX(1, ω, A˜t)(1 + µ) = 1, we have r and
w. Average revenue and profit of domestic sales are revd(A˜) =
s
s−σ+1
1+µ
µ
fcX(r, w, 1) and
pid(A˜) =
σ−1
s−σ+1fcX(r, w, 1), and those of exporting revex(A˜ex) =
s
s−σ+1
1+µ
µ
fexcX(r, w, 1)
and pi(A˜ex) =
σ−1
s−σ+1fexcX(r, w, 1). The average revenue of domestic firms is given by ¯rev =
revd(A˜)+ρexNrevex(A˜ex) which can be written as ¯rev =
s
s−σ+1
1+µ
µ
cX(r, w, 1)(1+ρexN
fex
f
).
As we have average revenue, we can find the number of domestic firms because aggre-
gate revenue is equal to the number of domestic firms times average revenue of domestic
firms: R = M ¯rev = Y . Hence, we have Mt = (1 + ρexN)M . The number of export-
ing firms is determined by Mex = ρexM . Replace in (4.35) A˜ by A˜t to find labor and
capital demand for the fixed costs and production, additionally we have for exporting
Lex = MexNfexaX(ω, 1) and Kex = MexNfexbX(ω, 1).
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4.4.4 Simulation: Effect of Trade Liberalization
This subsection provides a simulation of the effect of trade liberalization on gn, g and
κ = gn
g
when preferences are given by
U =
(
Qβ + (λG)β
) 1
β , β < 0 .
The elasticity of substitution between public and private good is determined by η = 1
1−β .
Since we have β < 0, it follows that η < 1. For the production functions and hence cost
functions we assume Cobb-Douglas. The cost function of the public sector is thus given
by cG(r, w) =
(
w
γ
)γ (
r
1−γ
)1−γ
. It follows for the cost minimal input coefficients in the
public sector: aG(ω) =
(
ω 1−γ
γ
)γ−1
and bG(ω) =
(
ω 1−γ
γ
)γ
. Cost function in the private
sector is given by cX(r, w, A˜t) = A˜
−1
t
(
w
α
)α ( r
1−α
)1−α
. This implies for the cost minimal
input coefficients: aX(ω, A˜t) = A˜
−1
t
(
ω 1−α
α
)α−1
, bX(ω, A˜t) = A˜
−1
t
(
ω 1−α
α
)α
. It is assumed
that γ > α which implies that kX > kG.
The relative price of the public sector under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas cost
functions are given by κ(ω, A˜t) =
ψG
A˜−1t ψX
ωγ−α where ψG = γ−γ(1 − γ)−(1−γ) and ψX =
α−α(1 − α)−(1−α). For the numerical analysis we set λ = 1 and N = 30. The other
assumptions on parameter values are taken from Bernard et al. (2007). This is σ = 3.8,
s = 3.4, K¯ = 1200, L¯ = 1000, γ = 0.6, α = 0.4, fe = 2, b = 0.2, f = fex = 0.1, δ = 0.025,
P = 1 (nume´raire).
The dashed line corresponds to β = −10⇒ η ≈ 0.1 (closer to the Leontief case), the
pointed one to β = −1 ⇒ η ≈ 0.5 and the solid curve to β = −0.1 ⇒ η ≈ 0.9 (closer to
the Cobb-Douglas case). There is almost no difference in κ across the different elasticities
of substitutions.
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Figure 4.9: The effect of trade liberalization on the real and nominal government share
and relative price of the public sector
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4.4.5 Tables
Table 4.1: Net FDI inflow with full sample, country fixed effects estimation
Dependent variable pG/pGDP govcur/gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDInetinflow -0.018 0.014 0.011*** 0.028***
(0.012) (0.033) (0.004) (0.008)
FDInetinflowlag 0.031 0.020*
(0.038) (0.011)
gov -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
pop -0.008 0.015 0.012 0.006* -0.006 -0.006
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007)
gdp 0.462*** 0.383*** 0.335*** 0.035** 0.010 0.027
(0.066) (0.104) (0.096) (0.016) (0.031) (0.031)
openness 0.055*** 0.166*** 0.147*** -0.030*** -0.090*** -0.093***
(0.016) (0.046) (0.043) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
polity2 -0.002 -0.002 0.001** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
war 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
depend 0.543*** 0.516*** -0.144*** -0.160***
(0.098) (0.108) (0.031) (0.034)
urban 0.001 0.000 -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
blackpremium 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 3675 2066 1993 3675 2066 1993
# Countries 163 120 123 163 120 123
R2 0.085 0.095 0.087 0.108 0.134 0.133
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.2: Net FDI inflow with OECD countries, country fixed effects estimation
Dependent variable pG/pGDP govcur/gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDInetinflow 0.013 0.032* 0.006** 0.016***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.003) (0.005)
FDInetinflowlag 0.086*** 0.006
(0.025) (0.007)
gov -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.001** -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pop 0.139 -0.780*** -0.810*** 0.070** 0.200*** 0.236***
(0.133) (0.164) (0.176) (0.028) (0.035) (0.036)
gdp -0.253 0.906*** 0.931*** -0.108*** -0.305*** -0.340***
(0.174) (0.253) (0.270) (0.037) (0.049) (0.050)
openness -0.050* -0.102 -0.124 -0.017 -0.072*** -0.058**
(0.030) (0.076) (0.077) (0.011) (0.024) (0.023)
polity2 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
war 0.018** 0.009 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002)
depend -0.103 -0.128 0.013 0.017
(0.143) (0.144) (0.029) (0.030)
urban 0.005*** 0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
blackpremium -0.210* -0.191* 0.021** 0.018**
(0.121) (0.112) (0.008) (0.008)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 816 577 561 816 577 561
# Countries 30 26 26 30 26 26
R2 0.340 0.389 0.392 0.522 0.511 0.507
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.3: Capital account with full sample, country fixed effects estimation
Dependent variable pG/pGDP govcur/gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA 0.646*** 0.939*** -0.179*** -0.170**
(0.224) (0.319) (0.054) (0.069)
CAlag 0.951*** -0.154**
(0.319) (0.076)
gov -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
pop -0.024 -0.004 0.005 0.019*** 0.007 0.002
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
gdp 0.543*** 0.534*** 0.436*** 0.001 -0.041 -0.009
(0.071) (0.111) (0.104) (0.019) (0.036) (0.035)
openness 0.060*** 0.170*** 0.150*** -0.033*** -0.088*** -0.093***
(0.016) (0.044) (0.041) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
polity2 -0.002 -0.002 0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
war 0.007** 0.007** 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
depend 0.513*** 0.488*** -0.157*** -0.164***
(0.102) (0.111) (0.032) (0.034)
urban 0.002 0.001 -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
blackpremium 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 3768 2093 2020 3768 2093 2020
# Countries 165 121 123 165 121 123
R2 0.086 0.096 0.088 0.110 0.135 0.135
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.4: Capital account with OECD countries, country fixed effects estimation
Dependent variable pG/pGDP govcur/gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA 0.394** 0.532*** -0.274*** -0.198***
(0.161) (0.138) (0.051) (0.051)
CAlag 0.517*** -0.177***
(0.146) (0.057)
gov -0.017*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.001** -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pop 0.175 -0.790*** -0.804*** 0.078*** 0.227*** 0.250***
(0.138) (0.184) (0.197) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035)
gdp -0.281 0.957*** 0.949*** -0.137*** -0.358*** -0.372***
(0.182) (0.284) (0.296) (0.036) (0.050) (0.050)
openness -0.058* -0.119 -0.146* -0.015 -0.060*** -0.051**
(0.030) (0.078) (0.079) (0.010) (0.023) (0.022)
polity2 0.008*** 0.008** 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
war 0.006 0.006 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002)
depend -0.147 -0.183 0.018 0.020
(0.144) (0.145) (0.029) (0.029)
urban 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
blackpremium -0.214* -0.202* 0.021** 0.019**
(0.121) (0.115) (0.009) (0.008)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 813 574 558 813 574 558
# Countries 30 26 26 30 26 26
R2 0.341 0.365 0.367 0.535 0.518 0.515
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.5: Trade liberalization (Trade Freedom index) with full sample, country fixed
effects estimation
Dependent variable pG/pGDP govcur/gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tradefreedom -0.227* -0.230* -0.018 -0.021
(0.128) (0.131) (0.016) (0.017)
tradefreedomlag -0.138 0.006
(0.144) (0.018)
gov -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.001* -0.001 -0.002**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pop -0.107** -0.059 -0.079* 0.036* 0.052** 0.078***
(0.045) (0.037) (0.042) (0.019) (0.026) (0.030)
gdp 0.159 -0.010 0.050 0.038 -0.043 -0.080
(0.125) (0.148) (0.153) (0.045) (0.060) (0.067)
openness -0.224 -0.299* -0.164 -0.022 -0.032* -0.028
(0.145) (0.175) (0.180) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
polity2 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
war -0.000 -0.002 -0.005** -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
depend 0.111 0.029 0.204** 0.220**
(0.118) (0.112) (0.088) (0.107)
urban -0.007* -0.005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 1328 1158 1023 1328 1158 1023
# Countries 154 142 142 154 142 142
R2 0.119 0.131 0.065 0.139 0.085 0.092
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.6: Trade liberalization (Trade Freedom index) with OECD countries, country
fixed effects estimation
Dependent variable pG/pGDP govcur/gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tradefreedom 0.128** 0.142*** -0.055 -0.031
(0.056) (0.050) (0.039) (0.038)
tradefreedomlag 0.136** -0.096*
(0.056) (0.052)
gov -0.008** -0.007* -0.006 -0.004** -0.003 -0.007***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
pop 1.456*** 1.783*** 1.583*** 0.018 -0.279 -0.147
(0.242) (0.412) (0.461) (0.073) (0.182) (0.193)
gdp -1.066*** -1.391*** -1.189*** -0.034 0.281* 0.175
(0.233) (0.367) (0.400) (0.073) (0.168) (0.168)
openness -0.014 0.002 0.026 0.003 -0.002 0.009
(0.019) (0.031) (0.027) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022)
polity2 0.006 0.011 0.007* 0.005
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005)
war 0.014 0.015 -0.010** -0.010**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
depend 0.076 0.085 0.098 0.137
(0.210) (0.228) (0.107) (0.126)
urban 0.005*** 0.004** 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 290 245 217 290 245 217
# Countries 30 28 28 30 28 28
R2 0.714 0.453 0.419 0.630 0.496 0.536
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.7: Trade liberalization (tariff) with full sample, country fixed effects estimation
Dependent variable pG/pGDP govcur/gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tariff 0.075 0.043 0.014 0.034
(0.071) (0.075) (0.021) (0.021)
tarifflag 0.060 0.019
(0.091) (0.021)
gov -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
pop 0.066** 0.091*** 0.108** -0.006 -0.007 -0.008
(0.032) (0.034) (0.042) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
gdp 0.061 -0.038 -0.092 0.077* 0.057 0.067
(0.133) (0.164) (0.194) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045)
openness -0.151* -0.165* -0.109 -0.041*** -0.046*** -0.045***
(0.087) (0.099) (0.130) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
polity2 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
war -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
depend 0.179 0.184 0.010 0.039
(0.136) (0.179) (0.057) (0.060)
urban 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 1767 1528 1432 1767 1528 1432
# Countries 158 135 135 158 135 135
R2 0.068 0.080 0.070 0.200 0.216 0.196
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.8: Trade liberalization (tariff) with OECD countries, country fixed effects esti-
mation
Dependent variable pG/pGDP govcur/gov
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tariff 0.212 0.224 0.019 0.016
(0.267) (0.382) (0.053) (0.079)
tarifflag 0.542** -0.008
(0.234) (0.078)
gov -0.022*** -0.017** -0.021** 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
pop 0.649*** 0.374 0.777** 0.092* 0.042 0.074
(0.211) (0.465) (0.379) (0.054) (0.084) (0.085)
gdp -0.772*** -0.268 -0.703* -0.078 -0.039 -0.069
(0.243) (0.512) (0.374) (0.058) (0.098) (0.094)
openness -0.078 -0.106* -0.134* -0.007 -0.028 -0.012
(0.079) (0.061) (0.075) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
polity2 0.008 0.005 0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
war -0.020 -0.023 0.004 0.006
(0.013) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004)
depend -0.778 -0.252 -0.130 -0.086
(0.662) (0.382) (0.097) (0.099)
urban 0.010* 0.011** 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Obs. 217 194 181 217 194 181
# Countries 15 14 14 15 14 14
R2 0.492 0.459 0.594 0.589 0.578 0.553
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
4.4. APPENDIX 153
Table 4.9: Data and Sources
Variable Description Source
pG/pGDP Ratio between the price level of governments
and the price level of GDP (both price levels
are from Penn World Tables 6.2)
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
govcur/gov Government consumption share (in % of
GDP) measured in current prices relative
to the government consumption share mea-
sured in constant prices (both government
consumption shares are from Penn World
Tables 6.2)
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
FDInetinflow FDI inflow minus outflow (in 100 bn) from
International Financial Statistics
International Monetary Fund
CA Capital account (in 100 bn) from Interna-
tional Financial Statistics
International Monetary Fund
tradefreedom Based on trade weighted average tariff rates
and non-tariff barriers (in 100)
http://www.heritage.org/index/
Trade-Freedom.aspx
tariff Unweighted average import tariff rates (in
100)
http://econ.worldbank.org/
gdp real GDP (Laspeyeres method in 2000
prices) (in 10 bn) from Penn World Tables
6.2, lagged one period
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
pop total population (in 100 m) from Penn World
Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
gov share of government consumption to real
GDP (in %) from Penn World Tables 6.2
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
polity2 Composite Polity index ranging from -10
(hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated
democracy)
http://www.systemicpeace.org/
inscr/inscr.htm
depend Dependency ratio is the share of population
below 15 and beyond 64 to the population
between 15 and 64 from World Development
Indicators
World Development Indicators 2005,
World Bank
urban The share of total population living in urban
areas from World Development Indicators
World Development Indicators 2005,
World Bank
war ACTOTAL from Major Episodes of Political
Violence (MEPV) and conflict regions, range
from 0 (no violence) to 10
http://www.systemicpeace.org/
warlist.htm
openness log-share of export plus import to real GDP
(in %) from Penn World Tables 6.2, lagged
one period
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
blackpremium Black market premium (in ‰) from Devel-
opment Research Institute, NYU
www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/
dataset/macro_time_series_8_
2005.xls

5Summary
The link between globalization and the public sector remains an interesting and complex
issue which has not ceased to be of immediate concern. The purpose of this book was
to analyze the effect of globalization on government spending and to shed some light on
new channels how globalization may affect the size of governments. Chapter 1 provided
stylized facts about the growth and size of government spending and presented important
theoretical and empirical contributions about the relationship between openness and gov-
ernment size of a country. It also highlighted how the chapters of this book are related
to the literature and stressed their contribution.
Chapter 2 analyzed the effect of trade liberalization on optimal public good provision in
a general equilibrium model with two heterogeneous countries, tradable and non-tradable
industries in the private sector, and a public sector producing a consumption good. The
model accounted for endogenous firm entry in the private sector and ‘love of variety’ in
consumer preferences. It was shown that an important cost of the public sector is its
negative effect on the equilibrium number of firms. However, due to the access to foreign
varieties, an increase in public spending reduces the diversity of varieties available to
consumers relatively less in open economies than in closed ones. Hence, the national costs
of public good provision in terms of welfare are lower, the more a country is integrated into
the world market. It was shown that, other things equal, high love of variety implies high
costs of public good provision. That is why optimal public good provision decreases in the
measure for love of variety. In return, the effect of trade liberalization on optimal public
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good provision increases if consumer have high love of variety. As for the smaller country
the gains from new varieties through trade are larger, the costs of public production are
lower and hence the positive effect of openness on optimal public good provision stronger.
Moreover, it was demonstrated that unilateral decisions on public production results in
overprovision of the public good as governments do not take the negative externality into
account. Hence, aggregate welfare maximization does require cooperation between the
governments. Finally, public expansion can have distortionary effects on relative factor
prices. Accounting for a labor intensive public sector, additionally to the ‘crowding out
of firms’-effect, public expansion causes a positive terms of trade effect.
The aim of Chapter 3 was to investigate empirically the effect of import diversity
on government consumption and to provide evidence for the love of variety effect on
government spending described in Chapter 2. The empirical investigation was based on a
panel data for OECD and non-OECD countries over a time period from 1964 to 2000. It
was found that the government consumption (as a share of GDP) is positively associated
with the diversity of imported products, particularly when these goods are classified as
differentiated. In addition, there is some evidence that the positive effect of the range of
imported products on government consumption is decreasing in home market size. In sum,
the evidence confirms the hypotheses derived from the theoretical analysis in Chapter 2
pretty well.
Chapter 3 did not intend to test the different existing channels against each other but
intended to provide evidence for the love of variety effect on government spending. In
view of Chapter 2, an interesting question to resolve would be to examine what fraction
of the effect of trade openness on government size is explained by the love of variety
effect compared to the fraction explained by the terms of trade effect. The theoretical
model in Chapter 2 has revealed a way to separate the two explanations. We have seen
that when the public sector crowds out the extensive margin of production (number of
firms), the love of variety effect plays an important role. In contrast, a crowding out of
the intensive margin of production (output per firm) induces the terms of trade effect.
Therefore, empirical investigations should distinguish between the extensive and intensive
margin of trade. There is a growing empirical trade literature which tries to separate the
extensive and intensive margin of trade flows. The discussion about the nexus between
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openness and government size should jump on this bandwagon.
The contribution of Chapter 4 was to distinguish between the real and nominal gov-
ernment share. This chapter investigated how capital market integration and trade lib-
eralization affect the aforementioned ratio between the two government shares and the
relative price level of public goods relative to private goods. The real share is assumed to
be constant to account for price inelastic demand. It is shown that an inflow of capital
increases the relative wage rate, pushing up the costs in the labor intensive public sector
relatively more than in the private sector. This can explain an increase in the expendi-
ture shares (relative to GDP) for public consumption goods. Capital outflow has exactly
opposite effects. Trade liberalization may also increase the relative price level and expen-
diture shares of public goods through raising average productivity in the private sector
and inducing a Baumol and Balassa-Samuelson effect. Chapter 4 also provided some em-
pirical investigations for a large country sample and separately for OECD countries. The
ratio between the nominal and real government share is mostly positively associated with
net inflow of foreign direct investment. This is in line with the model’s predictions. The
results for trade liberalization are mixed. For OECD countries there is some evidence
that trade liberalization has a positive effect on the price level of governments (relative
to price level of GDP).
An important aspect that was only briefly mentioned in the introduction and not
analyzed in this book is, how globalization affects the redistributive role of governments
and the amount of social security payments. A substantial part of government spending
is transfer payments. Also, the main catalyst for the discussion how openness affects
government - the seminal work by Rodrik (1998) - had an explanation more appropriate
for the social security part of government spending. Nevertheless, the focus in this book
was on the role of governments as a provider of public goods. This is the budget compo-
nent for which the investigated channels and explanations in the Chapters 2-4 are most
appropriate.
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